The current study examines judicial discourse about BDSM activities within decisions rendered in Canada during the past 20 years. A recent uprise in popular culture representation has resulted in a greater uptake of Bondage / Discipline / Dominance / Submission / Sadism / Masochism (BDSM) in the sexual lives of Canadians. Little research to date has been completed to analyze the implications that the uprise may have on the legal system when BDSM cases are presented. In particular, the legal system is being tasked with interpreting many different consent standards through the narrow affirmative-based definition found under Section 273.1 (1). The current study employed a qualitative analysis of all Canadian criminal court cases and appeals available in legal software that dealt with the issues of consent and BDSM (n=23) over a 20-year time frame. The study found that judges must interpret 4 different types of consent found within sexual relationships: affirmative consent, advanced consent to unconscious acts, consent to bodily harm and mistaken consent. Finally, the current study found that the way judges interpreted BDSM consent standards reflects a wider shift in governance from legal moralist thinking to a neoliberal paternalist governance.

RÉSUMÉ Reprenant les trois argumentaires des rapports divergents de la commission le Dain de 1972, soit le moralisme juridique pour le maintien de la prohibition du cannabis, le paternalisme juridique pour la décriminalisation de sa possession simple et le libéralisme juridique pour sa légalisation, cette thèse mobilise ce triptyque inspiré par trois philosophes juridiques à l’aide de l’analyse de contenu afin de voir comment ces arguments se sont manifestés à nouveau dans le processus parlementaire d’adoption du projet de loi C-45 ayant mené à la légalisation du cannabis au Canada. De plus, elle mobilise aussi le concept de la rationalité pénale moderne dans le but de comprendre l’approbation chez les différents acteurs d’avoir recours au pénal dans ce projet de loi en acceptant l’inclusion de deux nouvelles infractions criminelles passibles de 14 ans d’emprisonnement. Ces infractions visent un adulte qui ferait participer un mineur au marché illégal de cannabis, ou encore vendrait ou donnerait du cannabis à un mineur. La clarification de ce paradoxe était importante considérant que ce projet de loi fut essentiellement justifié par ceux qui y étaient favorables sur la volonté de diminuer un recours au droit criminel identifié comme inefficace à la réduction de la consommation du cannabis, tout en créant de nouvelles infractions pénales pour éviter son accès aux mineurs. Les résultats de cette thèse ont démontré que si des philosophies de type moraliste et paternaliste demeurent bien présentes lors des débats parlementaires sur C-45, le libéralisme juridique l’est aussi, mais tend fortement à disparaitre dès qu’arrive la question de la santé et de la sécurité des mineurs. De plus, si la durée des nouvelles peines demeure contestée par certains, il semble qu’en aucun temps le recours au pénal en guise d’outil de gestion de ces infractions ne soit remis en question, ce qui s’est traduit entre autres par l’absence totale de débats en ce qui a trait à l’utilisation d’un mineur dans le marché illégal de cannabis. Ce dernier point pourrait s’expliquer par une volonté de réforme par contraste qui vise une meilleure efficacité du système en place plutôt qu’une réforme générative qui cherche l’innovation et le renouveau, ce qui aurait demandé la remise en question du paradigme dominant sur certaines drogues actuellement illégales, soit la prohibition. ABSTRACT By taking up the three arguments of the divergent reports of the Le Dain Commission of 1972, the legal moralism in favor of the maintenance of the prohibition of cannabis, the legal paternalism for the decriminalization of tis simple possession and the legal liberalism in favor of legalization, this thesis mobilize this triptych inspired by three legal philosophers by using content analysis in parliamentary debates to see how these arguments manifested themselves again in the process of passing Bill C-45 which led to the legalization of cannabis in Canada. Furthermore, it also mobilizes the concept of modern criminal rationality in order to understand the approval for the various actors to use the criminal law in this bill by accepting the inclusion of two new criminal offenses punishable by 14 years of imprisonment. These offenses target an adult who would involve a minor in the illegal cannabis market, or sell or give cannabis to a minor. The clarification of this paradox was important considering that this bill was essentially justified by those who were in favor of reducing the use of criminal law identified as ineffective in reducing the use of cannabis, while creating new offenses to prevent its access from minors. The results of this thesis have shown that while moralistic and paternalistic philosophies remain very much present during parliamentary debates on Bill C-45, legal liberalism is also present, but tends to disappear as soon as the question of health and safety of minors come up. Moreover, while the duration of the new sentences is still disputed by some, it appears that at no time is the use of the criminal law as a tool for managing these offenses is questioned, which has resulted in the total lack of debate regarding the use of a minor in the illegal cannabis market. This last point could be explained by a desire for the adoption of a reform by contrast which aims to improve the effectiveness of the system in place rather than a generative reform that seeks innovation and renewal, which would have asked a questioning of the dominant paradigm on some currently illegal drugs, the prohibition in itself.

Tendo como premissas teóricas o liberalismo político e os limites internos da atuação do Estado, este estudo pretende ser uma contribuição à crítica do paternalismo jurídico, na medida em que traz para o debate constitucional contemporâneo uma categoria pouco estudada no direito brasileiro. O paternalismo existe se um agente estatal exerce o poder sobre um indivíduo, por meio de uma ação governamental, com a finalidade de evitar que o indivíduo pratique ações privadas ou se omita de tal forma a causar danos, ou risco de danos, a si mesmo. A partir da Constituição de 1988, os direitos fundamentais, em especial a autonomia individual, voltaram a ser levados a sério. Pouco a pouco, as questões morais controvertidas ganham espaço na mídia e nos tribunais. Essas questões exigem dos intérpretes uma nova hermenêutica. A leitura moral da constituição é o método interpretativo que traz a moralidade política para o centro do direito constitucional. Como a Constituição Federal de 1988 está vazada numa linguagem jurídica extremamente abstrata, é preciso recorrer a princípios morais abstratos, usados como limites aos poderes do Estado. Essa leitura moral da Constituição consagra o princípio central contra o paternalismo: cada indivíduo é digno de igual consideração e respeito como sujeito autônomo de direitos. / Taking as theoretical premises the political liberalism and the inner bounds of state action, this study aims to be a contribution to the critics of legal paternalism, as it brings to the current constitutional debate a still barely studied category. Legal paternalism exists if a state official influences someone to practice or to avoid conducts that could cause harm to self through government actions. Since the Constitution of 1988, fundamental rights- especially autonomy- have been taken seriously again. Gradually, the controversial moral issues have reached both the media and the Courts, requiring from interpreters a new hermeneutics. The moral reading of the constitution is the interpretative method which brings political morality to the center of Constitutional Law. As the Constitution of 1988 is built upon a highly abstract language, it is necessary to resort to abstract moral principles, which are used as limits to the powers of State. In a word, it is necessary to develop a moral reading of the Constitution which consecrate the main principle against paternalism: the State owes to each and every person equal respect and concern as autonomous rightsholder.

Tendo como premissas teóricas o liberalismo político e os limites internos da atuação do Estado, este estudo pretende ser uma contribuição à crítica do paternalismo jurídico, na medida em que traz para o debate constitucional contemporâneo uma categoria pouco estudada no direito brasileiro. O paternalismo existe se um agente estatal exerce o poder sobre um indivíduo, por meio de uma ação governamental, com a finalidade de evitar que o indivíduo pratique ações privadas ou se omita de tal forma a causar danos, ou risco de danos, a si mesmo. A partir da Constituição de 1988, os direitos fundamentais, em especial a autonomia individual, voltaram a ser levados a sério. Pouco a pouco, as questões morais controvertidas ganham espaço na mídia e nos tribunais. Essas questões exigem dos intérpretes uma nova hermenêutica. A leitura moral da constituição é o método interpretativo que traz a moralidade política para o centro do direito constitucional. Como a Constituição Federal de 1988 está vazada numa linguagem jurídica extremamente abstrata, é preciso recorrer a princípios morais abstratos, usados como limites aos poderes do Estado. Essa leitura moral da Constituição consagra o princípio central contra o paternalismo: cada indivíduo é digno de igual consideração e respeito como sujeito autônomo de direitos. / Taking as theoretical premises the political liberalism and the inner bounds of state action, this study aims to be a contribution to the critics of legal paternalism, as it brings to the current constitutional debate a still barely studied category. Legal paternalism exists if a state official influences someone to practice or to avoid conducts that could cause harm to self through government actions. Since the Constitution of 1988, fundamental rights- especially autonomy- have been taken seriously again. Gradually, the controversial moral issues have reached both the media and the Courts, requiring from interpreters a new hermeneutics. The moral reading of the constitution is the interpretative method which brings political morality to the center of Constitutional Law. As the Constitution of 1988 is built upon a highly abstract language, it is necessary to resort to abstract moral principles, which are used as limits to the powers of State. In a word, it is necessary to develop a moral reading of the Constitution which consecrate the main principle against paternalism: the State owes to each and every person equal respect and concern as autonomous rightsholder.