This thesis investigates the moral permissibility of military privatization. My analysis focuses on two distinct concepts: the authorization of war and the supply of war. Entities that authorize war decide that military force will be used and by whom; entities that supply war then execute the various tasks that have been authorized for performance. Part I argues that private actors may not justifiably authorize war. The reason is that, in so doing, they would impose considerable risks on individuals who lack a say in authorization—particularly fellow countrymen who may suffer from retaliatory military action—and we ought not to impose considerable risks on individuals who lack such a say. Public actors have a right, and indeed a duty, to prevent private actors from authorizing military force. Moreover, public actors have a further duty to authorize military force when their constituents are threatened. Part II then seeks to show that public actors who authorize military force may rely upon private contractors to an extent in military supply. Public actors may not rely upon private contractors to exercise command. The reason is that commanders must be able to punish their subordinates in intrusive ways (e.g. imprisonment) to ensure the prosecution of just wars. Such intrusive forms of punishment should only be dispensed by public actors. In addition, public actors may not rely upon private contractors to serve above commanders on the chain of command. Such high-ranking military officers exercise substantial political power over civilian decisions of military authorization and supply; moreover, these officers make weighty decisions in battle that substantially affect the well-being of others. Public actors, however, should be permitted to rely upon private contractors to serve below military commanders on the chain of command in rank-and-file military roles so long as these contractors are properly constrained and regulated.

One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `political obligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates political obligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a political obligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning political matters (e.g. a moral requirement to obey the laws and support one's country). Despite this agreement about the general nature of what is being searched for, a broad division has arisen between political obligation theorists - there are some who take political obligations to actually exist ("defenders of political obligation") and there are some who take there to be no general political obligation ("philosophical anarchists"). While there is debate within the camp defending political obligation about what it is that generates the obligations, the common core of all "defender theories" is the fundamental idea that one has a moral requirement(s) to support and obey the political institutions of one's country. Despite utilitarianism's status as one of the major ethical theories, historically, it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. Within the contemporary debate it is generally accepted that utilitarianism cannot adequately accommodate a robust theory of political obligation. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to challenge this general dismissal of a utilitarian account and to build upon the two accounts which have been developed (R.M. Hare's and Rolf Sartorius') in offering a robust utilitarian theory of political obligation which can be considered a competitor to the other contemporary theories (i.e., theories of consent, gratitude, fair play or fairness, membership or association, and natural duty). However, as this utilitarian account of political obligation develops, the possibility will also emerge for a non-antagonistic relationship between the utilitarian theory on offer and the contemporary political obligation debate. The moral reasons posited by the traditional theories of political obligation (i.e., consent, fair play, gratitude, associative, and natural duty) can be included in and accommodated by my utilitarian account. The utilitarian account of political obligation can accept that there are many types of reasons explaining why broad expectations concerning individual and group behavior are created, and each type of reason can be understood as supporting the utilitarian claim that there are moral reasons for following the laws and supporting legitimate political authorities. Taken all together, my arguments will take the form of a three tiered response to the prevailing opinion that any utilitarian attempt to account for political obligations is doomed. The first tier contends that the utilitarian can consistently claim that there are moral reasons to follow the law. This is not a particularly strong claim, but it is one which has been denied by the vast majority of political theorists. The second tier of my argument addresses this apparent issue by contending that even the traditional deontological accounts of political obligation are not offering more than this. Lastly, it is contended that, given the contingent features of humans (i.e., intellectual fallibility, selfish biases, and the way moral education is tied to rules), the strength of the utilitarian political obligations is comparable to other accounts' analyses of the obligations.

Religious fundamentalism is a confusing and not well understood phenomenon in present day Western societies. In order to obtain fresh insights into what social forces and conditions affect religious organizational development such that they become fundamentalist organizations, this study seeks to analyze a religious group that historically has been mandated to integrate and utilize alternative scientific and/or religious knowledge into their canon of teachings. A triangulation study consisting of a content analysis of its accepted history and a discourse analysis of its accredited membership are utilized to gather data on this religious organization to understand the historical, organizational, and external social circumstances that have allowed this religious community to engage and interact with alternative scientific and/or religious knowledge without interpretations of conflict becoming a source of social strife within their organization.

Religious fundamentalism is a confusing and not well understood phenomenon in present day Western societies. In order to obtain fresh insights into what social forces and conditions affect religious organizational development such that they become fundamentalist organizations, this study seeks to analyze a religious group that historically has been mandated to integrate and utilize alternative scientific and/or religious knowledge into their canon of teachings. A triangulation study consisting of a content analysis of its accepted history and a discourse analysis of its accredited membership are utilized to gather data on this religious organization to understand the historical, organizational, and external social circumstances that have allowed this religious community to engage and interact with alternative scientific and/or religious knowledge without interpretations of conflict becoming a source of social strife within their organization.

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One of the chief international security issues of today is humanitarian militaryintervention. In light of this, some questions have been raised about when and howoutsiders should get involved or if they are morally right at all to engage in humanitariancrises. In this paper Syria is the chosen case study because of its brutal crackdown and amassive human rights violation. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand themoral and legal criteria for launching a military intervention for humanitarian aid in Syriafollowed by a detailed analysis of its ethical, normative and legal issues. The maintheoretical framework of this study is just war theory. This study utilizes the criteria ofJus ad bellum principles, namely ‘legitimate authority’, ‘just cause’ and ‘right intention’in order to asses the extent to which Syria fits into the framework of just war theory. Thispaper also applies legal criteria such as the Charter of United Nations and internationallaw for the purpose of legal examination. The most complex issue in this thesis is the factthat although legitimate authority has the moral responsibilities to protect civilians, but itoften fails to uphold its responsibility mainly because of self-interest and the lack of rightintention.

Thesis (M.S.)--Miami University, Dept. of Family Studies and Social Work, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-54).