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This thesis argues that ‘democracy’ can better be understood in terms of a conceptual diarchy of ‘isonomia’ (equal political rights) and ‘isegoria’ (equal speech rights), rather than the conventional diarchy of ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ that originated in the era of absolute monarchy. As the proposed diarchy has its origin in classical Greece, the thesis starts with a brief overview of the institutional changes in sixth-, fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy that implemented the distinction in different ways, and examines some of its dysfunctions. The particular aspect of Athenian democracy under focus is sortition – the random selection of citizens for public office – viewed in antiquity as democratic, whereas election was viewed as an aristocratic or oligarchic selection mechanism. The thesis takes issue with Bernard Manin’s claim that the ‘triumph of election’ was on account of the natural right theory of consent, arguing that sortition-based proxy representation is a better way of indicating (hypothetical) consent than preference election. The thesis then seeks to clarify the concept(s) of representation – essential to the implementation of the democratic diarchy in modern large-scale societies – and to study how the diarchy has been reincarnated in modern representative democracies, along with an examination of the pathologies thereof. Consideration is given as to what the deliberative style of assemblies selected by lot should be, alongside evaluation of the epistemic potential of cognitive diversity and the ‘wisdom of crowds’. Given the need for both isonomia and isegoria to assume a representative form in large modern states, Michael Saward’s Representative Claim is adopted as a theoretical model to extend the reach of political representation beyond elections. The thesis concludes with tentative proposals as to how the fourth-century reforms (delegation of the final lawmaking decision to randomly-selected nomothetic courts) might be used as a template for modern institutions to resolve some of the problems of mass democracy.

This dissertation offers a new reading of Athenian democracy, focusing on the connection between the politics of accountability and the dynamics of political advice. I analyze Athenian institutions, norms, and practices comparatively, alongside their autocratic counterparts. I show how Greek thinkers relied on a common conceptual apparatus to understand, defend, and criticize patterns of accountability and unaccountability across regimes. I explore how powerful, unaccountable political actors – whether autocratic rulers or democratic assemblies – could solicit and secure good advice, and how accountable advisers could advise them effectively and safely. In stressing similarities between counsel across regime types, I challenge the characterization of Athens as a deliberative democracy. The sumboulos (adviser) was an important figure in Greek conceptions of both democratic and autocratic politics. Athenian orators are best understood – and understood themselves – as the accountable sumbouloi of the Athenian demos. This identification casts them not as co-deliberators with their fellow citizens but rather as participants in a common Greek tradition of advising powerful figures, a tradition that found expression across political contexts. The important role of sumbouloi in both democracies and autocracies follows from the structural similarity between the two regime types. The Athenian demos, gathered together in the Assembly and in the Popular Courts, was understood to have competencies and powers akin to those of an autocratic ruler. In particular, both the demos and the autocrat were recognized as unaccountable rulers able to hold others – including their advisers – to account. Given the power imbalances structuring relationships between sumbouloi and decision makers in both democracies and autocracies, both practicing orators and theoretically inclined observers came to see that the problems and opportunities associated with having (or choosing) to speak to the powerful were comparable across regimes. The issues at stake in the demos-adviser relationship could fruitfully be compared to those at stake in the autocrat-adviser relationship. Questions such as how the powerful could recognize good advice and good advisers and what the possibilities and limitations of frank advice were under conditions of risk were not regime-specific. Insofar as ancient Greeks had a theory of political counsel, it was a strikingly portable one. / Government

The ancient Greek terms parrhesia and isegoria are both frequently translated as "free speech" or "freedom of speech". Translating these terms in a straightforward fashion as "free speech" obscures a number of significant differences among what are in truth three very distinct concepts. These dis-analogies may appear unimportant at first glance, but when we understand the central role these concepts play in their respective cultures – more specifically, in their political and legal systems – it becomes clear that small differences in meaning can make a big difference in our ability to grasp the nature of Athenian civic culture. I will outline the most salient of these dis-analogies, and the mistaken conceptions of Athenian political culture that can, and do, result from them. In particular, though the idea of freedom features prominently in parrhesia and isegoria, what freedom amounts to in Athens is sometimes nearly antithetical to what it amounts to in modern liberal republics. Ancient Athenian freedom was the freedom of opportunity. In the case of parrhesia, it was a custom or value which was not a feature of government or law, but part of the Athenian character. The fact that Athenians valued free speaking was formalised in political practice under the democracy through the equal opportunity to address the political assemblies known as isegoria. There was in Athens no explicit or implied protection against the negative consequences of what one said. In contrast, "freedom of speech" means that the individual is protected against the negative consequences of speaking, in particular protected against action by the government to suppress speech and to punish speech after the fact. This difference in what having "freedom" with respect to speech amounts to, makes the translation of isegoria as "freedom of speech" nearly always systematically misleading, and so we should refrain from doing so in any context in which such confusion might be generated. This misunderstanding is compounded by the frequent translation of parrhesia as "freedom of speech" or "free speech". Parrhesia is the name for a certain mode of speech, namely speech which is direct and truthful, and risks negative consequences. As such, it has both positive and negative connotations, and correspondingly was only valued in contexts in which direct truthful speech would be preferable to other modes of speech. Parrhesia was never formalised as isegoria was, since isegoria was a political privilege while parrhesia was merely a mode of expression. In contrast, free speech is legally protected. Speech which is not believed to be valuable is protected, in order to ensure that valuable speech is not suppressed by the powerful through the instruments of government.

Esta dissertação consiste em uma investigação cujo objetivo é examir o tema da participação política dos metecos atenienses, através da análise dos discursos forenses de Lísias e da crítica da historiografia. Alguns conceitos são discutidos, como identidade, espaço, memória, Estado, vida cotidiana, reprodução social, poder, liberdade etc, como um meio de se acessar a complexidade da sociedade ateniense. / This dissertation consists in a investigation which aims to examine the issue of the political participation of Athenian metic in Classical Athens, through the analysis of the Lysias forensic speeches and the critique of the historiography. Some concepts are discussed, like identity, space, memory, State, everyday life, social reproduction, power, freedom etc, as a way to have access to the complexity of Athenian society.

Conventional accounts of classical Athenian democracy represent the assembly as the primary democratic institution in the Athenian political system. This looks reasonable in the light of modern democracy, which has typically developed through the democratization of legislative assemblies. Yet it conflicts with the evidence at our disposal. Our ancient sources suggest that the most significant and distinctively democratic institution in Athens was the courts, where decisions were made by large panels of randomly selected ordinary citizens with no possibility of appeal. This dissertation reinterprets Athenian democracy as “dikastic democracy” (from the Greek dikastēs, “judge”), defined as a mode of government in which ordinary citizens rule principally through their control of the administration of justice. It begins by casting doubt on two major planks in the modern interpretation of Athenian democracy: first, that it rested on a conception of the “wisdom of the multitude” akin to that advanced by epistemic democrats today, and second that it was “deliberative,” meaning that mass discussion of political matters played a defining role. The first plank rests largely on an argument made by Aristotle in support of mass political participation, which I show has been comprehensively misunderstood. The second rests on the interpretation of the verb “bouleuomai” as indicating speech, but I suggest that it meant internal reflection in both the courts and the assembly. The third chapter begins the constructive part of the project by comparing the assembly and courts as instruments of democracy in Athens, and the fourth shows how a focus on the courts reveals the deep political dimensions of Plato’s work, which in turn suggests one reason why modern democratic ideology and practice have moved so far from the Athenians’ on this score. Throughout, the dissertation combines textual, philological and conceptual analysis with attention to institutional detail and the wider historical context. The resulting account makes a strong case for the relevance of classical Athens today, both as a source of potentially useful procedural mechanisms and as the point of origin of some of the philosophical presuppositions on which the modern conception of democracy and its limits depends. / Government

Esta dissertação consiste em uma investigação cujo objetivo é examir o tema da participação política dos metecos atenienses, através da análise dos discursos forenses de Lísias e da crítica da historiografia. Alguns conceitos são discutidos, como identidade, espaço, memória, Estado, vida cotidiana, reprodução social, poder, liberdade etc, como um meio de se acessar a complexidade da sociedade ateniense. / This dissertation consists in a investigation which aims to examine the issue of the political participation of Athenian metic in Classical Athens, through the analysis of the Lysias forensic speeches and the critique of the historiography. Some concepts are discussed, like identity, space, memory, State, everyday life, social reproduction, power, freedom etc, as a way to have access to the complexity of Athenian society.

Le tribunal populaire de l’Héliée ne constitue pas seulement une des institutions les plus importantes de la démocratie athénienne ; il reflète la structure même du régime démocratique d’Athènes aux Ve et IVe siècles. Cependant, l’attribution, par certaines sources, de l’origine de l’Héliée aux réformes de Solon et à l’établissement d’un régime censitaire remet en question son caractère d’emblée démocratique et populaire. Le sujet est d’un intérêt particulier, étant donné que chaque année six mille Athéniens, non professionnels, étaient tirés au sort et formaient l’Héliée. Ce fait lui donne une importance politique prépondérante, qui est visible en particulier à partir de la fin du Ve siècle. L’activité judiciaire constitue un élément si important de la vie politique de l’Athénien et connaît une telle augmentation au cours du IVe siècle qu’on a souvent l’impression que le conflit politique se déplace de l’espace de l’Assemblée à l’Héliée. Ces problématiques nous conduisent à saisir la période de la création de l’institution de l’Héliée et le régime auquel elle est liée, puis à éclairer son caractère politique, tant du point de vue de son fonctionnement et des procès qui sont jugés devant ses tribunaux que du rôle de ses tribunaux dans la vie politique d’Athènes. L’étude conjointe des sources littéraires et épigraphiques permet de conclure qu’au-delà du rôle primordial de l’Assemblée du peuple dans la prise des décisions politiques, on trouve une autre institution fondée sur une base populaire qui participe à l’organisation politique de la cité et qui est étroitement liée au développement de la démocratie athénienne. / The court of Heliaia is not only one of the most important institutions of Athenian democracy, but also reflects the structure of the democratic constitution of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries. However, the fact that several sources attribute its origins to the reforms of Solon and the establishment of a timocratic constitution questions its explicit democratic and popular character. The issue is particularly interesting, given that each year six thousand non-professional Athenians are allotted and form the People’s Court. This fact implies that Heliaia is of prominent political significance, especially since the late fifth century. The importance of the judicial activity in the political life of Athenians, as well as its notable increase during the fourth century, were such that we often have the impression that the political conflicts occur not only in the Assembly but also in the People’s Court. Motivated from these issues, we first search for the period of the establishment of the institution of Heliaia and its historical context. Additionally, we aim to clarify its political character from the perspective of its function and trials, as well as from the perspective of its role in the political life of Athens. Indeed, the study of the literary and epigraphic sources allows us to conclude that, beyond the primary role of the Assembly of the People in the political decisions, there is another institution of popular composition involved in the political organization of the city, which is directly linked to the development of Athenian democracy.

RESUMO Serão investigadas, nesta dissertação, as origens da democracia ateniense através da análise de quatro epigramas de Simônides de Ceos e da contextualização de alguns outros. Partindo do assassinato de Hiparco por Harmódio e Aristogíton e traçando suas conseqüências, tanto do ponto de vista mítico quando político, tentaremos demonstrar como o povo, agora identificado como mesmo ideal de igualdade perante a lei (isonomia), foi capaz de afastar tanto o perigo de uma helotização da Ática, quanto o de uma submissão ao império aquemênida, ao vencer duas batalhas decisivas, cujo relato foi preservado em inscrições que chegaram até nós sob o nome de Simônides por transmissão literária ou epigráfica ou ambas. Também iremos lidar com todos os aspectos relativos à composição, caráter e transmissão de cada um dos quatro epigramas comentados, além de fornecer uma tradução de todos os outros - incluindo os novos fragmentos elegíacos recentemente descobertos - que possam ter alguma relevância para o assunto em questão. / The origins of Athenian democracy are herein surveyed through the analysis of four Simonidean epigrams and the canvassing of several others. Starting from the murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and following its consequences, both mythic and political, we shall proceed to demonstrate how the people, now identified with the same democratic ideal, was able to eschew both the danger of helotization by Sparta and submission by the Persian Empire by its winning two decisive battles recorded in inscriptions that came down to us either through literary or epigraphical transmission or both. We shall also deal with all aspects surrounding the composition, nature and transmission of each of the four epigrams, besides providing a translation of all other epigrams - including the newly discovered elegiac fragments - that may bear any relevancy to the subject under appreciation.

RESUMO Serão investigadas, nesta dissertação, as origens da democracia ateniense através da análise de quatro epigramas de Simônides de Ceos e da contextualização de alguns outros. Partindo do assassinato de Hiparco por Harmódio e Aristogíton e traçando suas conseqüências, tanto do ponto de vista mítico quando político, tentaremos demonstrar como o povo, agora identificado como mesmo ideal de igualdade perante a lei (isonomia), foi capaz de afastar tanto o perigo de uma helotização da Ática, quanto o de uma submissão ao império aquemênida, ao vencer duas batalhas decisivas, cujo relato foi preservado em inscrições que chegaram até nós sob o nome de Simônides por transmissão literária ou epigráfica ou ambas. Também iremos lidar com todos os aspectos relativos à composição, caráter e transmissão de cada um dos quatro epigramas comentados, além de fornecer uma tradução de todos os outros - incluindo os novos fragmentos elegíacos recentemente descobertos - que possam ter alguma relevância para o assunto em questão. / The origins of Athenian democracy are herein surveyed through the analysis of four Simonidean epigrams and the canvassing of several others. Starting from the murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and following its consequences, both mythic and political, we shall proceed to demonstrate how the people, now identified with the same democratic ideal, was able to eschew both the danger of helotization by Sparta and submission by the Persian Empire by its winning two decisive battles recorded in inscriptions that came down to us either through literary or epigraphical transmission or both. We shall also deal with all aspects surrounding the composition, nature and transmission of each of the four epigrams, besides providing a translation of all other epigrams - including the newly discovered elegiac fragments - that may bear any relevancy to the subject under appreciation.