Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves[53]-58).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves[53]-58).

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-146).

Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-146).

The understanding of terrorism has thus far been determined not by some independent line of inquiry but instead by a strong interplay between conflicting moral positions. Treated sometimes as a method or tactic and at other times as a distinct form of violence, the true nature of terrorism remains elusive, while a failure to understand it has squarely been blamed on the moral problem. The conceptual and theoretical debate in the field of terrorism studies as a result has not progressed in any meaningful way. Issues that were associated with terrorism when a formal inquiry into the problem was first launched still remain unresolved. Basic questions as to whether terrorism generates fear and if it is possible to identify its victim or perpetrator continue to plague the terrorism discourse. Meanwhile matters that are crucial, such as the widespread tendency to treat terrorism as a tactic, strategy or ideology and the essentially contested character of terrorism scholarship are either ignored or erroneously taken for granted. This thesis will show that our inability to define terrorism is not due to the moral problem as it is made out to be but because of our failure to understand the true nature of terrorism. To accomplish this task, it not only analyzes issues that are regularly contested but also discusses in detail the ones that are trivialized and overlooked. It ultimately concludes that terrorism primarily plays only an auxiliary or a facilitatory role and therefore the key to defining it and understanding its true nature lies in its utility and function.

The fundamental elements that shaped and gave rise to Christianity as a dominant religious movement rest in the crucifixion, death and resurrection of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Had there been no crucifixion and had Jesus died a natural death, there would be no foundation for the Christian gospel as we have it today. Jesus had to die a violent death and be a human sacrifice in order for him to be a historical figure that he is today. My point in departure is to highlight that the events that constitute history are in many aspects very violent in nature. Therefore, it may not be a great exaggeration to conclude that the shedding and spilling of blood is necessary in the making of history, since war and history are so joined together like Siamese twins. War is so much part of our lives, it is said that only the dead have seen the end of it. And history according to James Joyce, is a nightmare from which [he is] trying to awake. Such has been the explicit nature of Just War Theory as it is rooted in the backdrop of Christian conviction. This thesis seeks to illuminate the topic of Just War Theory from a Church and Augustinian perspective. It demonstrates how Augustine’s writings are a rich resources for theological, political and judicial reflection on international politics. It critically examines the connection between Church and State, that is to say, the origins of the Just War Theory. Further, it goes on to demonstrate that for Augustine the two are intertwined and God ordained. It draws conclusions for current Just War practices as outdated since its failure to attain world-peace. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2015. / tm2015 / Church History and Church Policy / MA / Unrestricted

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The legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer has largely been dependent upon the understanding of his position of pacifism and just war in the context of the Second World War. His own writings and presentations, particularly ones advocating for pacifism, seem contrary to his actions and involvement in the resistance movement against Nazi Germany. Scholars on both sides of this debate have presented compelling evidence to sway their audience one way or the other concerning Bonhoeffer's ethical position. This debate is further complicated by Bonhoeffer's own view of his life as a "straight and unbroken course." As many have claimed Bonhoeffer's ethics to justify their own stance on pacifism and just-war, the purpose of this paper is to determine if such claims are warranted. This paper seeks to investigate such claims by looking at Bonhoeffer's own writings throughout the course of his life. It traces his biography in attempts to place his writings in context. While many of his writings are important in understanding Bonhoeffer's worldview, this paper largely focuses on Sanctorum Communio as the basis for his theological framework, and his publications of Discipleship and Ethics wherein lies the tensions of understanding his position. This paper will attempt to show that while Bonhoeffer was not against pacifism and in fact advocated for peace, his contextual ethics serves as strong evidence that he was not a pacifist according to its most basic definition.

Denna uppsats syftar till att vara ett bidrag till den samtida debatten kring teorin om rättfärdiga krig. I uppsatsen utmanas rådande föreställningar om rättfärdiga krig, i synnerhet idén om att endast suveräna stater utgör legitima auktoriteter. Uppsatsen använder Hizbollah som fallstudie och författaren argumenterar för att rörelsens enorma popularitet och de facto kontroll över stora områden gjort Hizbollah till en legitim härskare. Därmed bör Hizbollah, trots att rörelsen är en icke-statlig aktör i Libanon, betraktas som en legitim auktoritet som kan utkämpa rättfärdiga krig. / This essay aims to be a contribution to the contemporary debate on the “Just War Theory” in a way that challenges traditional concepts of the theory, especially the idea that only sovereign states constitutes legitimate authorities. Using Hezbollah as a case study, the author argues that the organization’s enormous popularity and de facto control over considerable parts of Lebanon makes Hezbollah a legitimate ruler of its territory. Consequently Hezbollah, despite being a non-state actor, should be regarded as a legitimate authority and thus capable of fighting just wars.