The value of free speech is deeply rooted in democratic principles designed to foster a marketplace of ideas where diverse viewpoints thrive and enable accountability and social progress. Simultaneously, academic freedom is essential for the pursuit of knowledge. Yet both must be exercised responsibly. This thesis examines the intricate relationship between free speech, academic freedom, and humanistic concerns like respect, inclusivity, and diversity. By exploring pivotal court cases such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), Bonnell v. Lorenzo (2001), Axson-Flynn v. Johnson (2004), Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and Morse v. Frederick (2007), this paper illustrates the delicate balance needed in educational settings. The analysis suggests that schools should establish clear speech policies, prioritize education on responsible speech, and create committees to address speech-related concerns. An ideal policy balances court requirements, humanistic concerns, and promotes respectful dialogue while prohibiting harmful speech.

The standing doctrine is an evolving judicial tool to limit cases in the courtroom. However, the issue of how citizens are granted standing in environmental litigation remains unclear. This thesis will analyze the evolution of the standing doctrine and the requirements for future environmental litigation through an analysis of the more prominent cases that set the historical precedent. Particularly, this thesis is focused through the lens of climate change and the additional hurdles its standing requirements can bring to litigation brought by individual citizens. Jurisdiction has become a very complex issue in climate change lawsuits. While at first glance it may seem that causation is the largest obstacle for climate change plaintiffs, injury is equally difficult to prove. This thesis looks at the use of present and future injury in addressing the requirements for standing, as well as whether the injury can be redressed by the courts. Standing, which is a threshold issue for any court, has been limited to past harm. However, looking at issues regarding climate change requires the court to consider how the present impacts the future of litigation. Climate change litigation brings a new angle to these debates and will force the courts to reevaluate their previous conclusions.

The focus of this thesis is to explore the legality, the issues, and the remedy to a controversial statute in the State of Illinois. This thesis will explain how the First Amendment relates to the Illinois statute and its desire of a citizen is right to report information that is not being granted. Moreover, this paper will further go into a recent legislative bill to amend the Illinois statute, its failure, the media surrounding the issue, and the consequences of amending or not amending the statute. It will further review state law in regard to citizens recording police officers, and explain how some states deal with the statute.

Following the decision rendered in Obergefell v. Hodges, there have been unabating talk as to how courts may rule on disputed matters involving same-sex marriages. One specific aspect this thesis intends to focus on is what to expect from custody rulings following dissolutions of same-sex marriages. The purpose of this thesis is to interpret just how courts may rule regarding child custody in same-sex divorces, based on the concept of stare decisis. Given the fresh face of marriage equality in America, there is a lack of research done in the area. This thesis will serve as a substructure and reference for other studies of its kind. Through a focus on defining factors in same-sex relationships as well as factors often identified in heterosexual relationships, this thesis will be able to compare the two to determine what appropriate outcomes courts may result to in cases of child custody following same-sex dissolutions of marriage. This thesis will compile heterosexual cases involving more role-based relationships such as the caregiver and provider as well as collect cases that reflect the egalitarian lifestyle we know to be present in same-sex couples to get a general idea of how courts may rule when both parents are at an equal standing.

It is clear that D.U.I related accidents (driving under the influence) are a highly destructive, and often preventable, occurrence in our society. In response to this, many states in the past decade or so have started to implement D.U.I court programs modeled after drug court programs. Florida, like many other states in the U.S., have multiple active D.U.I court program districts. As of this time, there are currently four active D.U.I. court programs in Florida. These D.U.I. court programs, like drug court, are designed to focus on and facilitate rehabilitative measures against offenders whom have multiple D.U.I offenses. Studies on this relatively new court program, in relation to lowering the recidivism rate on the program's participators, have mostly shown to be effective in lowering the recidivism rate and overall court costs. However, there have been studies that cast doubt on the overall effectiveness on the recidivism rate. There is also little to no amount of studies and data in regard to Florida's D.U.I. court programs. Although understudied, Florida D.U.I courts show equal potential as many other studied D.U.I. courts throughout the U.S. in effecting the recidivism rate of D.U.I. offenders. The intent of this thesis is to explore the feasibility and method of conducting research on the court program designs of each Florida's DU.I. courts, and the recidivism rate of those who successfully underwent the court programs. The present study evaluates the size, scope, and method of each of the potential DU.I. court program research methods on the currently active D.U.I. courts in Florida.

The Supreme Court Justices of the United States sit on the highest court of the land. The justices have the ultimate say as to the meaning of the Constitution, and their role could aptly be summarized as interpreters of the Constitution. They decide what the words of the nation's founding document mean and therefore help to determine the rule of law for the social, political, and economic areas of society. To help them analyze the text of the Constitution and decide what it means and subsequently apply it to cases, justices use constitutional methodologies. Constitutional methodologies are algorithms or ways of thinking about provisions of the Constitution that guide a justice's reasoning and application of the Constitution to cases. These different structured methods of analysis seem to be fair and objective ways of interpreting the Constitution and deciding cases, yet this thesis argues the opposite. The argument expounded in this thesis is that constitutional methodologies instead act as smoke screens, a sort of constitutional camouflage, that allow a justice to decide a constitutional question not according to some objective standard but rather by however they feel it should be decided according to their beliefs and values. These methodologies use their theories, arguments, and philosophies to legitimize interpreting the Constitution a certain way, but this thesis shows that they inevitably lead a justice down a camouflaged path towards a single subjective decision. Multiple justices using the same constitutional methodology to analyze the same constitutional issue could come to different conclusions based on the values they hold and how they utilize the methodology. This subjective decision hides behind the structured methods of analysis purported by constitutional methodologies, and ultimately makes them more akin to smoke screens rather than objective mechanisms for interpreting and applying the Constitution.

In criminal cases, poor individuals must qualify as legally indigent to receive legal representation. In civil cases, poor and indigent individuals must find their own resources to support themselves since the government does not guarantee counsel. Without counsel, poor and indigent individuals are forced to find legal representation for these cases on their own, which can be difficult considering the expenses of fees and fines. Cognitive processes, including bias and stereotypes, create a barrier in advocacy because they cloud judgement of decision-makers, which can diminish the voice of this vulnerable community. Barriers like these create an invisible wall where limited court access restricts poor and indigent people. While there are many factors that contribute to this problem, the legal community has a responsibility to increase and promote education on reducing the impact of the invisible wall towards vulnerable communities.

This thesis draws on the theory and method of social ontology to explore why labour law struggles to provide for wage security and clarity of employment status today. It starts by exploring at a conceptual level the relationship between law and capitalism, before moving on to engage more specifically with the concept of the wage, situating the analysis in a theory of the wage's socio-economic function. The thesis understands the 'wage' as, initially, the market price of the commodity, 'labour power', which is exchanged in the labour market. As with any other 'price', the wage functions to coordinate decision making in the market. At the same time, however, the wage is also the cost of reproducing that commodity, a process which is not confined to the market but takes place in society more generally: this is the function of social reproduction. These two functions are not only conceptually and materially distinct; they are frequently in conflict. The price the market assigns to the labour commodity is not always, and not necessarily, that which is required to cover its costs of (re)production. The thesis shows that these functions of the wage find their expression in the various concepts the legal system uses to describe the payment made by employers to their workers. For example, the legal concept of the 'wage' corresponds closely to the economic idea of the wage as price, and the concept of 'remuneration' to the wage as the cost of social reproduction, shifting some of the social costs of employment onto the employer. How these conceptual tools are deployed, however, and thus how effectively these functions are performed in practice, depends on law's own view of its ontological status: that is, the implicit position that the legal system takes on what constitutes 'social reality' beyond the text of a particular case or statute, and thus its view of whether, and to what extent, legal concepts can shape, as well as respond, to it. The thesis shows that whether the legal system sees its concepts playing an active role in constituting social and economic relations, or whether it sees them as passively reacting to the 'demands' of a 'pre-constituted' economic system makes a difference to the effectiveness of law in practice. Understanding law's implicit ontology in this sense helps us to see why labour law struggles to provide for wage security and clarity of status. Thinking about law's relationship with social reality can thus make an important contribution to our understanding of the problems of low pay and unclear employment status today.

This study investigates the knowledge that legal practitioners use to solve authentic practical legal problems in naturalistic settings. The study examines the declarative and procedural knowledge that practitioners use in that context and whether experienced practitioners use knowledge organised in encapsulated and script form (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990) to enable ‘expert’ performance. The purpose of the study is to provide an empirically-based understanding of the knowledge used in solving real-life practical legal problems, for the information of the providers of practical legal training in Australia and other common law countries. The providers of that training use assumptions about that knowledge and how it is acquired, which do not always rest on coherent theoretical or empirically-derived foundations. The study uses the lawyering literature to identify the knowledge such literature considers is required to solve practical legal problems in lawyer and client interview settings. The study also examines the assumptions about the nature of that knowledge, and how it is acquired, which are apparent in the approaches of the providers of practical legal training. The limitations of those assumptions are identified from a cognitive perspective. The study examines cognitive conceptions of the knowledge used in problem solving in particular fields and how that knowledge becomes proceduralised and organised into structures called chunks and schemas. A particular examination is made of cognitive theories developed in the field of medical problem solving, which use the concepts of ‘encapsulations’ and ‘illness scripts’ to explain ‘expert’ performance in diagnosing disease in clinical settings. This analysis is used to synthesise the prediction that experienced legal practitioners may develop and use structures similar to encapsulations and illness scripts in problem solving. This prediction is based on the similarities between the way medical practitioners and legal practitioners are educated and trained, and are taught to solve problems using a hypotheticodeductive method (or a domain variant in the case of law), and on the similarities between clinical settings and lawyer and client interview settings. The study also examines theories that explain human problem solving by reference to a metaphorical ‘problem space’, and synthesises the prediction that practical legal problem solving can be explained by a problem space theory that was developed to accommodate complex, ill-defined problems. That theory uses the concepts of a problem zone to reflect the ill-defined nature of the problem as presented to the problem solver, a search and construction zone to reflect the phenomenon that the problem solver will have to construct operators to use to solve the problem, and a satisficing zone to reflect the phenomenon that there will be no single unambiguous solution to the problem (Middleton, 1998). The study uses the lawyering literature to identify the characteristics of practical legal problems in a lawyer and client interview setting. The cognitive literature is used to identify the cognitive conceptions that correspond to those characteristics. It is argued that these problems are complex, ill-defined problems that have to be found by the problem solver using weak problem solving strategies such as problem decomposition, attribute identification and means-ends analysis (Simon, 1973; Dillon, 1982; Newell, 1980). Based on these predictions two research questions are developed as follows: How do legal practitioners find and construct practical legal problems? Are there differences in the knowledge that experienced legal practitioners use and that which novice practitioners use? Do those differences reflect differences in the individual practitioner’s underlying knowledge and how that knowledge is organised? These questions are investigated in four case studies. Two of these studies involve experienced legal practitioners and two involve novices. These studies reveal that all the subjects used similar general problem solving strategies to find and construct problems. The subjects all constructed a series of problems rather than one large problem. The subjects did not all find and construct the same problems and some subjects’ constructions of problems changed as new information came to light. Most subjects did not finish the construction of problems at the interview. The processes that the subjects use to construct problems can be explained by Middleton’s (1998) problem space model, although this study suggests that model needs to be modified to accommodate the on-going emergent character of practical legal problems as they occur in lawyer and client interview settings. The investigation revealed qualitative differences between the problem attributes and moves that the experienced subjects identified and those that the novices identified. In summary, the experienced subjects identified attributes and moves that were more detailed, more directly related to the ‘facts’ and more concrete than those that the novices identified. Both the experienced subjects and the novices appeared to rely on recognition (Newell & Simon, 1972) to identify problem attributes and moves rather than on any apparent step-by-step legal analysis and reasoning process. This study suggests that the superior performance of the experienced subjects may be explained by their use of knowledge in encapsulated and script form, as predicted. The study discusses the implications of its findings for practical legal training courses as a need to provide students with general problem solving knowledge, provide them with the knowledge that they will need to recognise problems in specific areas of practice, to help them start to develop knowledge in encapsulated and script form, and to develop an understanding of the limits of institutional training in developing professional expertise.

The primary focus of this thesis is to examine the utilization of paralegals in the job market. A summary and analysis of the paralegal role will include career development, level of academic education, and employment outlook.