Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2002. / Extra t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Creighton University, 2009. / Bluebrary (DSpace). Title from title screen (viewed Mar. 11, 2010). Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-53).

Disputats. Rheinische Friedrick-Wilhelms-Universität, 2002. / Haves kun i elektronisk udg.

Thesis (doctoral)--Helsinki School of Economics, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Global trade and increasing food demand are important drivers of impacts in the water system across scales. This study coupled a spatially-explicit physical account of trade between Brazilian municipalities with a water footprint accounting model, in order to analyse water footprints of Brazilian soy produced for domestic and international consumption, and assess their relevance in the context of water scarcity and competing demands for water resources. The water footprints of Brazilian soy production were assessed for different levels of spatial-explicitness for comparison. The Swedish water footprints were analysed within this framework to illustrate the use of the methodology. As a result, temporal and geographical patterns of variability of water the footprints related to Brazilian soy production, attributed to different consumers in the global market, were identified. The study found the methodology to unveil important processes connected to economic and trade drivers, as well as to variability in climate and production yields. It was found that important regional variability was not considered or fully understood when accounting for water footprints as a national aggregate. Opportunities for improvement and further research were also discussed.

It is generally accepted that the less developed nations have suffered a long run deterioration of their terms of trade, which represents an indirect transfer of income to the developed nations.1 If true, the gains from international trade are being unequally distributed and the less developed nations have a legitimate complaint. They are very concerned about their terms of trade on the international scene because their trade gains provide for skills required for modernization. Raul Prebisch2 cited the Latin American nations as a classic example in the deterioration of the terms of trade. Most of these nations export heavily in "primary commodities" and spend a large percent of their monies on imports. If these nations maintain a quasi-monopoly position in the marketing of the above items, then the writeer questions whether or not an unfavorable trade relationship does exist.

This dissertation consists of two essays in international trade and one essay in political economy. The first essay analyzes the role of firm-level and country-level reputation for quality in international transactions. It studies the entry and pricing strategies of high-quality and low-quality exporters when buyers cannot observe the quality of a product prior to purchase. In a steady-state industry equilibrium, country reputations are endogenously set by the quality of their exports, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria and low-quality traps. We show that export subsidies have a positive long-run effect on average quality, reputation and welfare in countries exporting low-quality goods. However, they have the opposite consequences in countries that export high-quality products. We present some evidence consistent with the model in the empirical pattern of US export prices. The second essay studies the choice between home country and host country financing for multinationals facing demand uncertainty. Three main channels are identified. The cost of capital depends on local financial development. A diversification channel arises from the ability of geographically diversified firms to generate more stable cash flows. By contrast, contagion risk may result in inefficient liquidations when firms raise funds exclusively on their home market. In particular, the model predicts that the prevalence of affiliate production and the share of parent finance should increase with the correlation of business cycles between the home and host markets. Moreover, exchange rate risk tilts the financing decision towards local debt. The third essay deals with the emergence of mass education. Using data from the last 150 years in 137 countries, we show that large investments in primary education systems tend to occur when countries face military rivals or threats from their neighbors. Interestingly, democratic transitions are negatively associated with education investments, although democratic political institutions magnify the positive effect of military rivalries. These empirical results are robust to a number of statistical concerns and hold when we instrument military rivalries with commodity prices or rivalries in a given country’s immediate neighborhood. We also present historical case studies, as well as a simple model, that are consistent with the econometric evidence. / Economics

This dissertation consists of three essays on Economic Growth. The first essay introduces directed technical change in a growth model with environmental constraints. The final good is produced from ”dirty” and ”clean” inputs. We show that when inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable growth can be achieved with temporary taxes/subsidies that redirect innovation towards clean inputs; and that delay in intervention is costly as it later necessitates a longer transition phase with slow growth. The second essay explains how unilateral environmental policies undertaken by a group of committed countries can ensure sustainable growth in the presence of directed technical change. There are two countries and two tradeable goods: a nonpolluting good and a polluting one, which, itself, is produced with a clean and a dirty input. Innovation can be targeted at the non-polluting sector, at clean or at dirty technologies. I show that sustainable growth can generally not be achieved by unilateral carbon taxes but can be achieved by a temporary unilateral combination of clean research subsidies and a tariff. I characterize the first best policy, the world optimal policy under the constraint that one country must be in laissez-faire, and the optimal policy from the viewpoint of a single country. The third essay shows that long-term relationships, which reduce the static costs associated with low contractibility, create dynamic inefficiencies. We consider the repeated interaction between final good producers and intermediate input suppliers, where the provision of the intermediate input is non contractible. Producer/supplier pairs can be good matches or bad matches (featuring lower productivity). We build a ”cooperative” equilibrium that features cooperation in good matches without any collusion amongst suppliers. We contrast this set-up with the Nash equilibrium where cooperation is precluded and a contractible setting. Every period one supplier has the opportunity to innovate. We show that innovations need to be larger to break up existing relationships in the cooperative case than in the contractible and Nash cases. The rate of innovation in the cooperative case is lower than in the contractible case, and can be lower than in the Nash case. / Economics

Wring the last decade documentary maritime fraud has caused considerable financial loss. The internationality of the crime and the difficulties experienced in the investigation and prosecution of offenders has caused serious concern both nationally and internationally. The aim of this research was to examine the system of international trade in terms of flow between institutions, and to develop a model of the system to identify areas of system failures in terms of actual or potential frauds. A database consisting of 101 fraud cases was compiled. Detailed examination of the cases identified features common to different classes of fraud. Systems approach was used to investigate the system with particular reference to Bills of Lading and method of payment under documentary credits. Conceptual mcdels of the three main contractual sub-systems i. e. carriage, insurance and payment, and of the total system were developed. The latter was used in conjunction with the database to pin-point the weak links both within the system and its imiediate envirormLent. Using a rwlti-disciplinary international Panel of Experts the Delphi technique, appropriately modified, was employed to test the hypothesised weak links, determine feasibility of implementing the recoamndations and seek information to assist in introducing measures to combat fraud. The analysis supports the hypothesised weak links identified in the environment and reccmuendations to strengthen them. Factors creating an environment for fraud are identified, along with reasons for not reporting the crime. Information required to combat fraud is identified. Prior to payment under documentary credits banks should carry out factual checks. The Bill of Lading is not a weak link but the people handling the document are unaware of its importance. Establishmnt of a Conmrcial Crim Research Unit specialising in international trade is recamrended, as is the development of an educational prograrmTo to increase conmercial awareness.

This thesis is composed of three essays. In the first essay I identify the effects of imposing a broad range of environmental regulations under different market conditions.. I compare four types of regulatory controls under Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Cournot Competition: Emission Standards, Design Standards, Concentration Standards, and Output Standards. I rank each of the standards in terms of firm profitability, industry output, abatement costs, and social welfare. I derive sufficient conditions for Design, or Concentration Standards, to dominate Emission Standards. I show how the different forms of regulation can raise industry profits by reducing the degree of inter-firm competition. Further, I show how environmental regulations can enhance competition and yield a "double dividend": higher Social Surplus and less pollution. In the second essay I extend the comparison of standards to an open country. I show how a country's choice of regulatory regime influences the level of environmental protection when governments care about the competitiveness of their industries. I show that the mode of regulation can create a "race to the bottom" if regulators behave strategically. I show that Emission Standards permit the race, as do Emission Charges. Design Standards, on the other hand, avoid the race altogether by breaking the link between environmental stringency and industrial competitiveness. Countries using Design Standards will always regulate emissions. This holds regardless of the environmental stance taken by competitor nations. If countries do not behave strategically, then Emission Standards and Emission Charges always dominate Design Standards. In the third essay I use the concept of home biases in traded goods, or "Border Effects", to rank industries and countries in terms of their openness to trade. I first confirm the presence border effects for individual sectors and individual industries among OECD countries for 1970 to 1985. I also examine whether country-specific border effects are determined by the sectoral composition of a country's production. I find limited evidence to support this. Rather, per capita incomes appear to be the most important factor. The conclusion I draw is that the level of development appears to be the prime factor in explaining the differences in country-specific border effects. What countries produce is of some importance. Therefore, we should see continued, though possibly slow, reductions in home biases as all countries continue to develop. This will partially determine the kind of environmental regulation used as well as their level.