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1	Normative Judgments, 'Deep Self' Judgments, and Intentional Action Shepard, Jason S 13 April 2011 (has links) Sripada and Konrath (forthcoming) use Structural Equation Modeling techniques to provide empirical evidence for the claim that implicit and automatic inferences about people’s dispositions, and not normative judgments, are the driving cause behind the pattern of folk judgments of intentional action in Knobe’s (2003a) chairman case. However, I will argue that their evidence is not as strong as they claim due to the potential of methodological and statistical problems with the way they tested their model. After correcting for these problems, I show that even after accounting for the role of dispositional inferences, normative judgments are still playing a significant role in folk judgments of intentional action. Side-effect effect intentional action moral judgments dispositional judgments Joshua Knobe Chandra Sripada Philosophy
2	Deep Trouble for the Deep Self Rose, David, Livengood, Jonathan, Sytsma, Justin, Machery, Edouard 01 October 2012 (has links) Chandra Sripada's (2010) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions-a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada & Konrath, 2011). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable. causal modeling deep self experimental philosophy harm and help cases intentional action knobe Sripada structural equation modeling
3	Investigating conceptions of intentional action by analyzing participant generated scenarios Skulmowski, Alexander, Bunge, Andreas, Cohen, Bret R., Kreilkamp, Barbara A. K., Troxler, Nicole 19 November 2015 (has links) (PDF) We describe and report on results of employing a new method for analyzing lay conceptions of intentional and unintentional action. Instead of asking people for their conceptual intuitions with regard to construed scenarios, we asked our participants to come up with their own scenarios and to explain why these are examples of intentional or unintentional actions. By way of content analysis, we extracted contexts and components that people associated with these action types. Our participants associated unintentional actions predominantly with bad outcomes for all persons involved and linked intentional actions more strongly to positive outcomes, especially concerning the agent. People’s conceptions of intentional action seem to involve more aspects than commonly assumed in philosophical models of intentional action that solely stress the importance of intentions, desires, and beliefs. The additional aspects include decisions and thoughts about the action. In addition, we found that the criteria that participants generated for unintentional actions are not a mere inversion of those used in explanations for intentional actions. Associations between involuntariness and unintentional action seem to be stronger than associations between aspects of voluntariness and intentional action. Inhaltsanalyse Intention Freiwilligkeit Aktion Technische Universität Chemnitz Publikationsfonds intentional action experimental philosophy Knobe-effect concepts lay conceptions content analysis Technische Universität Chemnitz Publication funds ddc:150 Inhaltsanalyse Intention Freiwilligkeit Handlung
4	Investigating conceptions of intentional action by analyzing participant generated scenarios Skulmowski, Alexander, Bunge, Andreas, Cohen, Bret R., Kreilkamp, Barbara A. K., Troxler, Nicole 19 November 2015 (has links) We describe and report on results of employing a new method for analyzing lay conceptions of intentional and unintentional action. Instead of asking people for their conceptual intuitions with regard to construed scenarios, we asked our participants to come up with their own scenarios and to explain why these are examples of intentional or unintentional actions. By way of content analysis, we extracted contexts and components that people associated with these action types. Our participants associated unintentional actions predominantly with bad outcomes for all persons involved and linked intentional actions more strongly to positive outcomes, especially concerning the agent. People’s conceptions of intentional action seem to involve more aspects than commonly assumed in philosophical models of intentional action that solely stress the importance of intentions, desires, and beliefs. The additional aspects include decisions and thoughts about the action. In addition, we found that the criteria that participants generated for unintentional actions are not a mere inversion of those used in explanations for intentional actions. Associations between involuntariness and unintentional action seem to be stronger than associations between aspects of voluntariness and intentional action. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/150 ddc:150

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