During the time between 1660-1680 the nobility in Sweden came to be a gigantic landowner with 65 % of the total amount of land, but only 20 years later they lost almost half of their possessions. The eighteenth century was on its way – a period in history were “ordinary” people started to question the nobility’s right to be excused from tax, at the same time as farmers and the “middlegroup” started to appropriate more and more land from the nobility and the Crown. Through King Gustav III:s document of 1789, land became free to own to whoever it was – except from the prime nobility’s land; but the Swedish Parliament followed the wind of change, and 1809/10 this land was also free to own. At the end of 1840, the nobility owned about 19 % of the land in Sweden, and the farmers and middlegroup owned 69 %. The tide had turned... But Öja parish showed a different development compered to the rest of Sweden. Instead of decreasing their land, nobility increased from 0 percent in 1784 to 33 percent in 1840, and at the same time farmers, the Crown and the middlegroup lost possessions.

<p>During the time between 1660-1680 the nobility in Sweden came to be a gigantic landowner with 65 % of the total amount of land, but only 20 years later they lost almost half of their possessions. The eighteenth century was on its way – a period in history were “ordinary” people started to question the nobility’s right to be excused from tax, at the same time as farmers and the “middlegroup” started to appropriate more and more land from the nobility and the Crown.</p><p>Through King Gustav III:s document of 1789, land became free to own to whoever it was – except from the prime nobility’s land; but the Swedish Parliament followed the wind of change, and 1809/10 this land was also free to own. At the end of 1840, the nobility owned about 19 % of the land in Sweden, and the farmers and middlegroup owned 69 %. The tide had turned...</p><p>But Öja parish showed a different development compered to the rest of Sweden. Instead of decreasing their land, nobility increased from 0 percent in 1784 to 33 percent in 1840, and at the same time farmers, the Crown and the middlegroup lost possessions.</p>

En uppsats gällande Hushållningssällskapets projekt mellan 1870-1910. Kvalitativt om skördeutfall, kreatursutfall, och förändrade metoder inom jordbruket som förväntades ge högre avkastning i Örebro län. Samt kvantitativt om befolkningsmängd, kreaturshållning, jordägare och jordbrukare i Askersunds landsförsamling, Viby- och Lerbäck socken.

A large part of the poor people in the world is dependent on local natural resources for their survival. Often, these resources are managed as common-pool resources; that is, they are used in common by a limited group of people, who are dependent on each other in their use of the resource. The first two essays in this dissertation explicitly examine the effects of poverty on common-pool resource management. I show that if utility is a non-homogeneous function of consumption, both income level and income distribution affects the chances for cooperative management of common-pool resources. In the first essay, I let the S-shaped relationship between health and consumption be reflected in an S-shaped utility function, and use game theory to examine the effects on cooperation. I find that the chances for cooperation are greater if the users of the common-pool resource are relatively well off than if they are very poor, but greatest of all in groups of users just managing to get the food they need to remain in good health. In the most relevant consumption levels, a temporary decrease in consumption may cause cooperation to fail. In the second essay, I show that income inequality decreases the scope for cooperation. In poor groups of users, the poorest will be the ones unable to cooperate, while in richer groups of users, the richest will be the ones who can not commit to cooperate. Alms-giving, an unequal sharing of the gains from cooperation and even a certain amount of free-riding are ways of making cooperation possible despite inequality. In the third essay data from ten, and case studies of five, irrigation systems in Nepal are analysed. The results show a positive correlation between income level and cooperation and a negative correlation between income inequality and cooperation, which supports the results from the first two essays. However, while the theoretical essays focus on the incentives to cooperate, the empirical analysis shows that it is at least as important that the users find a way to coordinate their efforts. The case studies, in particular, emphasise the importance of having a person as a leader. Furthermore, cooperation works better when a large share of the users belongs to the same ethnic group. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002</p>