Developing microgrids is an attractive solution for integrating inverter-based resources (IBR) in the power system. Distributed control is a potential strategy for controlling such microgrids. However, a major challenge toward the proliferation of distributed control is cybersecurity. A false data injection (FDI) attack on a microgrid using distributed control can have severe impacts on the operation of the microgrid. Simultaneously, a microgrid needs to be protected from system faults to ensure the safe and reliable delivery of power to loads. However, the irregular response of IBRs to faults makes microgrid protection very challenging. A microgrid is also susceptible to faults inside IBR converters. These faults can remain undetected for a long time and shutdown an IBR. This dissertation first proposes a method that reconstructs communicated signals using their autocorrelation and crosscorrelation measurements to make distributed control more resilient against FDI attacks. Next, this dissertation proposes a protection scheme that works by classifying measured harmonic currents using support vector machines. Finally, this dissertation proposes a protection and fault-tolerant control strategy to diagnose and clear faults that are internal to IBRs. The proposed strategies are verified using time-domain simulation case studies using the PSCAD/EMTDC software package. / Doctor of Philosophy / Renewable energy resources, such as wind, solar, and geothermal, are interfaced with the grid using DC-to-AC power electronic converters, popularly known as inverters. These “inverterbased resources (IBR)” are mostly distributed and located near consumers. During outages, IBRs can be used to provide power to customers. This gives developers the idea of integrating IBRs in microgrids. A microgrid is a miniature grid that consists of IBRs and customers. A microgrid is normally connected to the grid but can disconnect from the grid and operate on its own. To run efficiently, a microgrid uses fast and reliable communication between IBRs to create a high-performance distributed control strategy. However, this creates cybersecurity concerns for microgrids. This dissertation proposes a cybersecure distributed control strategy to make sure microgrids can keep their advantages. This dissertation also proposes a protection method that relies on machine learning to clear short circuits in the microgrid. Finally, this dissertation proposes a strategy to diagnose failures inside IBRs and ride through them. The proposed solutions are verified using the industry-grade simulation software PSCAD/EMTDC.

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Rapidly growing Inverter- Based Resources (IBR) have different fault properties compared to Synchronous Generators (SG). Therefore, it is necessary to study the fault behavior of systems that contain different types of IBR and compare it to the conventional system responses in order to understand what steps should be taken to adapt conventional protection settings for new types of sources. For a two bus model, it is found out that sequence profiles in a system with one IBR are different from those observed in conventional system. Thermal and electrical limitations of the power electronics reduce the fault current from the IBR significantly, driving negative sequence current to small values compared to conventional sources. This is true for all studied types of IBR. Moreover, if IBR is connected to the grid through one line only, during Three Phase Fault (3hp) it is possible to lose synchronism with grid due to erroneous estimation of the grid angle through the Phase-Locked Loop (PLL). Verification of the obtained results is made through comparison to the Fault Recordings taken from the protection relays placed at substations. It is shown that for some faults simulation results can predict the behavior of symmetrical components in the network whereas for others they do not. To explain the latter behavior modifications to the sequence networks are proposed. / Snabbt växande inverterbaserade resurser (IBR) har olika felinmatningsegenskaper jämfört med synkrongeneratorer (SG). Därför är det nödvändigt att studera felbeteende hos system som innehåller olika typer av IBR och jämför det med konventionella källor för att kunna förstå vilka steg som ska göras för att anpassa konventionella skyddsinställningar för nya typer av källor. Under litteraturöversikten introduktion till det fast jordade systemet och dess speciella fall med isolerad transformatorjordning är klar. Kort introduktion till den studerade IBR och typer av simulerade fel görs också. För en tvåbussmodell har det visat sig att sekvensprofiler i ett system med en IBR skiljer sig från de som observerats i konventionella system. Termisk och elektrisk begränsningar i kraftelektroniska komponenter minskar felströmmen från IBR avsevärt och driver negativ sekvensström till små värden jämfört med konventionella källor. Detta gäller för alla studerade typer av IBR. Dessutom, om IBR är ansluten till nätet endast genom en linje, är det möjligt under trefasfel (3hp) att tappa synkronisering med nätet på grund av felaktig uppskattning av fasvinkeln genom styrsystemets faslåst slinga (PLL). Verifiering av de erhållna resultaten görs genom jämförelse med Fel Inspelningar från reläet placerade på transformatorstationer. Det visas att för vissa fel simuleringsresultat kan förutsäga symmetriska komponenters beteende i nätverket medan andra inte gör det. För att förklara de senare beteendena föreslås modifieringar i sekvensnätverket.