The purpose of this study was to determine the major causes of German revival as well as reasons for their radical changes from Postwar Socialism to the acceptance of a basically free market economy, and also to determine the effects of neo-liberalism on the rapid recovery.

Against the background of conservatism, liberalism, and counter-reaction among linguists, this study will survey the degrees of liberality shown by the writers of a group of present-day handbooks and grammars toward six disputable issues.

Thesis advisor: Robert K. Faulkner / Why are men in modern societies so busy and anxious? Modern, liberal democratic society is distinguished both by the unprecedented strength and prosperity it has achieved, as well as its remarkable number of psychologists per capita. Why is this? This dissertation explores the connection between restlessness and modernity by way of an examination of the themes of liberalism and restlessness in the thought of Locke and Tocqueville. "Restlessness" refers to a way of life characterized by three features: limitless desires, mildness, and an orientation towards material goods. Tocqueville argues in <italic>Democracy in America<italic> that democracy, by way of individualism, makes men materialistic and restless (<italic>inquiét<italic>), or restlessly materialistic. The intense, limitless pursuit of material well-being is a historical phenomenon, one of the many results of the centuries-long development of equality of conditions. Modern democrats are restless; pre-modern aristocrats were not. Tocqueville is ambivalent about restlessness. According to him, the incessant, energetic movement of American life conceals an underlying absurdity and mediocrity. Many of what Tocqueville views as the more undesirable qualities of democratic American life are associated with restlessness, but any solution is likely to be worse than the problem. It could be worse: we must tolerate restlessness if we want to remain free. "All free peoples are grave." Locke by contrast could be described as a partisan of restlessness. The anxious understand the world better than the complacent or vegetative. There are two dimensions to Locke's teaching on restlessness, an "is" (found in <italic>Essay concerning Human Understanding<italic> Book II Chapter 21) and an "ought" (found in "Of Property," Chapter Five of the <italic>Second Treatise<italic>). Our desires are naturally limitless-this we can only understand, we cannot change it. But if we know what's good for us, we will orient ourselves towards a milder and more materialistic way of life. We master restlessness by becoming more restless, or restless in a more enlightened way. Locke's teaching on restlessness in the fullest sense is partly his account of necessity, and partly his recommended response to necessity. This difference in their views on restlessness points to certain important differences in their liberalisms. Tocqueville's liberalism is more pessimistic than Locke's: some fundamental problems have no solutions, and some of the highest goods cannot be reconciled with one another. Lockean liberalism is more confident about its ability to find solutions to the fundamental problems of political life, and there is no problem of the harmony of the goods for Locke. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Seth Jacobs / Counterinsurgency doctrine, as an intellectual project, began as a response on the part of liberal world powers to the dual crises of decolonization and the Cold War. Unlike earlier means of suppressing rebellions, counterinsurgency sought not to quash, but to channel the revolutionary energies of decolonization into a liberal, developmentalist direction. Counterinsurgency would simultaneously defeat communists and build a new and better society. As early efforts at developmentalist counterinsurgency failed in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the counterinsurgent’s methods and goals changed. The CORDS Project, starting in 1967, replaced the emphasis on building a new society with altering present societies in such a way as to prioritize surveillance and the removal of subversive elements. From its inception, the political visions that counterinsurgency seeks to implement have shifted alongside – and at times prefigured – changes in liberal governance more broadly. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: History.

Much of contemporary mainstream political philosophy operates under the assumption that if reasonable people deliberate about matters of basic justice in the right conditions, agreement will emerge. This assumption implies that although reasonable people will likely disagree about private matters concerning the nature of the good life, they will nonetheless agree about public matters of justice. I reject this assumption, and in this dissertation I argue that reasonable people are likely to experience deep and persistent disagreements about matters of basic justice. I concede that there are some domains of justice where broad agreement has been achieved in modern democratic societies, namely those concerning the scope and content of civil and political liberties. However, when it comes to the scope and content of economic liberties, there is little agreement to be had. This is because reasonable people can be committed to radically different premises about matters of basic justice as well as the fact that basic agreed-upon concepts can be interpreted and interconnected in significantly different ways. Even in ideal theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to idealized reasonable people, rational consensus is not a feasible goal on certain core matters of justice. From here, I turn to the realm of non-ideal deliberation about justice and explore the difficult problem of rational political ignorance. I further discuss the effects of the Internet on non-ideal political deliberation, and I look at the ways in which online deliberation can fuel normal cognitive biases and deepen political polarization. I argue that matters of economic justice are characterized by both moral pluralism and epistemic complexity, both of which tend to be downplayed within the deliberative enclaves that proliferate on the Internet. How are we to deal with these problems of political disagreement and polarization? To help answer this question, I turn to the tradition of American pragmatism, and especially the writings of William James, to suggest a re-orientation of political philosophy away from the assumption of rational consensus and toward a more humble, but more constructive, vision in which the philosopher attempts to fashion new ideals that might help overcome currently entrenched disagreements.

This PhD thesis asks how ‘neo-liberal’ was the Thatcher government? Existing accounts tend to characterise neo-liberalism as a homogeneous, and often ill-defined, group of thinkers that exerted a broad influence over the Thatcher government. This thesis - through a combination of archival research, interviews and examination of ideological texts - defines the dominant strains of neo-liberalism more clearly and explores their relationship with Thatcherism. In particular, the schools of liberal economic thought founded in Vienna and Chicago are examined and juxtaposed with the initial neo-liberals originating from Freiburg in 1930s and 1940s Germany. Economic policy and deregulation were the areas that most clearly linked neo-liberal thinking with Thatcherism, but this thesis looks at a broad cross section of the wider programme of the Thatcher government. This includes other domestic policies such as education and housing, as well as the Thatcher government’s success in reducing or altering the pressures exerted by vested interests such as the trade unions and monopolies. Lastly, while less associated with neo-liberal theory, foreign policy, in the area of overseas aid, is examined to show how ideas filtered into the international arena during the 1980s. Although clearly a political project, the policies of Thatcherism, in so far as they were ideological, resonate most with the more expedient, or practical, Friedmanite strain of neo-liberalism. This encapsulated a willingness to utilize the state, often in contradictory ways, to pursue more marketorientated policies. As such, it sat somewhere between the more rules-based ordoliberalism and the often utopian Austrian School.

Motivated by the desire to see a world living up to the ideal of harmonious multicultural communities, this thesis critically assesses two contemporary approaches to multiculturalism, namely Liberalism 1 and 2. The central argument forwarded here is that although Liberalism 1 and 2 are commendable approaches to the management of difference in a polity, they are unable to secure long-term intergroup harmony owing to the static understanding of identity that underpins both approaches. To highlight the shortcomings of Liberalism 1 and 2, this thesis examines the relationship between Diasporas and more sessile communities. Diasporas have been specifically selected for this purpose for two reasons. Firstly, most comprehensive discussions on multiculturalism have not employed the experience of diasporas in their research. Secondly, as the number of diasporas are set to grow and as the term is traditionally used in a negative way in reference to a `difficult' minority, there is a need to examine approaches towards multiculturalism through diasporic eyes. Evaluation of the three diasporic experiences of the Chinese, Africans and Jews in both Liberalism I and 2 has supported the main argument of the thesis. All three experiences have revealed that Liberalism 1 and 2 are unable to attain their long-term goals for multiculturalism due to three difficulties that stem from their static notion of identity. (1) Both positions foreclose the possibility for long-term harmony in a multicultural polity due to an overly pessimistic approach to the management of difference. Due to this foreclosure, predictions of conflict unwittingly prove to be true. (2) Liberalism 1 is overly reliant on constant but unachievable enforcement with its difference-blind approach to the management of difference. (3) The need for Liberalism 2 to compartmentalise individuals into distinct groups leads to the perpetuation of stereotypes while also denying individuals the opportunity to redefine themselves.

This dissertation focuses on the diocese of Linz in the Habsburg Monarchy during the second half of the nineteenth century, examining how the Roman Catholic Church and its priests adapted to and confronted the broad set of modernizing forces that were shaping the world around them against the backdrop of rising Ultramontanism within the Church. The study is divided into three sections. The first section explores the structural and ideological transformation of the Catholic Church in Upper Austria in this period. With a focus on the clergy, it examines the changing networks and structures of religious life; it investigates how the diocese changed under the watch of Bishop Franz Josef Rudigier (1853-1884) and Franz Maria Doppelbauer (1889-1908), and also under the influence of Ultramontanism. The second section examines the confrontation with liberalism. It begins in the 1850s, exploring how two events - the building of a general hospital in Linz and the burial of a prominent Protestant in a small town - inform our understanding of the dynamics of Catholic-liberal conflict in 1850s Austria. Next it turns to the height of the Austrian Kulturkampf between 1867 and 1875, exploring, how liberals and Catholic-conservatives presented a social vision that used the active exclusion of the 'other' to define itself. The third section shifts from liberalism to socialism, and from a study of the rise of Ultramontanism to that of Ultramontanism in practice. Examining Catholic responses to the social question, the study argues that Ultramontanism created its own internal set of contradictions when converted into policy, especially after the publication of the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum. Instead of bringing the different elements together within the Church, the encyclical had the opposite effect; each group began to interpret the document in different ways and to act accordingly, effectively demolishing the image of Catholic unity that existed around Ultramontanism.

No one seems to be against freedom of speech. We have profound disagreements, nonetheless, about what people should be allowed to say. Superficially, these disagreements seem to be independent of our own personal views on larger moral issues such as the desirability of state neutrality and the possibility of promoting certain views of the good life. This perception, however, misrepresents the deeper connections that one's views on free speech have with one's interpretation of political morality; connections which shape the very way in which one reasons about free speech. In order to understand these connections, it is important to be conscious of the rich and complex history of the very notion of freedom of speech. While sometimes represented as a modern ideal, the very fabric of the modern view on free speech is the result of earlier social practices and of competing moral claims. To understand how we think about free speech today it is not enough to look into our own world. Some aspects can only be made vivid by revisiting the history of this notion. But not only that. Aside from reconstructing the history of the modern notion of freedom of speech, we also have to grasp the place of liberalism in shaping our views on these matters. Questions of paternalism, neutrality, and the good life, and of liberalism's relationship to these ideas, are all important in defining what it means to have free speech. Any articulation of free speech which disregards these points would be missing an important aspect of the discussions surrounding what we should be allowed to say. To reason about free speech, we need to go beyond the normal justifications for the freedom of speech. Truth, democracy, and autonomy are the familiar reasons for defending freedom of speech, but they are not the defining aspects of one's free speech reasoning. For that, we need to look elsewhere. This is what the argument in the thesis is set to do: to explore and explain how our free speech reasoning is shaped by historical experiences and by the gradual evolution of a certain view of the moral world. By engaging in a reconstruction of the different forms of reasoning on these issues, the argument sets out a systematic account of the competing ways of reasoning about free speech. The argument has four parts. In Part One, I set out the history of the social practices and moral claims which gave birth to the modern idea of freedom of speech and claim that they are still an integral part of what it means to have free speech. Part One shows how some of the normative positions (liberties, claim-rights, and immunities) which are thought to be part of the freedom of speech were the result of certain historical experiences. Then, in Part Two, I introduce some key theoretical distinctions with regard to liberalism, which provide the argumentative platform for the rest of the thesis. In developing the distinction among different strands of the liberal tradition, the variable role and meanings of principles of neutrality is of particular significance. Part Three then goes on to connect the different strands of the liberal tradition with the justifications for valuing freedom of speech, showing how opposing versions of the arguments for a defense of free speech reflect underlying assumptions about political morality. Finally, Part Four explores the three core aspects of the modern view on free speech: the formalization of moral reasoning, the role of a set of individual rights in the identification of neutral reasons, and the place of one's view on political morality in the delimitation of the meaning of the freedom of speech. It is not the purpose of the argument to defend one particular form of reasoning over the others, but to examine the different argumentative resources that are available within competing strands of the contemporary debate. Put simply, this thesis seeks to show that - and the ways in which - our free speech reasoning is fundamentally shaped by our deeper views about political morality.

Restorative justice emerged in the western world as an alternative to the existing retributive penal system. An alternative that no longer relied on lawyers and judges to resolve criminal matters and community disputes, but rather empowered victims, offenders, and community members to do justice themselves. Throughout the past thirty years restorative justice has distanced itself from the traditional criminal justice system by focusing on repairing the harm caused by an offence rather than charging an offender for committing a crime against the state. This study focuses on the institutionalization of restorative justice. Specifically, this thesis conducts a content analysis of five Canada institutionalized restorative justice programs with the purpose of answering one primary research question. This question asks: are institutionalized restorative justice programs within Canada structured to reflect the core values of restorative justice? In order to answer this question, this thesis analyzes all the available textual documents pertaining to the five selected restorative justice programs for evidence of core restorative justice values and values associated with the co-opting institution, the retributive criminal justice system. This thesis concludes that yes, the five analyzed restorative programs are structured to reflect the core values of restorative justice. Although, the programs are also structured to reflect the core values of the current political ideology of neo-liberalism.