Les systèmes d’échange de quotas d’émission (SEQEs) sont un instrument de régulation environnementale important et ont un rôle clef à jouer dans la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre pour l’atténuation du changement climatique. Cette thèse a une double orientation : les liaisons spatiales entre SEQEs d'une part et les échanges inter-temporels au sein d’un SEQE d'autre part.Les liaisons entre SEQEs peuvent aider à établir un futur cadre de politique climatique mondiale coût-efficient. Cependant, ces liaisons sont difficiles à mettre en place et à ce jour, peu nombreuses. Dans un premier temps, à l’aide d’un modèle simple et unifié et en se basant sur des expériences réelles de SEQEs, nous comparons différentes restrictions à l’échange comme éléments facilitants une transition vers le libre échange de quotas. Dans un deuxième temps, nous construisons un modèle qui décrit et caractérise analytiquement les effets et gains associés à des liaisons multilatérales sous incertitude. Ensuite, le modèle est calibré sur émissions historiques de différentes juridictions pour illustrer les déterminants des préférences de liaison.Les SEQEs sont sujets à de l’incertitude réglementaire, ce qui peut affaiblir leurs efficience coût dynamique et signal prix de long terme. La prévalence d’une telle incertitude peut être assimilée à une situation d’ambiguïté. Nous analysons alors les décisions inter-temporelles d’entités couvertes par un SEQE et averses à l’ambiguïté puis caractérisons les distorsions induites sur le fonctionnement du système. Nous discutons enfin de l’éclairage apportés par ces résultats en rapport aux observations faites dans les SEQEs existants. / Emissions Trading Systems (ETSs) are an important instsrument in regulating pollution and have a key role to play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate climate change. This dissertation has a twin focus: spatial linkages between ETSs at a point in time and intertemporal trading within an ETS.Linkages between ETSs are crucial for cost-effectiveness of the future climate policy architecture. Complete linkages, however, are difficult to agree and to date, few and far between. Here, our contribution is twofold. First, using a simple and unified model and drawing on experiences with real-world ETSs, we compare alternative trade restrictions on bilateral linkages in facilitating the transition to an unrestricted link. Second, we provide a general model to describe and analytically characterize the effects and gains from multilateral linkages under uncertainty. The model is then calibrated to historical emissions of real-world jurisdictions to illustrate the determinants of linkage preferences.ETSs are subject to regulatory uncertainty, which can disrupt dynamic cost-effectiveness and undermine their long-term price signal. The prevalence of regulatory uncertainty can be assimilated to a situation of ambiguity. Here, our contribution is to analyze regulated entities’ intertemporal decisions under ambiguity aversion, characterize the induced distortions in market functioning, and discuss how these can help explain observations from existing ETSs.

In my thesis, I address two important issues: (i) the creation of a price signal through the use of carbon markets (or cap-and-trade schemes) and (ii) the necessity to reach a global agreement on greenhouse gas emission reduction policies. It consists of three separate papers. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis emphasize theoretically and empirically the fact that achieving international cooperation on climate change is very difficult. Chapter 3 suggests that the global nature of the climate change problem and the design of climate agreements (i.e. the means available to reduce CO2 emissions) may explain this failure. Chapter 2 shows theoretically that asymmetric information between countries may exacerbate the free-rider problem. These two chapters also provide some possible solutions to the lack of international cooperation. To address the issue of information asymmetry, chapter 2 proposes the creation of institutions in charge of gathering and certifying countries' private information before environmental negotiations. If achieving international cooperation is still not possible, chapter 3 suggests that regional cooperation may supplement global treaties. Chapter 1 presents an example of such a regional agreement to reduce CO2 emissions. The EU emissions trading system is a cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate change. However, as it is highlighted in chapter 1, the design of such regional carbon markets really matters for their success in reducing carbon emissions. This chapter shows the interactions between intertemporal permit trading and the incentives of firms to undertake long-term investments in abatement technologies. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished