The ancient Greek terms parrhesia and isegoria are both frequently translated as "free speech" or "freedom of speech". Translating these terms in a straightforward fashion as "free speech" obscures a number of significant differences among what are in truth three very distinct concepts. These dis-analogies may appear unimportant at first glance, but when we understand the central role these concepts play in their respective cultures – more specifically, in their political and legal systems – it becomes clear that small differences in meaning can make a big difference in our ability to grasp the nature of Athenian civic culture. I will outline the most salient of these dis-analogies, and the mistaken conceptions of Athenian political culture that can, and do, result from them. In particular, though the idea of freedom features prominently in parrhesia and isegoria, what freedom amounts to in Athens is sometimes nearly antithetical to what it amounts to in modern liberal republics. Ancient Athenian freedom was the freedom of opportunity. In the case of parrhesia, it was a custom or value which was not a feature of government or law, but part of the Athenian character. The fact that Athenians valued free speaking was formalised in political practice under the democracy through the equal opportunity to address the political assemblies known as isegoria. There was in Athens no explicit or implied protection against the negative consequences of what one said. In contrast, "freedom of speech" means that the individual is protected against the negative consequences of speaking, in particular protected against action by the government to suppress speech and to punish speech after the fact. This difference in what having "freedom" with respect to speech amounts to, makes the translation of isegoria as "freedom of speech" nearly always systematically misleading, and so we should refrain from doing so in any context in which such confusion might be generated. This misunderstanding is compounded by the frequent translation of parrhesia as "freedom of speech" or "free speech". Parrhesia is the name for a certain mode of speech, namely speech which is direct and truthful, and risks negative consequences. As such, it has both positive and negative connotations, and correspondingly was only valued in contexts in which direct truthful speech would be preferable to other modes of speech. Parrhesia was never formalised as isegoria was, since isegoria was a political privilege while parrhesia was merely a mode of expression. In contrast, free speech is legally protected. Speech which is not believed to be valuable is protected, in order to ensure that valuable speech is not suppressed by the powerful through the instruments of government.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-18T11:34:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dilson Cavalcanti Batista Neto.pdf: 1447222 bytes, checksum: e2d863b78c787d340cd0024eee30c13b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-18T11:34:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dilson Cavalcanti Batista Neto.pdf: 1447222 bytes, checksum: e2d863b78c787d340cd0024eee30c13b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-15 / The present thesis has as problematic point the challenge of proposing limits to the religious discourse in the political environment before a plural society and the democratic ideal of neutrality in relation to religious organizations. Thus, the central hypothesis is that the boundaries between law, politics and religion are better delineated when one takes into account that the protection of freedom of expression must attend to the basic moral foundations built historically, especially through central ideas of John's work Rawls, especially after the release of Political Liberalism. In this sense, the primary objective of the thesis is a proposal of ethical and political foundations that involve a protection of the freedom of religious expression in the sphere of the political discussion inserted in a democratic State. Through the deductive method, two more basic foundations are proposed in order to deal with specific cases of religious discourses given by public agents, as well as with the possible interference of law in the expression of religious and their organizations. It is proposed that freedom of religious expression in the political environment should be based on two basic foundations: the first was called the basis of the isegoria which, through the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, points to the possibility of a democracy with equal status among citizens , whether religious or not. The second ground is that of the parresia that has in the proposal of public reason of Rawls, mainly in its last formulation, a suitable framework so that the religious does not have to live in divided form: hour through an internal posture of its doctrine, hour in the field politician dissociating himself from his religious language. This theoretical course is finalized with proposals of limits to religious discourse by public agents and also with the need to reinforce that law and politics should not limit, without seriously justifiable reasons, the expression of religious groups / A presente Tese tem como problemática o desafio de propor limites ao discurso de cunho religioso no ambiente político diante de uma sociedade plural e do ideal democrático de neutralidade estatal em relação às organizações religiosas. Desta forma, a hipótese central é que as fronteiras entre direito, política e religião são melhores delineadas quando se leva em consideração que a tutela da liberdade de expressão deve atentar para fundamentos morais básicos construídos historicamente, em especial através de ideias centrais da obra de John Rawls, principalmente após o lançamento de O Liberalismo Político. Nesse sentido, o objetivo primário da Tese é a proposição de fundamentos éticos e políticos que envolvam a tutela da liberdade de expressão religiosa na esfera da discussão política inserida em um Estado democrático. Através do método dedutivo, propõem-se dois fundamentos básicos mais gerais para que se possa lidar com casos específicos de discursos religiosos proferidos por agentes públicos, bem como com as possíveis interferências do direito na expressão dos religiosos e das suas organizações. Propõe-se que a liberdade de expressão religiosa no ambiente político observe dois fundamentos básicos: o primeiro foi denominado como o fundamento da isegoria que, através da ideia rawlsiana de consenso sobreposto, aponta para a possibilidade de uma democracia com igualdade de status entre os cidadãos, quer sejam religiosos ou não. O segundo fundamento é o da parresía que tem na proposta de razão pública de Rawls, principalmente em sua última formulação, um arcabouço adequado para que o religioso não precise viver de forma dividida: hora através de uma postura interna da sua doutrina, hora no campo político desvinculando-se do seu linguajar religioso. Tal percurso teórico é finalizado com propostas de limites ao discurso religioso por agentes públicos e também com a necessidade de se reforçar que o direito e a política não devem limitar, sem motivos gravemente justificáveis, a expressão de grupos religiosos