Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed March 3, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 26).

Thesis (M.Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-123). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-109). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-89). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 329-338).

Habilitation - Universität, Bonn, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references and register.

This thesis seeks to justify on moral grounds the existence of tort systems. The argument is that corrective justice is necessary but not sufficient to succeed at this task. Corrective justice is necessary because it is the only principle that can adequately justify the bilateral structure of tort litigation between claimants and defendants, and full compensatory damages as the default remedy in most tort systems. However, it is argued that the critiques to corrective justice lead us to the important lesson that tort law is more than just corrective justice. Three gaps of corrective justice are identified: the equivalence between gains and losses, the definition of what counts as a tort, and the diversity of remedies. The thesis offers a solution to these problems based on the values of restorative and distributive justice. It is argued that restorative justice plays an important role in tort law, providing an apologetic framework for material compensation (the message that money awards communicate), but especially for symbolic remedies, such as apologies, nominal damages, non-pecuniary damages, punitive damages, and gain-based damages, solving the diversity of remedies problem. This restorative framework of tort remedies is compatible with corrective justice. Distributive justice also plays an important role in tort law. Even though corrective and distributive justice are conceptually separate concepts, in the context of tort law they cannot be separated. It is argued that the definition of what counts as a tort involves a distributive task. Following this argument, the thesis argues that there is a distributive uneasiness in tort law, because tort law protects some interests regardless of how they were acquired, and regardless of whether their distribution amounts to an unfair distribution of resources. It is suggested that the distributive mechanism of insurance can solve, or at least ameliorate, this uneasiness.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

System justification theorists have proposed that people are motivated to view their political, economic, and social circumstances as desirable, necessary, and fair (e.g., Jost, Nosek & Banaji, 2004). Despite more than 15 years of system justification research, the meaning of fairness within this context has not been investigated directly. Over the past several decades three major criteria have been identified as contributing to people's perceptions of fairness: distributive justice, procedural justice, and one's own idiosyncratic set of personal values. Focusing on the last two, we reasoned that values are represented more abstractly than is information about procedural fairness, and that the relative weight of values versus procedures should increase at higher levels of mental construal. Whereas information about procedures is often seen as providing a basis for the acceptance of undesirable outcomes, judgments based on personal conceptions of right and wrong are considered to be independent from "establishment, convention, rules, or authority" (Skitka & Mullen, 2008, p. 531), and are therefore unlikely to be used in a motivated defense of the status quo. We therefore hypothesized that system justification would be most likely to occur in conditions where procedures are most salient (i.e., at low levels of construal). However, despite using manipulations of the system justification motive that have previously been successful, and working with issues similar to those used in previous work, we were unable to produce the typical system justification pattern of results. Possible reasons for this are discussed. / by Nicholas Martens. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

This thesis reconstructs John Rawl's Original Position in order to show that within a liberal democratic culture, the institution of punishment ought to conform to the Moral Education Theory of Punishment, put forth by Jean Hampton. According to Hampton, punishment should facilitate a medium where the state educates the criminal on the moral implications of her wrongdoing. I argue that citizens would select the Moral Education Theory of Punishment in the Original Position, since it offers the best opportunity to redress two calamities related to the criminal's wrongdoing---namely, that it threatens the moral status of the victim, and that it results from the wrongdoer's deficient moral sensibility. Upon consideration, the representatives in the Original Position recognize that redressing either of the two calamities necessitates redressing the other; thus, both objectives reinforce one another. Consequently, the representatives would unanimously select the principles of punishment manifest in the Moral Education Theory.