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Univ., Diss.--Saarbrücken, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. [289] - 298 . Text überw. dt., teilw. franz.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-02-16T19:31:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Carolina Nilce Barreira Candia.pdf: 1404900 bytes, checksum: 0ee8069bd0fdcff815f5f39981c9545f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-16T19:31:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Carolina Nilce Barreira Candia.pdf: 1404900 bytes, checksum: 0ee8069bd0fdcff815f5f39981c9545f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-06 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / The work at hand intends show that, if one of the parents does not detain custody of the offspring, that is not a factor to allow total absence, even when it already involves support regarding cost of food and other material issues. This is because a parent’s obligation to impute paternal duties cannot be fulfilled without presence. In this way, absence necessarily implies the parent's failure to fulfil the duties of care inherent to the parent’s obligation, that is, it constitutes an unlawful act. The damages resulting from this must, therefore, give rise to the incidence of liability, which is based on the precept of not harming others. Seeking to obey this principle, is that the parent who sees the other parent practicing parental alienation of the child should seek judicial protection in order to cease this act and ensure their right-duty to visit and live with the child. If the father or mother does nothing to stop the parental alienation, he cannot use it as a pretext to exclude civil liability if he practices abandonment, since this scenario would be the act of benefiting from his own inaction, since it would use the omission in not ceasing the alienation in order to avoid the duty of care. On the other hand, if the non-custodian seeks to visit the child, but - for reasons of his own - is faced with rejection by the child, there will be no possibility of parental abandonment to give rise to the obligation to indemnify. Instead, in this hypothesis, there is the practice, by the father or mother, of commissive acts for their convenience. With respect to love, it was verified that the incidence of the indemnity is not for lack of affection, but for lack of care; It should be noted that those who care do not show rejection, even if they do not love. It was also pointed out that biological, adoptive or socio-affective parenthood are equivalent, therefore, the inherent duties are also equivalent. In turn, the one who, although not effecting paternity registration in the civil registry, captivates the infant acting as if the father or mother were, must also respond for the damages caused in case of later abandonment of the minor. This is because it will be faced with non-compliance with the precepts of objective good faith. Following the same logic of reasoning, however, in reverse, we also denote the right of the elderly to family life and the duty of their sons to care for them. Thus, even if there is material costing, the lack of zeal and absence of the offspring when the parents are old constitutes itself as an unlawful act and causes the consequent damages. However, there is an exception to the enforceability of this care, when the child who leaves was once a victim abandoned in childhood or adolescence, that is, he was the victim of an unworthy act that should rule out the enforceability of both food and immaterial care / Dedica-se o presente trabalho a observar que o fato de algum dos genitores não deter a guarda da prole não é fator a permitir a total ausência, ainda que haja o custeio de alimentos e outras questões materiais. Isto porque, o poder familiar imputa deveres paternos que não podem ser cumpridos sem que haja presença. Desta forma, a ausência implica, necessariamente, em inadimplemento, pelos pais, dos deveres de cuidado inerentes ao poder familiar, ou seja, se constitui como ato antijurídico. Os danos decorrentes deste devem, assim, ensejar a incidência da responsabilidade, a qual tem como base o preceito de não lesar a outrem. Buscando obedecer a este princípio, é que o genitor que vê o outro progenitor praticando alienação parental do(a) filho(a), deve buscar tutela jurisdicional a fim cessar este ato e garantir o seu direito-dever de visitar e conviver com o filho. Se o pai ou a mãe nada faz para cessar a alienação parental, não poderá usá-la como pretexto para afastar a responsabilidade civil caso pratique o abandono, vez que esse cenário configuraria o ato de se beneficiar da própria torpeza, pois se utilizaria da omissão em não cessar a alienação para se furtar do adimplemento do dever de cuidado. Por outro lado caso haja busca pelo não guardião em visitar o(a) filho(a), mas este é que – por motivos próprios- pratique a rejeição, não se estará diante de hipótese de abandono paterno a ensejar o dever de indenizar, vez que, nesta hipótese, há a prática, pelo pai ou mãe, de atos comissivos para a convivência. Com relação ao amor, verificou-se que a incidência da indenização não é por falta de afeto, e sim por ausência de cuidado; cabendo notar que quem cuida não demostra rejeição, ainda que não ame. Também se apontou que a paternidade biológica, adotiva ou socioafetiva são equivalentes, portanto, os deveres inerentes também o são. Por sua vez, aquele que, apesar de não efetivar averbação de paternidade no registro civil, cativa infante agindo como se pai ou mãe fosse, também deverá responder pelos danos causados caso posteriormente abandono o menor. Isto porque, estar-se-á diante de descumprimento dos preceitos da boa-fé objetiva. Seguindo a mesma lógica de raciocínio, porém, de maneira inversa, denotamos também o direito dos idosos à convivência familiar e o dever dos filhos cuidarem daqueles. Assim, ainda que haja o custeio de questões materiais, a falta de zelo e ausência da prole quando os pais são idosos se constitui como ato antijurídico a enseja os decorrentes danos. Contudo, há exceção da exigibilidade deste cuidado quando o filho que abandona, outrora foi vítima abandonado na infância ou adolescência, ou seja, foi vítima de ato indigno que deve afastar a exigibilidade tanto de alimentos como de cuidados imateriais

This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations. On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect nofault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2007.

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Real Estate and Construction / Master / Master of Science in Construction Project Management

This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations. On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect nofault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2007.

Zugl.: Zürich, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.