published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning

In Latin America, a social revolution is statistically far more likely to fail than to succeed. Yet there is little understanding as to the contributory factors of revolutionary failure or success. Many researchers look for commonalities by examining multiple revolutions across the region or even around the globe and throughout large periods of time, but their analysis frequently lacks commonality in the underlying conditions of the insurgencies. The case of Peru, however, provides a unique opportunity to examine multiple revolutions in the fairly homogenous environment of one state during a short and constrained timeframe of thirty years. In the history of the Republic of Peru, there have been only four social revolutions. These insurgencies were contained within two discreet periods of time: the MIR and ELN in the 1960’s, and Shining Path and MRTA in the 1980’s to 1990’s. While each of these revolutions experienced varying levels of success, each ultimately failed due, in no small part, to a particular set of structural and socioeconomic variables. / text

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / The United States is embarking on a course of designing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to protect the US and her citizenry against ballistic missile attacks. The BMDS will need a Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) organization/system to support military and national decision makers in times of crisis. The C2BMC must also be able to react quickly once a missile event has occurred. This thesis will cover the doctrinal issues with merging Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the National Missile Warning System into one system, how the Unified Command Plan affects missile defense efforts, the lessons learned from Desert Storm, and presents alternative chains of command that might allow the BMDS to engage threat missiles in a timely and efficient manner. Preliminary findings indicate that a 'flattened' chain of command for missile defense forces seems to be a positive starting point for the initial deployment of the BMDS. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost. To achieve US objectives in Iraq it is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadist elements as well. This thesis uses a social mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) describing the group's political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames and repertoires of action. The result of this analysis shows an internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-specific political or social strengths. This thesis applies this knowledge to established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort. This relational analysis views the conflict through a six dimensional framework to examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions. We then examine the current status of the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq. Trend-analysis tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern and areas of positive movement. Based on the nature of AQI and the current trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare through a thorough analysis of the nature and strategies of insurgency and a comparative examination of the current strategic approaches to counterinsurgency warfare. Toward this end, a systems model approach, which views insurgent organizations as open systems, is adapted to the insurgent environment. Popular support, external support, and insurgent organization are determined as the major variables of the insurgency system. The evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and its implementation in the Algerian rebellion is examined under the light of the major variables of the system and strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. After an analysis of the F.L.N. tactics and French countermeasures, three important propositions are offered: First, popular support is the primary condition for the success of the insurgent organization; second, political, social, economic, and administrative factors have a primacy over military factors; and, third, domestic factors have a primacy over external factors in the outcome of a rebellion.

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model's relevance for strategic use in other regions.

This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of grand strategy. Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the "Instrument-Element Model" because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which belligerents contend with each other. Each belligerent is modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the military. Belligerents affect each other using the instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military force, economic leverage, and this thesis argues, ethical principles. This thesis argues that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the government or the military. The Instrument-Element Model is tested and illustrated by an analysis of three wars in which a successful grand strategy focused on each of the three elements: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (focusing on the Military), the 1999 Kosovo War (focusing on the Government) and the Algerian Revolution (focusing on the People). This thesis also considers how to apply the Instrument-Model to terrorist and insurgent groups, and concludes with three recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically.

In the waning days of apartheid, an operative of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of South Africa’s most powerful dissident organization the African National Congress, returned to his home community of N’wamitwa after over a decade in exile. His mission was to spark a people’s war, an imported form of revolutionary warfare developed by Mao Zedong and perfected by the North Vietnamese in their revolutionary struggles. In this thesis I examine the political context in which the ANC chose to adopt the strategy and how it was imported into South Africa. The later chapters of this thesis use N’wamitwa as a case study examining how a people’s war is successfully implemented on the ground. I argue that one can see the three phases of a people’s war as articulated by Mao play out in N’wamitwa between the years 1989 to 1994 This piece was largely written and researched using oral testimony from nine former members of the MK in N’wamitwa and thus can also be seen as a collection of personal histories of the South African Freedom Struggle. / Graduate

This paper explains how the Islamic State grew rapidly, answering a question of "what is" the Islamic State? A review of existing literature on simulation modeling of insurgencies identifies several gaps, as existing theories of non-state actors and insurgencies are inadequate to explain ISIS's performance. Additionally, there are few mathematical simulation models of insurgent behavior that can reproduce ISIS results. Finally, what models exist are not detailed enough either to conduct detailed experiments testing proposed explanations of ISIS, or evaluate policy responses aimed at containing or mitigating ISIS. The paper offers several contributions. First it proposes a dynamic hypothesis that the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, a new form of actor that differs from traditional non- state actors and insurgencies. Propositions are constructed and presented as an overall theory of emerging-state actor behavior. These propositions are then simulated as experiments within a detailed model parameterized with conditions very similar to what ISIS faced in Iraq and Syria 2013. The model is then run from 2013-2020, and experiment results confirm evidence of emerging- state actor behavior and allow refinement of model boundary assumptions. Second, an initial set of intervention policies are tested in a variety of conditions: best case, operationally constrained, isolated, combined, and at different timing intervals. Analysis of the results yields key dynamic insights. These insights aid policy makers in understanding the challenges posed by emerging state actors. Finally, the detailed simulation model used to test the propositions and policy analysis, including a novel approach to combat simulation with endogenous geospatial feedback, is provided in full detail in two Appendices. Appendix A provides a sector-by-sector view of model structure and equations. Appendix B provides more discussion, analysis and sources used to develop model structure, establish parameter values and determine equations for the simulation. Due to length and other considerations, Appendix B is available only upon request. The detailed simulation model can be used to refine non-state actor theories (configured for insurgencies, emerging-state actors, or other scenarios). The model can be loaded with other scenarios to simulate other actors in other geospatial terrain: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the returning Taliban in Afghanistan, etc. Keywords: ISIS, ISIL, DAESH, insurgency, conflict, security, stability, non-state actor, emerging- state actor, combat simulator, geospatial, national security.

This paper explains how the Islamic State grew rapidly, answering a question of "what is" the Islamic State? A review of existing literature on simulation modeling of insurgencies identifies several gaps, as existing theories of non-state actors and insurgencies are inadequate to explain ISIS's performance. Additionally, there are few mathematical simulation models of insurgent behavior that can reproduce ISIS results. Finally, what models exist are not detailed enough either to conduct detailed experiments testing proposed explanations of ISIS, or evaluate policy responses aimed at containing or mitigating ISIS. The paper offers several contributions. First it proposes a dynamic hypothesis that the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, a new form of actor that differs from traditional non- state actors and insurgencies. Propositions are constructed and presented as an overall theory of emerging-state actor behavior. These propositions are then simulated as experiments within a detailed model parameterized with conditions very similar to what ISIS faced in Iraq and Syria 2013. The model is then run from 2013-2020, and experiment results confirm evidence of emerging- state actor behavior and allow refinement of model boundary assumptions. Second, an initial set of intervention policies are tested in a variety of conditions: best case, operationally constrained, isolated, combined, and at different timing intervals. Analysis of the results yields key dynamic insights. These insights aid policy makers in understanding the challenges posed by emerging state actors. Finally, the detailed simulation model used to test the propositions and policy analysis, including a novel approach to combat simulation with endogenous geospatial feedback, is provided in full detail in two Appendices. Appendix A provides a sector-by-sector view of model structure and equations. Appendix B provides more discussion, analysis and sources used to develop model structure, establish parameter values and determine equations for the simulation. Due to length and other considerations, Appendix B is available only upon request. The detailed simulation model can be used to refine non-state actor theories (configured for insurgencies, emerging-state actors, or other scenarios). The model can be loaded with other scenarios to simulate other actors in other geospatial terrain: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the returning Taliban in Afghanistan, etc. Keywords: ISIS, ISIL, DAESH, insurgency, conflict, security, stability, non-state actor, emerging- state actor, combat simulator, geospatial, national security.