Master of Arts - International Relations / This research attempts to examine and explain the failure of UN diplomacy that was applied in Iraq from 1991 post-Gulf War to 2003. In order to achieve this, UN diplomatic instruments that included diplomatic negotiations, UN Resolutions, sanctions, and weapons inspections have been rigorously analysed within the context of ascertaining their diplomatic effectiveness. The report specifically focuses on the impact that was made by the diplomatic tools in an effort to peacefully disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the report explores factors that undermined the use of the diplomatic instruments. A number of factors have been responsible for the failure of the UN diplomacy in Iraq. They include, among others, a structural problem in form of an enforcement mechanism in the UN Security Council Resolutions; lack of complementarity in the use of the diplomatic instruments, and implemented at an earlier phase of the disarmament crisis; use of the UN by some of its key members to pursue their interests; flaws in the overall US/UN policy toward Iraq; deeply entrenched hostilities between Iraq and the West especially US and Britain; the approach within which sanctions were modelled discouraged key diplomatic dialogue and negotiation; and the nature of the UN of being an association of sovereign countries largely limited diplomatic efforts to resolve the disarmament crisis. Thus, the report reveals factors ranging from the ineffectiveness of the UN diplomatic instruments to the flaws in the external influence- that is, the policy of the UN and some of its key members to have failed the UN diplomacy in Iraq.

Thesis advisor: Dennis Hale / This dissertation aims to evaluate the utility of democracy promotion in the Middle East to U.S. foreign policy; in particular, it asks why the Arab-Islamic world has proven uniquely resistant to liberal democracy. The overall argument is that an inadequate theoretical understanding of our own regime and its prerequisites led American policy makers simultaneously to expect too much of democratization, and to think too little of liberal democracy. We overestimated its promise, believing transforming key regimes could, in a cost effective manner, bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East, and in the long term help root out terrorist acts committed in the name of Islam. One of the reasons for this: policymakers underestimated what liberal democracy requires of its citizenry--deeply ingrained beliefs and social practices that are acquired only with difficulty. In Iraq, the Bush administration failed to appreciate that long established opinions and mores establish boundaries that constrain political action. Part I begins by giving an account of the assumptions and deliberations that led the Bush administration to pursue regime change in Iraq. It goes on to demonstrate by concrete examples drawn from the occupation period, the insurgency period, and the period since (characterized by utterly dysfunctional and increasingly authoritarian politics), that the rights and privileges associated with democracy--free and fair elections, new liberties, even the constitutional convention itself--are often used in illiberal ways, as weapons to serve narrow and self-interested factions, where the citizenry has not internalized a liberal political consciousness. Part II argues that a rare political personality--largely separable from any particular national character--accounts for the confluence of political liberalism and democratic institutions in the North Atlantic states. Our gentle and tolerant politics are the result of a series of revolutions in social consciousness that have not occurred in the Islamic world. In fact, the Islamic Resurgence of the last century, a revolution as consequential as the French of American Revolutions, is the consequence of a conscious project dedicated to popularizing guiding opinions that are deliberately inhospitable to political liberalism. Analysis of leading Islamist thinkers in the Sunni and Shiite world demonstrates the extent to which they have been successful in erecting barriers to modern and moderate government in the Middle East, which they reject as unjust and corrupting. The dissertation concludes by arguing that Turkey succeeded at establishing a mixed regime by emulating, so far as possible under its own circumstances, the conditions that made the emergence of liberal democracy possible in the West. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: John J. Michalczyk / This thesis explores public relations tactics employed by the United States government during the second Iraq war. It discusses the similarity between public relations and propaganda, giving an in-depth exploration of the strategies used by the government before, during, and after the war to garner support for the effort. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2004. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Fine Arts. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture. Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that “proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the army’s philosophy of war.

Typescript, etc. / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

In recent years, human rights discourse has become increasingly intertwined in the justifications presented for Western wars and interventions. The aim of this thesis is to illustrate the problems implicated in human rights based justifications of war and violence. To achieve this aim, this work makes three primary contributions to International Relations scholarship. First, the thesis provides a robust critique of Michael Walzer's conception of ethical responsibility and his rights based justification of war. Second, I describe an alternative understanding of ethical responsibility that follows from the work of Jacques Derrida, ethics as response. And third, I demonstrate, thorough a reading of the 2003 Iraq War, how ethics as response can provide us with a better understanding of what it means to act ethically in times of war. The central argument presented in this thesis is that rights based justifications of war are predicated upon the belief that moral rules of conduct help us to resolve questions of ethical responsibility in war: moral rules tell us what the right thing to do is and show us how we can act in a morally justified way. This thesis argues that moral rules narrow our understanding of ethical responsibility by promoting adherence to the law rather than responsibility to other people. In contrast, ethics as response provides a model of ethical action that denies the possibility of satisfaction and, thereby, advocates sustained engagements with the consequences of violent action. Ultimately, the idea of ethics as response calls our attention to the uncertainty and uncontrollability implicated in violent actions justified in the name of human rights.

Diplomová práce s názvem Vývoj transatlantických vztahů po 11. září 2001 se zabývá politickými vztahy mezi USA a Evropou v souvislosti s bojem proti terorismu. Autor se zaměřuje zejména na následující témata: historie transatlantických vztahů před 11. zářím 2001; změna globálního bezpečnostního kontextu pro euroatlantické vztahy; odlišné postoje obou partnerů k válce v Iráku; pomoc evropských spojenců při obnově a demokratizačním procesu v Afghánistánu a Iráku; důsledky boje proti terorismu na oblast lidských práv; postoje USA a hlavních evropských spojenců k Evropské bezpečnostní a obranné politice (EBOP) EU; vztah EBOP ? NATO.

Democracy building operations in foreign nations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been met with resistance and at great cost in terms of dollars and lives. Reducing these costs requires understanding why individuals choose to resist the transition to democracy, yet current research in the field does not address the issues of a previously nonviolent population turning to terrorism to resist transition to democracy. The purpose of this single case study was to use rational choice theory and Crenshaw's 3 levels of causation to understand what factors influenced members of the Sunni sect to resist democratic transition following the 2003 invasion of U.S. forces. Data for this study consisted of secondary data, including transcripts of interviews with 15 Sunni Iraqis who once supported or showed neutrality for a democratic government but then resisted transition through terrorism. Data were deductively coded according to Crenshaw's 3 levels of causation and then subjected to thematic analysis. Findings revealed that the primary factor that led individuals to support terrorism against the transitioning government was political, in that Sunni participants felt that after the democratic transition, the government excluded them from participation in the development of the new government to include constitutional development and elections. Findings also showed that religion, specifically being Sunni, impacted the decision to resort to resistance through terrorism. The study concluded with recommendations to the U.S. government and military forces that highlight planning and execution considerations to address during similar democracy building operations for success in the future.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2007. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 223-241). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

<p>An elementary precondition for the EU Member States to act coherently in the field of foreign policy is to reach a common standpoint on particular issues of the CFSP. Due to the intergovernmental character of decision-making in the sphere of the CFSP, the Member States reach a common position primarily through negotiations. In this regard the thesis focuses on an analysis of the EC/U Member States negotiations about two politically highly controversial foreign policy issues – the Yugoslav recognition crisis of 1991 and the Iraqi crisis of 2002/2003.</p><p>Developing a theoretical model of analysis based on merging Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism and negotiation analysis the author seeks to examine and explain the outcomes of these negotiations, while emphasising the necessity to view negotiation as a process throughout which a variation in certain factors can occur and hence influence the outcomes of negotiation in a decisive way.</p>