Using Gene Sharp’s guidelines for nonviolent action and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s four arenas of contestation (electoral, legislative, judiciary, and the media) that allow opposition forces to challenge, weaken, or defeat competitive authoritarian regimes, this study provides a functionalist analysis of Serbia’s Otpor movement. Serbia under Milošević was a particular type of hybrid regime called competitive authoritarianism, a regime where the rules of a fully democratically integrated government are violated so often and to such extent that competitive authoritarian incumbents fall short of the bare minimum standards of conventional democracy, bordering the line of authoritarian dictators. Combining Sharp, Levitsky, and Way’s functionalist perspective on social movements with those of sociologists Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood and Charles Stewart’s functional approach to the rhetoric of social movements, this study outlines Otpor’s strategies and analyzes them in hopes of outlining a blueprint for future social movements with similar political opportunities available.

Using Gene Sharp’s guidelines for nonviolent action and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s four arenas of contestation (electoral, legislative, judiciary, and the media) that allow opposition forces to challenge, weaken, or defeat competitive authoritarian regimes, this study provides a functionalist analysis of Serbia’s Otpor movement. Serbia under Milošević was a particular type of hybrid regime called competitive authoritarianism, a regime where the rules of a fully democratically integrated government are violated so often and to such extent that competitive authoritarian incumbents fall short of the bare minimum standards of conventional democracy, bordering the line of authoritarian dictators. Combining Sharp, Levitsky, and Way’s functionalist perspective on social movements with those of sociologists Charles Tilly and Lesley Wood and Charles Stewart’s functional approach to the rhetoric of social movements, this study outlines Otpor’s strategies and analyzes them in hopes of outlining a blueprint for future social movements with similar political opportunities available.

This study examines if the process of democratic backsliding is observable in the discursive patterns of a government that is the driving force of democratic erosion which can be useful when attempting to discern if a government has undemocratic ambitions. The actor analyzed to answer the research question is the government of Ethiopia. Three hypotheses have been developed based on Levitsky and Ziblatt’s model of democratic backsliding and from these, an analytical framework containing a set of questions has been developed. The questions have been used to systematically analyze the source material. This study found that the Ethiopian government framed those in law and law enforcement agencies and other opposition it perceives as adversaries as illegitimate actors while glorifying and legitimizing their own. In addition, the study found that the government argued that criticism directed at it not following laws or the constitution was either from an illegitimate source or not based on facts.

The study examines to what extent Levitsky & Ziblatt’s theory of democratic backsliding, as a universal three-step sequential process of democratic deterioration, can explain the novel phenomena of Covid-19 autocratization, in the context of Poland. Via said aim, the research serves as an explorative investigation into the strategies and methods used to invoke democratic backsliding amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. The theory’s external validity is assessed by analyzing the most blatant and far-reaching policies of Polish Covid-19 autocratization, targeting the presidential election, health personnel, and civil servants. To structure said analysis Vedung’s goal-attainment evaluation model is utilized. Results conclude that the theory lacks significant explanatory power. While the targets of democratic deterioration remained relevant, theoretical conformity only occurred for one of the analyzed policies, while the rest revealed tactics of democratic deterioration not theoretically applicable. Moreover, substantial parts of the theory remained irrelevant, and the theory’s sequential aspect did not apply. Consequently, the study proposes a revised version of the theoretical framework, encompassing strategies of democratic deterioration specific to the examined context and that disregards the sequential aspect. The likely explanation for the lack of theoretical conformity is attributed to the structural component; the theory suggests democratic backsliding as a gradual and strategic process, whereas Covid-19 autocratization occurred more chaotically and opportunistically, instigating autocratization whenever and wherever possible. The opportunistic structure also elucidates the novel and imaginative strategies through which autocratization was invoked, capitalizing on the alternative prospects of democratic deterioration presented by the crisis.