The relation between revelation and reason is a matter of interest for human beings and is connected with the development of reason and knowledge in modern society. Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, a modern Muslim scholar who was an expert in both Islamic philosophy and Qur'anic interpretation, developed new approaches to such issues as the role of human rational ability, logic and philosophy in religious knowledge. Furthermore he deals with such specific controversial topics on the subject of revelation and reason as, social freedom and freedom of thought and belief in Islam. He tends to elaborate his view of freedom based on both the Qur'an and rational bases. Tabataba'i's approach to revelation and reason, his reconciliation of them in general, and his specific perspective of freedom are studied in this thesis with respect to their underlying principles and their scopes.

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Project finance is a debt finance and risk allocation technique. In Mexico, contracts of this nature mostly arise as a result of a government procurement process. In such projects, there is a limited amount of freedom for the negotiation of the contractual terms and conditions. / Contracts for the engineering, procurement and construction of power plants implemented under the project finance structure are subject to the ordinary law of contracts as opposed to the administrative law which may place the government in a stronger bargaining position. Regardless of the application of the private or administrative law the principle of autonomy of will may seem to be relegated to a secondary level in these transactions. Given this aspect it is interesting to evaluate what role the parties play in negotiating the contract in order to establish whether freedom of contract is a mere fiction in such transactions.

It is generally acknowledged that educating children entails limiting their social freedom, (or liberty), to some extent. The question is, how far can children's liberty justifiably be limited in education, and on what grounds? One approach to this issue adopted in recent educational philosophy involves the idea that development of 'free' persons constitutes a key educational ideal, if not the educational ideal itself. It is argued that children's liberty should be regulated in accordance with the ideal of developing 'free' persons. After arguing in Chapter One that freedom may be construed both as a relationship obtaining between human beings and as a form of personality development, I examine philosophically the connection between children's liberty in education and the development of 'free' persons. Some educational philosophers identify 'free' persons with rational, (autonomous) persons, and suggest that the development of reason is consistent with - and may actually presuppose - considerable restrictions on children's liberty. In particular, development of 'free' persons may require that children be initiated into the rational disciplines. Given the analysis of "social freedom" which I advance in Chapter Two, this requirement can be seen to constitute a serious curtailment of children's liberty. I argue that there are good reasons for challenging the view that to be a 'free' person consists in being rational, and then advance an alternative account of "free persons". This has quite different implications for the social freedom of children in education from those of the 'rationalist' view. Indeed, I conclude that whereas the 'rationalist' account of "free persons" is well-suited to justifying a considerable degree of unfreedom for children, mine more obviously lends itself to a positive end: namely, suggesting ways in which children may be offered increased social freedom by comparison with much current educational practice.

This thesis examines the relationship between property and freedom in both the continuous sense of the word and the status sense of the word. Status freedom concerns the distinction between a free person and an unfree person. Continuous freedom concerns the continuum of liberties that make a person more or less free, whether they affect her status as a free person or not. Part One defines a status freedom as effective control self-ownership - the effective power to have and to refuse active cooperation with other willing people. It argues why this concept of freedom is important, situates it among the recent theories of freedom, and examines the conditions necessary to secure it. It concludes that a free person requires at least some unconditional access to property and that basic income is one way to secure that access. Part Two considers what kind of property-rights regime provides the greatest freedom in the continuous sense. It argues that Lockean and right-libertarian property theories fail to establish that full liberal ownership rights are consistent with the greatest freedom for all. It concludes that a payment from property owners to the propertyless in the form of an unconditional basic income from is necessary to establish property rights consistently with maximal equal freedom. Part Three examines whether social duties can take precedence over the commitment to effective control self-ownership and basic income proposed in the first two sections.

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In chapter one, I describe the different conceptions of self that Murdoch and Nussbaum have, and I show how these affect their depictions of human good. And I relate how each one defends the internal logic of her claims against the critique of moral relativism. I examine Iris Murdoch's conception of reality and consciousness in the distinctive way that she fuses them to a transcendent morality. / In chapter two, I turn to Murdoch's description of the journey from illusion to reality and the role of love or eros in this journey. I examine the many points of intersection between her description of the escape from selfishness and Wendy Farley's (1996) theory of how we acknowledge the other through a type of attention that she calls eros for the other . / In Chapter three, I discuss the problem that evil poses for Murdoch's moral philosophy, and how Murdoch and Farley interpret the experience of the void as yearning for relation. In the conclusion of this thesis, I present Murdoch's views on form as the consolation of human yearning. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Project (M.A.R.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2005. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 52).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Göttingen. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 191-203).

European Univ. Inst., Diss.--Florence. / Literaturverz. S. 266 - 288.