National discourse on cyberconflict has largely focused on defensive concerns, or protecting “critical infrastructure” from cyber threats. By contrast, the U.S. government’s employment of cyberattack is shrouded in secrecy and receives scant public attention. The seminal study on U.S. cyberattack, published by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009, noted that the clandestine nature of U.S. cyber operations hinders “widespread understanding and debate about the nature and implications of U.S. cyberattack.” This secrecy has contributed to a policy and legal framework for cyberattack that the NRC-NAS Report called “ill-formed, underdeveloped and highly uncertain.” Since the NRC-NAS Report was published, the U.S. government has signaled an unprecedented seriousness of purpose in addressing cyberconflict. It has marshaled its cyber resources under the leadership of a single “Cyber Command” and attempted to articulate formal “cyberstrategy.” Media reports from 2010-11 provide rare insight into cyberattack decision-making, and describe gradual development of policy and process for a specific type of cyberattack. The topic of U.S. cyberattack merits revisiting. This Report surveys the current international environment regarding cyberconflict, traces the development of “cyberstrategy” by the Executive Office of the President (EoP) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to make general points about the U.S. approach to cyberattack, and examines the statutory framework applicable to U.S. cyberattack in a narrow set of cases. This Report draws on news media reports about a series of cyberattack incidents to examine the dynamics of the cyberattack policy-making process, discusses recent attempts to address these issues, and summarizes lessons learned. / text

131 NÁZEV DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE V ANGLICKÉM JAZYCE The Criminalization of Cyberattacks on Information Systems ABSTRACT Cybercrime represents an increasing danger to human society. The main aim of this thesis is to find out which attacks on information systems pose a threat to the state and whether new technological trends represent a challenge for the current Czech legislation in the field of criminal law. The methodology varies across this thesis. The analytical method together with the synthesis is used to fulfil the aim. In some parts, an empirical approach is used. The introductory part of the thesis explains the key institutes in the field of cybercrime and international instruments for combating cybercrime. The most important document is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. The main part of the thesis is devoted to the difficulties of current Czech legislation in connection with cyberattacks. The final part of the thesis deals with current technological trends, such as Artificial Intelligence, Cloud Computing, Cryptocurrencies and the Internet of Things, which play an important role in the field of attacks on information systems. The current Czech legislation has responded to the growing tendency of cybercrime, and therefore new types of criminal offenses have been introduced. Artificial...

<p>Cyberterrorism kan ses som ett relativt nytt, komplicerat och diffust hot som uppenbarat sig till följd av en snabb IT-utveckling. För Försvarsmakten kan detta hot innebära en ny utmaning eftersom doktrinen som skall fungera som vägledning i verksamheten börjar bli inaktuell. De grundläggande förmågorna, som är en viktig del av doktrinen, ses som tankemässiga hjälpmedel för att Försvarsmakten skall kunna analysera, samordna och beskriva verksamheten. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur pass användbara de grundläggande förmågorna är som tankemässiga hjälpmedel när Försvarsmakten ställs mot ett hot som cyberterrorism. Detta görs genom en analys utifrån ett scenario där Försvarsmaktens ledningssystem utsätts för en cyberattack med ett efterföljande resonemang om tillämpningen av förmågorna. Resultatet utvisar att förmågorna är ett stort stöd i kontexten men att resonemanget kring tillämpningen kompliceras av att hotet äger rum i det virtuella rummet.</p> / <p>Cyber Terrorism can be seen as a relatively new, complex and diffuse threat that appeared due to rapid IT development. For the Armed Forces this threat can be a new challenge because the doctrine to serve as guidance in the work is becoming obsolete. The fundamental abilities, which are an important part of the doctrine, should be seen as thinking tools for the Armed Forces to analyze, coordinate and describe the business. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how useful the fundamental abilities are thinking as tools in the Armed Forces, against a threat like cyberterrorism. This is done through an analysis based on a scenario in which the Armed Forces command and control system is exposed to a cyber attack followed by a discussion on the application of the fundamental abilities. The result shows that the fundamental abilities are a great support in the context but that the reasoning regarding the application is complicated because the threat takes place in the virtual space.</p>

Cyberterrorism kan ses som ett relativt nytt, komplicerat och diffust hot som uppenbarat sig till följd av en snabb IT-utveckling. För Försvarsmakten kan detta hot innebära en ny utmaning eftersom doktrinen som skall fungera som vägledning i verksamheten börjar bli inaktuell. De grundläggande förmågorna, som är en viktig del av doktrinen, ses som tankemässiga hjälpmedel för att Försvarsmakten skall kunna analysera, samordna och beskriva verksamheten. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur pass användbara de grundläggande förmågorna är som tankemässiga hjälpmedel när Försvarsmakten ställs mot ett hot som cyberterrorism. Detta görs genom en analys utifrån ett scenario där Försvarsmaktens ledningssystem utsätts för en cyberattack med ett efterföljande resonemang om tillämpningen av förmågorna. Resultatet utvisar att förmågorna är ett stort stöd i kontexten men att resonemanget kring tillämpningen kompliceras av att hotet äger rum i det virtuella rummet. / Cyber Terrorism can be seen as a relatively new, complex and diffuse threat that appeared due to rapid IT development. For the Armed Forces this threat can be a new challenge because the doctrine to serve as guidance in the work is becoming obsolete. The fundamental abilities, which are an important part of the doctrine, should be seen as thinking tools for the Armed Forces to analyze, coordinate and describe the business. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how useful the fundamental abilities are thinking as tools in the Armed Forces, against a threat like cyberterrorism. This is done through an analysis based on a scenario in which the Armed Forces command and control system is exposed to a cyber attack followed by a discussion on the application of the fundamental abilities. The result shows that the fundamental abilities are a great support in the context but that the reasoning regarding the application is complicated because the threat takes place in the virtual space.

A single cyberattack event involving 1 major corporation can cause severe business and social devastation. In this single case study, a major U.S. airline company was selected for exploration of the strategies information technology administrators and airline managers implemented to reduce the financial devastation that may be caused by a cyberattack. Seven participants, of whom 4 were airline managers and 3 were IT administrators, whose primary responsibility included implementation of strategies to plan for and respond to cyberattacks participated in the data collection process. This study was grounded on the general systems theory. Data collection entailed semistructured face-to-face and telephone interviews and collection and review of public documents. The data analysis process of this study involved the use of Yin's 5-step process of compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting, and concluding, which provided a detailed analysis of the emerging themes. The findings produced results that identified strategies organizational managers and administrators of a U.S. airline implemented to reduce the fiscal influence of cyberattacks, such as proactive plans for education and training, active management, and an incident response plan. The findings of this study might affect social change by offering all individuals a perspective on creating effective cyberculture. An understanding of cyberculture could include the focus of a heightened understanding, whereby, to ensure the security of sensitive or privileged data and information and of key assets, thus, reducing the fiscal devastation that may be caused by cyberattacks.

In Air Traffic Management (ATM) training, simulations of real air traffic control (ATC) scenarios are a key part of practical teaching. On the internet one may find multiple different ATM simulators available to the public with open source code. Today most aircraft transmit data about position, altitude, and speed into the atmosphere that essentially are unencrypted data points, available to the public. This means that potential attackers could project "fake" ADS-B data and spoof existing data to the air traffic controllers (ATCO) if the right equipment is used. We see this as a security flaw and we want to prepare ATCO for cyberattacks by modifying an ATM simulator with cyberattacks. First, openScope was chosen as the ATM simulator to be modified. Subsequently, three types of attacks were chosen for the simulator to be equipped with, based on ADS-B weaknesses from existing literature: aircraft that do not respond to commands, aircraft with altering positional data, and aircraft with incorrect speed and altitude data. The recorded parameters were the written command lines and corresponding aircraft type it was applied to. Using this modified simulator, ATCO can now be evaluated against cyberattacks. / Inom utbildningen till att bli flygledare finns olika simuleringar av verkliga scenarion och det är en viktig del av lärandet. Idag finns det många olika flygledningssimulatorer som finns tillgängliga för allmänheten med öppen källkod på internet. Idag sänder de flesta flygplan information om position, höjd och hastighet ut i atmosfären som i själva verket är okrypterade datapunkter och är tillgängliga för vem som helst som har rätt teknik tillgänglig. Det är även möjligt att både skicka och ändra denna data. Vi ser detta som en stor säkerhetsbrist och vill förbereda flygledare för olika former av cyberattacker genom att modifiera en tillgänglig simulator. Först valdes simulatorn openScope till att modifieras. Härnäst valdes tre olika former av attacker: flygplan som inte ger svar på kommandon, flygplan som spontant byter position och flygplan som visar felaktig höjd och hastighet. För att analysera användaren valdes det att spara använderans kommandon och attacksorten av flygplanet i fråga. Med hjälp av denna simulator kan flygledare nu utvärderas på deras hantering av cyberattacker.

This dissertation investigates vulnerabilities in unmanned vehicles and how to successfully detect and counteract them. As we entrust unmanned vehicles with more responsibilities (e.g. fire-fighting, search and rescue, package delivery), it is crucial to ensure their safe operation. These systems often have not been designed to protect against an intelligent attacker or considering all possible interactions between the physical dynamics and the internal logic. Robust control strategies can verify that the system behaves normally under bounded disturbances, and formal verification methods can check that the system logic operates normally under ideal conditions. However, critical vulnerabilities exist in the intersection of these fields that are addressed in this work. Due to the complex nature of this interaction, only trivial examples have previously been pursued. This work focuses on efficient real-time methods for verification and validation of unmanned vehicles under disturbances and cyberattacks. The efficiency of the verification and validation algorithm is necessary to run it onboard an unmanned vehicle, where it can be used for self diagnosis. We begin with simple linear systems and step to more complex examples with non-linearities. During this progression, new methods are developed to cope with the challenges introduced. We also address how to counter the threat of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) under hostile control by developing and testing an estimation and control scheme for an air-to-air counter UAS system.<br>

In this thesis work we present CLIK, a new, automated, remote attack on the control logic of a programmable logic controller (PLC) in industrial control systems. The CLIK attack modifies the control logic running in a remote target PLC automatically to disrupt a physical process. We implement the CLIK attack on a real PLC. The attack is initiated by subverting the security measures that protect the control logic in a PLC. We found a critical (zero-day) vulnerability, which allows the attacker to overwrite password hash in the PLC during the authentication process. Next, CLIK retrieves and decompiles the original logic and injects a malicious logic into it and then, transfers the infected logic back to the PLC. To hide the infection, we propose a virtual PLC that engages the software the virtual PLC intercepts the request and then, responds with the original (uninfected) control logic to the software.

I denna uppsats beskrivs en fallstudie på överbelastningsattacken mot Estland 2007, där attackens skeden redovisas samt visar på vilka åtgärder som vidtogs för att stoppa attacken, samt på vilket sätt attacken drabbade Estlands befolkning. Därefter analyseras attacken med hjälp av Richard Stiennons teori, om cyberkrigets fyra pelare. Avslutningsvis diskuteras de två frågorna som rör; vilka möjligheter en nation har när det kommer till försvar mot cyberattacker samt vad som kan tänkas räknas som militära problem.   Syftet med uppsatsen är att visa på hur en nation drabbas, när den blir utsatt för en cyberattack och vilka handlingsåtgärder som är möjliga att vidta. Resultatet visar på att sättet Estland drabbades på, var att nationen var tvungen att isolera sig från det internationella internet, men att internet inom nationen kunde upprätthållas. Diskussionen mynnar ut i att en nation har mycket få handlingsmöjligheter till att försvara sig själv, när det kommer till cyberattacker från aktörer som inte är andra nationer. En viktig slutsats var att fallet Estland inte var ett militärt problem, utan kunde lösas helt civilt

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