How do armed rebellions begin? Scholars often probe the “origins” and “onset” of internal conflict, but rarely scrutinize how violence initially emerges. This study does so by examining the inception of all rebel groups that formed in Uganda since 1986. It focuses in particular on understanding why only some nascent groups become viable, while others fail too early to make an imprint on the historical record and thus remain omitted from scholarly analyses. By comparing the initial stages of rebellion for groups that become viable with those of groups that fail early, this project offers a rare opportunity to examine how armed conflict begins and how it sometimes ends before large-scale violence occurs. The project highlights the importance of information in the initial trajectories of aspiring rebels. While most existing work envisions rebel initiation as a collective action problem, I posit that in fact insurgencies often begin as small, vulnerable, clandestine groups whose primary challenge is to avoid information leaks to the government. Several arguments at the core of the dissertation follow from this conceptualization of incipient rebellion. First, in weak states – those with minimal institutional penetration and thus minimal monitoring of their territory beyond the capital – barriers to entry for clandestine groups are low and therefore rebel formation will occur more commonly and with less spatial predictability than several dominant theories of conflict initiation suggest. Second, the decisions of civilians who live near newly-formed rebel groups, many of who could provide information about nascent rebels to the government, are critical in determining whether nascent groups survive. Civilians make decisions about whether to provide information to the government about incipient rebels based primarily on information they receive from other civilians; thus, variation in the structure of civilian information networks importantly influences incipient rebels’ chances for becoming viable. By showing a link between ethnicity and information networks, the dissertation advances a new understanding of how ethnicity can influence conflict onset. A third argument calls attention to the importance of domestic intelligence institutions in allowing states to access local information networks, deterring the initiation of new rebel groups. / Government

published_or_final_version / History / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis offers a revaluation of the role played by Akramiya and Islam in the events of 13 May 2005 in Andijan. Using Scott's concept of the hidden transcript coupled with a Marxist analysis of the Uzbek state, this thesis suggests that the insistence on public conformity demanded by the state's secular nationalist project, in the context of a political economy of exploitation, creates dissonance with regards to the meaning of Islam among popular classes. Akramiya proposed a vision of Islam in tune with notions of moral economy. The protest constituted the public affirmation of an emerging intersection between class-based and religious identities. The temerity of the protestors when faced with increasing levels of violence was a reaction to the psychological effects of domination and the emotions associated with participation in an open act of defiance within the context of oppressive authoritarian rule.

This thesis examines the influences on and evolution of the Irish Republican Army‘s guerrilla war strategy between 1917 and 1921. Utilizing newspapers, government documents, and memoirs of participants, this study highlights the role of propaganda and political concerns in waging an insurgency. It argues that while tactical innovation took place in the field, IRA General Headquarters imposed policy and directed the conflict with a concern for the political results of military action. While implementing strategies necessary to effective conflict of the war, this Headquarters staff was unable to reconcile a disjointed and overburdened command structure, leading its disintegration after the conflict.

In 1992, Algeria's government held its first ever democratic elections. With the Front Islamique du Salut poised to win the elections overwhelmingly, the Algerian military cancelled the democratic process and imposed military rule. Soon afterward, Algeria plunged into a civil war that claimed upward of 100,000 lives. Despite very significant popular support for the Islamist insurgency aiming to violently overthrow the Algerian government, the insurgency ultimately failed. Why? This paper will argue that while structural and actor-oriented approaches to understanding revolution are certainly important, they focus inadequate attention on contingencies that arise during a conflict, which in turn, affect structural and actor-oriented variables. Furthermore, a process-level approach enables us to factor in actor-oriented and structural variables dynamically, and is necessary to understanding the ultimate failure of the Islamist insurgency in Algeria.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 263-282).

Thesis (M.A. (Human Rights))--Mahidol University, 2003.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Roberts, Nancy. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on 13 July 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, charisma, charismatic, radicalism, terrorism, insurgencies, radical social movements, cohesion, power structure, flux, control, communion, stability, Islam, Islamic. Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-145). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Lund, Sweden, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-282) and index.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-81). Also available online.