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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliano de Almeida Oliveira.pdf: 1059613 bytes, checksum: a88e1f295120d10a98fb69c5b12893aa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-04-27 / This work wishes to investigate the writings of Levinas, from the perspective of the intentionality of consciousness in order to check the plausibility of considering it or not linked to the phenomenological approach, initiated by Husserl. In the three chapters which make up, we seek to provide: a) the thought of Husserl, array of contemporary phenomenology, in his theoretical and historical context, emphasizing the fundamental concept of intentionality animating consciousness, b) the first contact Emmanuel Levinas and the phenomenology and its interpretation of Husserl in this doctoral thesis which he defended in 1930, which highlighted his ontological reading of the Husserlian project, and in particular the understanding of intentionality - the essence of subjectivity - as transcendence c) the development and maturation of Levinasian philosophy, always in dialogue with the phenomenology, in which the ethical vision of otherness, based on the face of another, shall exercise primary role and serves as a criterion for evaluating the concept of intentionality, particularly his theory, which priority is to give way to a pre-theoretical dimension of consciousness - consciousness unintentional. We reach the conclusion that, if not in appearance sought by Husserl, the first momentum of intentionality - out of himself as his own constituent status - remains a strong point of the thought of Levinas and to suggest a Levinasian posterity of Husserl, to beyond all apparent total collapse / O presente trabalho deseja investigar os escritos de Levinas, a partir do prisma da intencionalidade da consciência, a fim de se verificar a plausibilidade de considerá-lo vinculado ou não ao pensamento fenomenológico, iniciado por Husserl. Nos três capítulos em que se articula, busca-se apresentar: a) o pensamento de Husserl, matriz da fenomenologia contemporânea, em seu contexto histórico e teórico, ressaltando o conceito fundamental de intencionalidade que anima a consciência; b) os primeiros contatos de Emmanuel Levinas com a fenomenologia e sua interpretação de Husserl presente na tese doutoral que defendeu em 1930, em que se destacam sua leitura ontológica do projeto husserliano e, em particular, a compreensão da intencionalidade essência da subjetividade como transcendência; c) o desenvolvimento e amadurecimento da filosofia levinasiana, sempre em diálogo com a fenomenologia, em que a visão ética da alteridade, fundada sobre o rosto do outro, passa a exercer papel de primeira grandeza e serve de critério para avaliar o conceito de intencionalidade, sobretudo aquela teórica, cuja primazia vem ceder espaço a uma dimensão pré-teórica da consciência a consciência não-intencional. Chega-se à conclusão de que, ainda que não no aspecto visado por Husserl, o dinamismo primeiro da intencionalidade saída de si como próprio elemento constitutivo originário permanece como ponto forte do pensamento de Levinas e permite afirmar uma posteridade levinasiana de Husserl, para além de toda aparente ruptura total

This thesis addresses a major trend (what might be termed a “post-Buddhism”) within contemporary Western Buddhist thinking, and hence practice, emphasising the epistemic, existential and ethical autonomy of self as it engages with the Asian Buddhist traditions. Aligning its enquiry with a corresponding hermeneutic of the Buddha‘s biography in his “second renunciation” (his social-psychological and praxiological relinquishment of the structures of religious authority) it focuses on the work of contemporary Western dharma teachers Stephen Batchelor, David Loy and Alan Clements. Their respective emphases of agnostic doubt, ontological groundlessness, and existential-ethical autonomy are investigated in turn, alongside a corresponding reading of the Buddha‘s praxis prior to his enlightenment. Of interest to academic Buddhist Studies, this analysis introduces potential re-theorisations of the meta-epistemic nature of Buddhist praxis and the phenomenology of self and Buddhist ‘non-self’ as it/they engage with both Buddhist and Derridean deconstructive (contemplative and intellectual) praxis. It also considers a re-contextualisation of Buddhist ethics as it is influenced by the deconstructive and ethical strategies of Derrida and Levinas, as well as a (native but under-explored) Buddhist ‘ethics of non-duality.’ (All of these themes might be seen as more or less implicit also in the work of Western Buddhist theorists such as Roger Jackson, John Makransky, José Ignacio Cabezón, Alan B. Wallace, John Pickering and so on, and their deconstructionist counterparts in John Caputo, Robert Magliola, Steven Laycock, Carl Olson and others.) The thesis concludes with a general theorisation of the newly-inflected models of Buddhist enlightenment, praxiology and ethical engagement that necessarily emerge from such a shift of emphasis: a post-secular, non-hierarchical trans-religious culture of self-determination both within and without tradition. The Buddha‘s enlightenment itself emerges as a heterogeneous culture of human freedoms rather than a form of univocal religious transcendence. Similarly, Batchelor, Loy and Clements’ concerns around authenticity can be seen as productive elements of an evolving model of Buddhism within Western culture: one that in paradoxically grounding itself in ‘groundlessness,’ returns to the meta-religious roots of Gotama Buddha‘s own socio-historic transformation of the (religious and other) conditions of his time. Such a transformation becomes characterised by a greater attention to the contingencies of the unique self and its environment, knowledge-acquisition and its constructed character, justice and ethical ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of normative religious claims.

This thesis addresses a major trend (what might be termed a “post-Buddhism”) within contemporary Western Buddhist thinking, and hence practice, emphasising the epistemic, existential and ethical autonomy of self as it engages with the Asian Buddhist traditions. Aligning its enquiry with a corresponding hermeneutic of the Buddha‘s biography in his “second renunciation” (his social-psychological and praxiological relinquishment of the structures of religious authority) it focuses on the work of contemporary Western dharma teachers Stephen Batchelor, David Loy and Alan Clements. Their respective emphases of agnostic doubt, ontological groundlessness, and existential-ethical autonomy are investigated in turn, alongside a corresponding reading of the Buddha‘s praxis prior to his enlightenment. Of interest to academic Buddhist Studies, this analysis introduces potential re-theorisations of the meta-epistemic nature of Buddhist praxis and the phenomenology of self and Buddhist ‘non-self’ as it/they engage with both Buddhist and Derridean deconstructive (contemplative and intellectual) praxis. It also considers a re-contextualisation of Buddhist ethics as it is influenced by the deconstructive and ethical strategies of Derrida and Levinas, as well as a (native but under-explored) Buddhist ‘ethics of non-duality.’ (All of these themes might be seen as more or less implicit also in the work of Western Buddhist theorists such as Roger Jackson, John Makransky, José Ignacio Cabezón, Alan B. Wallace, John Pickering and so on, and their deconstructionist counterparts in John Caputo, Robert Magliola, Steven Laycock, Carl Olson and others.) The thesis concludes with a general theorisation of the newly-inflected models of Buddhist enlightenment, praxiology and ethical engagement that necessarily emerge from such a shift of emphasis: a post-secular, non-hierarchical trans-religious culture of self-determination both within and without tradition. The Buddha‘s enlightenment itself emerges as a heterogeneous culture of human freedoms rather than a form of univocal religious transcendence. Similarly, Batchelor, Loy and Clements’ concerns around authenticity can be seen as productive elements of an evolving model of Buddhism within Western culture: one that in paradoxically grounding itself in ‘groundlessness,’ returns to the meta-religious roots of Gotama Buddha‘s own socio-historic transformation of the (religious and other) conditions of his time. Such a transformation becomes characterised by a greater attention to the contingencies of the unique self and its environment, knowledge-acquisition and its constructed character, justice and ethical ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of normative religious claims.