Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / Though Americans have tended to be untheoretical or undogmatic in their politics, they have persistently believed that a two-house legislature is superior to one having a single chamber. John Adams long ago expressed the attitude which has become traditional when he wrote: "A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailities of an individual, subject to fits of humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudices, and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgements." The purpose of this paper is to present as clearly as possible the historical background for the adoption of two houses, a subject so extenuous that few have hazarded it. The procedure to be followed is to discuss the various circumstances state by state which brought about bicameralism leaving out those states whose experiences paralleled each other or whose records were too scanty to provide an adequate analysis. These commonwealths include Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Vermont plus an account of bicameralism and the Constitutional Convention of 1787. [TRUNCATED]

Thesis - Alger / Bibliography: p. [7]-8

This research addresses the question under what conditions will rank and file legislators favor or oppose changes in a legislature’s internal rules of order. The study deviates from previous approaches to the study of legislatures in four primary ways: 1) the study moves from advanced democratized cases of the U.S. Congress and British House of Commons to cases of neo-democracies; 2) the study considers the interaction between the design of the electoral system and its impact on legislature organization; 3) in addition to chamber level factors, party and individual level factors are considered; and 4) the theory considers when legislators will rebel against attempts by party leadership to alter the internal rules of order. The central question focused on is what factors influence legislators’ willingness to speak out or vote against changes in the internal rules of order following a change in the electoral system design. The theory proposed that when it comes to changing the internal rules of order of a legislative chamber, the effective number of parties in the chamber, the effect of proposed changes in the rules of order on legislator behavior, party discipline, and the nature of legislator ambition affect the probability that change occurs. Experimental and statistical methodologies are used to test the hypotheses derived from the theory. Original data were collected from experiments conducted on undergraduate pupils at Texas A&M University. For the statistical analyses, a data set of proposed changes in the rules of order were compiled using archived data from the Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress. This multi-method approach was used because of the nature of the question under examination and to minimize limitations of the individual methodologies. The experimental analyses demonstrate that the operations of the theory are supported in the controlled environment of the experiment. The results from the statistical analyses were, within the restrictions imposed by the data, consistent with both theoretical expectations and the experimental findings. The most consistent factor influencing change in the rules of order is the effect of the proposal followed by party discipline.

Policy-minded legislatures have a number of tools to implement policy at their disposal. On the one hand, they can write specific legislation and ensure that their policy wishes are accurately carried out. On the other hand, legislatures can delegate this authority to administrative agencies, and, with broad authority, allow them to formulate policy in a manner consistent with the preferences of the agency. This "delegation game" has received significant scholarly attention, and scholars have noted that the political context within which legislatures make this decision affects whether or not delegation will occur. Scholars have also examined the role that interest groups play in this game, yet studies at the interest group level are few in number. Interest groups are strategic actors that formulate strategies of lobbying in a manner that maximizes their potential influence per their resources. As such, interest groups should formulate lobbying strategies that take into consideration the delegation game that legislatures play when formulating policy. In this paper, I develop a game-theoretic model of legislative delegation and examine interest group lobbying strategies within that context. The equilibria from the game that I present: (1) Confirm previous studies of legislative delegation that argue legislatures delegate in a strategic manner given differing political conditions and (2) Suggests that indeed interest groups are strategic actors who develop lobbying strategies based on the expected actions of the legislature.

Thesis--Rotterdam. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thése--Université de Paris. / "Bibliographic"; p. [209]-211.

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 261-278). Also available via the Internet

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Rostock.