A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in 50 per cent fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) February 2017 / This study examines legislative oversight practice within the Limpopo Legislature (subnational government) in South Arica, over a specific historic period. Legislative oversight and executive accountability are constitutionally mandated responsibilities. This study is focused on the fourth term (2009-2014) of the government of Limpopo, when financial management and policy implementation challenges resulted in five departments being placed under national administration. Semi-structured interviews and document analysis was utilised to understand the practice of legislative oversight and explore the challenges embedded in securing executive accountability. Drawing on the literature, a conceptual framework was used to guide the process for establishing the areas for detailed exploration. These included the legal and institutional framework for oversight; the capacity availed and utilised for oversight; and the informal institutional incentives and challenges that influenced the performance of oversight. The study revealed that oversight by the legislature and accountability by the executive are intertwined mandates and there are numerous contingencies embedded in the relationships they embody. The manner in which mandates unfold and oversight is exercised is affected by the underlying political dynamics within the dominant party. These dynamics impact on the autonomy of the legislature, shape the power relations between the executive and the legislature and creates incentives for practices that impact on legislative oversight and executive accountability. Members of the legislature were junior in party structures and did not have political authority which influenced the extent to which members of the legislature held the executive answerable as well as the extent to which the executive would account. In addition, the capacity of the institution and budget were insufficient to perform adequate oversight effectively and timeously and enable the legislature to develop into an efficient and successful institution. Furthermore, the legislature relied on the executive for information which was not always credible or reliable. This combination of factors led to oversight at times not being effective. The lessons derived from this study can be used to improve oversight effectiveness at a subnational and national governance level. However, given the role that the party plays in the governance system, there is a need for further research on party functioning, party incentives and internal democracy within the party. Key words: legislative oversight, executive accountability, parliamentary system, proportional representation, electoral system, Limpopo / MT2017

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Over the past two decades there has been a rapid decline in public oversight of state and local governments. From 2003 to 2014, the number of journalists assigned to cover the proceedings in state houses has declined by more than 30\%. During the same time period, non-profit projects such as Digital Democracy sought to collect and store legislative bill and hearing information on behalf of the public. More recently, AI4Reporters, an offshoot of Digital Democracy, seeks to actively summarize interesting legislative data. This thesis presents STRAINER, a parallel project with AI4Reporters, as an active data retrieval and filtering system for surfacing newsworthy legislative data. Within STRAINER we define and implement a process pipeline by which information regarding legislative bill discussion events can be collected from a variety of sources and aggregated into feature sets suitable for machine learning. Utilizing two independent labeling techniques we trained a variety of SVM and Logistic Regression models to predict the newsworthiness of bill discussions that took place in the California State Legislature during the 2017-2018 session year. We found that our models were able to correctly retrieve more than 80\% of newsworthy discussions.

Le fondement théorique du contrôle parlementaire du budget exécuté a été prévu par la DDHC de 1789. Cependant, c’est sous la Restauration que son application fut devint possible. Ainsi, l’utilité et l’efficacité du contrôle parlementaire du budget exécuté résidèrent dans l’établissement d’un chaînage budgétaire qui avait pour finalité, non seulement la clôture d’un exercice budgétaire dans un délai assez court mais aussi de perfectionner la prévision des budgets ultérieures. Alors que la Restauration était « l’âge d’or » du contrôle parlementaire a posteriori du budget de l’État, la 3e et la 4e Républiques furent les périodes de l’abandon de la loi de règlement. Pour autant, la Ve République n’a pas amélioré la situation. Mais, la nécessité de réformer l’État a créé une occasion sans précédent pour que les Assemblées parlementaires françaises retrouvent une meilleure place parmi les institutions politiques. La LOLF du 1er août 2001, a été adoptée pour renforcer les prérogatives budgétaires du Législateur. Même si la loi de règlement n’a pas changé son caractère juridique, les documents comptables qui l’accompagnent et son adoption dans un délai très court, lui octroient toute son effectivité. En revanche l’absence d’objectif précis et pragmatique ainsi que le manque de volonté parlementaire en sont les principaux facteurs. La solution que nous proposons consiste à fixer la soutenabilité des finances publiques, exigée par les Traités européens, comme l’objectif principal de loi de règlement et à continuer la réforme de l’État afin de redonner aux parlementaires l’envie de contrôler l’exécution budgétaire. / The basis of parliamentary oversight on budget was foreseen by Human and Citizen Right’s Declaration of 1789. But, it wasn’t applicable before “Restauration”. If “Restauration” period was a “golden age” of parliamentary control on budget, the IIIrd and IVth Republic were the age of its decline. On one hand, parliamentary prerogative to amend Budget Act and on the other hand, delays in establishment of budgetary document were the essential reasons.We can observe a mutation in parliamentary budget control during the Fifth Republic. In 1958, France has adopted a new constitution to found a semi-presidential political system. But what had consequently reduced Parliament’s budget competence, was the Organic Act of the 2nd January of 1959. This limitation contributed to demotivate MPs because they considered this institution in decline. However, when the French State engaged in new reforms, Parliament tried to prepare and adopt a new Organic Act to balance again budgetary relationship. With this end in view, different mechanisms were created to reinforce parliamentary budget oversight. Nevertheless, we can not estimate the promised effectiveness until MPs haven’t political will and pragmatic objectives. We think the economical sustainability, as the most important European engagement of French Government, can be a real objective. For all that, political involvement of Parliament will be obtained when the State reform continues and the “value of money” becomes the national priority.

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Management in the field of Public Policy / This study investigates oversight and accountability in the City of Johannesburg. The study explores the City of Johannesburg’s new governance model as implemented after the 2006 local government elections. The study is premised on establishing an understanding of the issues that the City of Johannesburg is grappling with since rolling out its oversight and accountability model as adopted by its Council in 2006. The Constitution of South Africa (1996) vests both the executive and legislative authority in the Municipal Council. This is in contrast to other spheres of government, namely National and Provincial, whereby there are specific chapters on what the Executive, the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures powers are. The study begins by discussing the cases of separation of powers in local government in the United Kingdom and the City of Johannesburg governance model and the rationale behind implementing such a model. The study then makes an analysis of the legislative framework in South Africa that gives expression to oversight and accountability in government broadly. The study discusses its research methodology and the rationale for such a methodology in investigating issues that the City of Johannesburg is faced with in implementing its oversight and accountability model. In this case study the researcher explores the functionality of the model. In doing so, the researcher then proposes ways of ensuring that the oversight and accountability could be more effective and whether there are any legislative impediments, and then propose to national law makers what needs to be done as informed by the research conducted

<p>In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a deliberative legislative body. This is considered critical for the municipal council to establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, particularly, oversight of budget execution. However, indications are that, the current legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council to exercise oversight of the budget execution. Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of budget execution. In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South African municipalities.</p>

<p>In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a deliberative legislative body. This is considered critical for the municipal council to establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, particularly, oversight of budget execution. However, indications are that, the current legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council to exercise oversight of the budget execution. Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of budget execution. In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South African municipalities.</p>

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / In South Africa, municipal councils are accorded a legal status and authority of a deliberative legislative body. This is considered critical for the municipal council to establish appropriate structures, processes and systems for effective oversight, particularly, oversight of budget execution. However, indications are that, the current legal and institutional measures need to be strengthened to enable municipal council to exercise oversight of the budget execution. Literature review conducted in this study highlighted executive dominance, lack of technical capacity, lack of access to relevant information and partisan attitude as key factors constraining elected representatives in general from exercising oversight of budget execution. In addition, the review identified institutional and behavioural criteria as the normative framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legal and institutional measures for oversight of budget execution in South African municipalities. / South Africa

過去立法院常被譏為行政院的橡皮圖章，但隨著國內民主政治的快速發展，立法院已成為我國當前最重要的政治舞台，不管是各政黨或是政治人物，對於在立法院合議制度下，所形成的權力分享與利益分配，都有莫大的關注與興趣。再者，立法院職權之行使攸關人民生活財產的維護，在民主化的過程裡，代表民意的立法院，更背負著民眾的高度期待。因此，研究立法院之監督功能，對立法與行政之間的互動關係做一明確的界定與釐清，將有助於了解我國民主政治的建立與實踐民主化的進程。 本研究旨在探討立法院之監督功能，也因此擬先介紹民主國家國會監督概念，針對「監督」一詞，加以界定並分析其理論基礎。再針對各國憲政發展之比較，來了解何以要研究我國立法院監督功能，並從我國民主發展過程中，探討立法院扮演監督功能的意義與角色，最後試圖從法制規範層次與實務操作層次上，找尋出我國立法院所具有的監督效果，以達到探究其監督功能之目的。 從萬年國會到國會全面改選，乃至目前歷經六次修憲以來，我國國會體制逐漸落實立法院真正成為全國最高立法機關之制度設計，不過立法權如何有效落實其監督制衡行政權的功能，除了從靜態的憲法條文賦予的職權來分析，還必須透過動態的立法權行使過程加以探討。因此，本文先從民主憲政原理中的監督背景及其概念，假設我國在國會全面改選後，雖然行政部門過去的主導力量甚強，但立法權仍能發揮其監督行政權之功能，以立法院所行使的職權是否具有監督功能來分析，並觀察出立法院非制度面部分，具有的實際監督功能之機制，最後做出結論與提出建議。 本文分成六個部分。第一章緒論，介紹本論文研究背景、研究目的、概念界定、研究架構設定、文獻回顧、研究方法及研究範圍與限制；第二章國會監督功能之理論基礎，從形成國會的民主概念破題，來介紹國會監督功能之背景、意義、基礎、技術，以了解民主國家之國會監督功能；第三章我國立法院監督功能之介紹，從我國立法院形成之背景，來介紹立法院監督功能之背景、意義、基礎、技術，以呼應第二章；第四章法制規範層次之監督功能分析，是以監督對象為基礎來分析立法院的監督功能，文中將監督對象分成對人如同意權、彈劾權等；對機關如預算權的監督；對政策如法案權，再放置到四個重要民主政治概念（權力分立、代議政治、有限政府、權力制衡）中來檢驗，以了解其法源依據、規範作用及實質影響；第五章實務操作層次之監督功能分析，將提出具有實際運作而無法在法制層次探討如議事杯葛、政黨協商等非正式制度面之監督功能，從實務操作層次中，去探討其實質影響。第六章結論，提出研究過程中所得到之發現，及希冀提供後進研究者之建議。