University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of History

"Audience costs" models of international relations suggest a purely informational role for domestic politics in conflict settings. Here, domestic politics serve as a rich signal of belligerents' true intentions, allowing them to more quickly resolve disagreements, decreasing the likelihood and duration of war. But if belligerents can have different beliefs about publicly available information, then domestic politics might confuse rather than clarify conflict situations, increasing the likelihood and duration of war. I present empirical evidence of conventional "audience costs" models' shortcomings in explaining the dynamics of the US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and the response of Iraqi insurgents to those efforts. I then develop a formal model to show how differences in beliefs between insurgents and counterinsurgents about domestic political audiences in Iraq may have contributed to the prolonged nature of the conflict. I argue that the underlying cause of the conflict's duration is disagreement between belligerents about whether and how Iraqi civilians contribute to a successful counterinsurgency, leading belligerents to disagree not only before fighting about who is likely to win, but during fighting about who is actually winning. / text

In his 2005 work entitled The Marketing of Rebellion , author Clifford Bob explores the phenomenon of political marketing and its use by insurgent groups struggling to achieve their aims, most often against a central government opposed to their platform. In his book, Bob makes two central arguments: that courting support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is central to the success of insurgent groups; and that support is given to insurgent groups from NGOs not because of need, but rather because of political marketing techniques that insurgent groups use to attract that support. Thus, a successful and savvy insurgent group or opposition movement must employ sophisticated political marketing techniques in order to acquire the support they seek, and thus succeed in their struggle. / Using Bob's framework as a model, this paper examines the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) and their use of political marketing techniques, largely in the period of 2001-2006. In existence since 1965, the MeK is Iran's largest opposition group, having been formed to oppose the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi, and currently opposed to the clerical regime in Tehran. The bulk of the group has been based in Iraq since 1986, and has been confined to their main base, Camp Ashraf, since the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Ba'ath regime in Iraq in 2003. The MeK aggressively uses political marketing to promote their cause and attract support, and thus the paper examines their strategies, discusses characteristics of the MeK, and ultimately offers a series of explanations as to the outcome of their efforts as they stand in 2006.

<p>This dissertation examines the history of the military institutions of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The kingdoms emerged after years of war-fighting, and the capacity to wage war remained central to state formation in the Hellenistic Age (323-31 B.C.). The creation of institutions and recruitment of populations sufficient to field large armies took a great deal more time and continual effort than has generally been imagined. By bringing documentary evidence into contact with the meta-narratives of the Hellenistic period, and by addressing each of the major powers of the Hellenistic world, this project demonstrates the contingencies and complexities within the kingdoms and their armies. In so doing, it offers both a fresh perspective on the peoples and polities that inhabited the Hellenistic world after Alexander and a much-revised narrative of the process by which Alexander's successors built kingdoms and waged war. Inheritors of extensive political and military traditions, they were forced to reshape them in their new and volatile context, eventually establishing large and powerful kingdoms and armies that dominated the eastern Mediterranean and Near East for over one hundred years. </p><p>The early model of Hellenistic kingship was based on military successes and martial valor. It found a complement in the burgeoning mercenary market of the early Hellenistic period, which allowed Alexander's generals to field massive armies without relying on complex military institutions for recruitment and mobilization. As years of continual warfare stressed populations and war chests, several new kings, crowned in the era of war, sought to end their reliance on mercenaries by developing core territories, settling soldiers, and constructing powerful military institutions. These institutions did not develop seamlessly or quickly, and often functioned awkwardly in many of the locales that had recently come under Macedonian rule, whether in the cities of Syria or along the Nile valley in Egypt. My project involves several detailed studies of military mobilization during the Hellenistic period, as a way to analyze the structures and evaluate the successes of the kingdoms' respective military institutions. </p><p>I employ methodologies from both history and classical studies, moving between technical work with papyrological, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence, close reading of ancient texts, and comparative analysis of narrative and documentary texts, while drawing upon the large historiographies of each of the largest kingdoms. One of this dissertation's contributions is in making comparisons between these spaces and across time, when much of Hellenistic history has trended toward ever-greater partition. The papyrological material, in particular, permits the greatest access into both the social activities of individuals and the particular elements of human, legal, and customary infrastructure within a Hellenistic state, though it has rarely been used outside of particularly Ptolemaic histories. My dissertation argues against Egyptian exceptionalism, and offers a Hellenistic history drawn from the full array of available sources. Part of the narrative of Egyptian exceptionalism developed from the perception that it was in some sense less traditionally Macedonian than the other two kingdoms. A careful reading of the evidence indicates instead that in the violent and multi-polar world of the Hellenistic age, military identity was very flexible, and had been since the time of Alexander. Additionally, the strict adherence of the other kingdoms to the Macedonian way of war ended in defeat at the hands of the Romans, while the Ptolemies in Egypt innovated counterinsurgent activities that preserved their power in the wealthiest region of the Mediterranean.</p> / Dissertation

Access to abstract restricted until May 2015. / Access to thesis restricted until May 2015. / Department of Political Science

Lasting peace in Sudan would reverberate throughout Africa, the Arab world, and globally. But signing a historic peace agreement will not guarantee successful post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan. Several critical openings must follow-with expanded roles for the Sudanese people and their international partners. Sudanese fighters from both sides will need to integrate into joint military units that defend Sudan's borders and gain capacity to deal with rogue elements. Sudanese politicians must expand the opportunities for fresh and excluded voices to participate in Sudan's governing structures (north and south, national, regional, and local) and its political processes. Benchmarks against which international assistance is measured could help guarantee this need, as would an inclusive constitutional drafting process. Sustained economic assistance and forward-learning decisions on reducing Sudan's debt burden will help move Sudan on the path to economic growth. At the same time, international pressure must be brought to bear on the Sudanese to ensure that revenue streams, particularly oil and are handled transparently and for the benefit of Sudan's people, not its leaders. Uncertainty, hatred and mistrust run deep within Sudan. Donors must focus on building connections among the Sudanese and bringing communities together around common goals. The past focus on north-south issues should give way to more inclusive programs that begin to address the political and economical marginalization that is fuelling discontent and conflict in Sudan's peripheral regions. Lasting peace will require not just changing attitudes within Sudan, but shifting outside practices to better confront the enormous challenges that will complicate reconstruction efforts. Sudan's coming peace presents an opportunity to move beyond almost forty years of intrastate war. The United State, the United Nations, African Union, and other friends of Sudan should now consolidate and capitalize on this opportunity. / Thesis (M.A. (Peace Studies and International Relations) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2005

This thesis considers Michael Ignatieff’s theory regarding ethnic conflict and applies Afghanistan as a case study. Ignatieff correlates the outbreak of ethnic violence to the breakdown of state government which creates societal anarchy and war. Ignatieff argues that ethnic relations can improve through the creation of democratic institutions. Afghanistan represents a model empirical case study to explore the central tenets of the Ignatieff thesis. Ignatieff’s argument is critically analyzed by assessing the viability of transplanting democratic institutions into Afghanistan. According to democratic theory a successful democracy requires a strong economy, a vibrant civil society, an advantageous institutional history and a positive security and geopolitical environment. Based on these five key variables it is reasonable to conclude that Afghanistan is not predisposed to pluralistic governance. Such analysis highlights the limitations of Ignatieff’s thesis as his theory is only relevant to those post-conflict societies that possess the requisite preconditions for democracy.

This dissertation seeks to analyse the upsurge of insurgent violence in the North Caucasus following the end of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 2009. By looking at the development of radical Islam and the impact of the Chechen spillover in the region, this research suggests that these factors should be analysed and contextualized in each republic. By comparing the cases of Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate the importance of vendetta, criminal activity, religious repression and corruption as local factors that contribute to the increase of violence. By focusing on the case of Dagestan, the author proposes a political ethnographic approach to study the mechanisms and details of religious repression and corruption in everyday life. This analysis permits us to map out the different pathways towards the participation in insurgent groups in Dagestan. By doing so, it demonstrates that one can identify three different generations of insurgent fighters in Dagestan. This dissertation demonstrates that the role of Salafist ideology is often marginal in the early stages of the process of violent radicalisation, and slowly gains importance as the involvement in violence increases. The emphasis should be placed on vengeance and religious repression as crucial triggering factors as they provoke a cognitive opening for young people in Dagestan to engage in violence.

<p>Pro-urban bias in policy is often seen as a common phenomenon in the developing world. Empirical reality though is much more varied. Many governments actively support agricultural producers and rural citizens, even at early stages of development. In addition, the binary distinction between urban and rural bias in policy aggregates over important sub-national variation in the distributive impact of government policies. This dissertation extends the research frontier by analyzing the political roots underlying spatial bias in policy using new theoretical and empirical approaches. First, this dissertation develops a theory that identifies conditions under which politicians will institute pro-urban or pro-rural policies, by considering the threat of a rural insurgency. Second, I argue that elections in rural majority societies can empower citizens in the rural periphery. Competitive elections and high rural turnout induce governments to supply favorable policies to the rural sector as a whole and salient regions in particular. To test the effect of the threat of rural violence, I use new cross-national data on net taxation in the agricultural sector. Data on fiscal transfers and the sub-national effects of agricultural pricing policies in Indonesian districts provide additional evidence for the first hypothesis. To test the effect of elections on urban bias, I exploit a natural experiment from the Indonesian context. Last, I analyze the proliferation of districts in Indonesia from 2001 to 2009, with important implications for future fiscal transfers, and show the process is largely driven by local elite competition within and between districts.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis considers Michael Ignatieff’s theory regarding ethnic conflict and applies Afghanistan as a case study. Ignatieff correlates the outbreak of ethnic violence to the breakdown of state government which creates societal anarchy and war. Ignatieff argues that ethnic relations can improve through the creation of democratic institutions. Afghanistan represents a model empirical case study to explore the central tenets of the Ignatieff thesis. Ignatieff’s argument is critically analyzed by assessing the viability of transplanting democratic institutions into Afghanistan. According to democratic theory a successful democracy requires a strong economy, a vibrant civil society, an advantageous institutional history and a positive security and geopolitical environment. Based on these five key variables it is reasonable to conclude that Afghanistan is not predisposed to pluralistic governance. Such analysis highlights the limitations of Ignatieff’s thesis as his theory is only relevant to those post-conflict societies that possess the requisite preconditions for democracy.