Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 1999. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-93).

Texte remanié et abrégé de: Diss.--Fachbereich 05--Gießen--Justus-Liebig-Universität, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 367-409. Index.

Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2004

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 1999. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-93).

Inaug.-diss.--München. / Vita. "Literaturverzeichnis": p. iv.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 1999. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-93).

Tübingen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2003. / Dateien im PDF-Format.

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.

<p>This essay concerns itself with the historical background to what it refers to as <em>existential pedagogy</em>, which designates the way in which existential literature presumably seeks to affect the reader so that he experiences his existence as isolated, and how this is done through the employment of harsh and uncompromising language and rhetorical devices. The assumption underlying this project is that there is a pedagogical purpose to the existential manner of de-livery, and this essay traces this purpose back to how in the 18th century certain thinkers – Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Schlegel – came to look back at Socrates rhetorical en-deavour in order to perfect their own desire to place the question of ‘meaning’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ into the hands of the receiving individual – the reader of a text or the student of a teacher. By studying the manner in which Hamann and Schlegel used this Socratic rhetoric in their own authorship, I seek to establish how they considered it vital that the recipient experi-enced himself as thoroughly alone in order to cultivate his ability to infuse meaning into the world. The essay continues to examine how Sören Kierkegaard – in his capacity as the mythi-cal ‘father of existentialism’ – conceived of the Socratic rhetoric as lacking in sufficiently accounting for the despair and sinfulness he saw as being intertwined with experiencing one-self as lonely and ignorant. By studying how Kierkegaard approached the reader in his pseu-donymous and existential literature, the essay makes it clear that the existential pedagogy util-ized by Kierkegaard works in order to simultaneously infuse the reader with a feeling of isola-tion and ignorance, as it, through repeatedly focusing on the despair involved in that condi-tion, provoked the reader into taking action, despite (or, existentially, because he was) being taught that he, on account of his inevitable loneliness and ignorance, could not.</p>

This essay concerns itself with the historical background to what it refers to as existential pedagogy, which designates the way in which existential literature presumably seeks to affect the reader so that he experiences his existence as isolated, and how this is done through the employment of harsh and uncompromising language and rhetorical devices. The assumption underlying this project is that there is a pedagogical purpose to the existential manner of de-livery, and this essay traces this purpose back to how in the 18th century certain thinkers – Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Schlegel – came to look back at Socrates rhetorical en-deavour in order to perfect their own desire to place the question of ‘meaning’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ into the hands of the receiving individual – the reader of a text or the student of a teacher. By studying the manner in which Hamann and Schlegel used this Socratic rhetoric in their own authorship, I seek to establish how they considered it vital that the recipient experi-enced himself as thoroughly alone in order to cultivate his ability to infuse meaning into the world. The essay continues to examine how Sören Kierkegaard – in his capacity as the mythi-cal ‘father of existentialism’ – conceived of the Socratic rhetoric as lacking in sufficiently accounting for the despair and sinfulness he saw as being intertwined with experiencing one-self as lonely and ignorant. By studying how Kierkegaard approached the reader in his pseu-donymous and existential literature, the essay makes it clear that the existential pedagogy util-ized by Kierkegaard works in order to simultaneously infuse the reader with a feeling of isola-tion and ignorance, as it, through repeatedly focusing on the despair involved in that condi-tion, provoked the reader into taking action, despite (or, existentially, because he was) being taught that he, on account of his inevitable loneliness and ignorance, could not.