Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science. Dept. of Political Science, 1960. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 296-301).

This research looks at the effectiveness of state lobbying in Florida. It evaluates effectiveness through the use of eight case studies: the sugar lobby and the cleanup in the Florida Everglades; the lobby for a raise for tomato pickers in the state; the lobby for increased advertising money for state tourism; the tourism lobby and offshore drilling; the lobby for more accessible healthcare on behalf of state insurance companies; the lobby for an increased tobacco tax; the high-speed rail lobby; and the red light camera lobby. The study concludes that lobbying in Florida is generally effective as groups achieved their desired goals in seven out of eight cases.

<p>As EU’s authority increased the number of lobbies in Brussels grew. Today there are approximately 15 000 lobbyists in Brussels. EU decisions and EU directives can have a huge impact on companies and organizations. They can however influence these decisions and directives through lobbying. The EU institutions also have an interest in cooperating with lobbies. Organizations and companies are regarded as important providers of knowledge and information. Lobbying has its advocates and critics, and is often debated. Which democratic and economic effects can lobbying imply?</p><p>According to different perspectives lobbying can have either negative or positive effects on democracy. Advocates think that lobbying imply more opportunities to influence policies and that good policies are created in a society open to all kinds of new ideas.  Critics claim that lobbying creates non-democratic decisions and non-democratic decision-making processes. This is due to the fact that lobbying performance is more dependent on resources rather than the number of votes, there is a lack of transparency and that lobbies pursuit a special interest.  According to critics lobbies often obtain a political influence at the expense of the general interest.</p><p>Economic theory states that lobbying can cause an inefficient allocation of resources and imply a waste of resources.   Lobbying is regarded as rent-seeking - an attempt to capture existing wealth instead of creating new wealth.  The competition for political influence is regarded as the main cause of inefficient allocation of resources. Becker, however, has a different view and states that the competition for political influence will result in an implementation of efficient policies. Governments will favor the politically powerful lobbies, and these lobbies are politically powerful because they lobby for efficient policies. The lobbies’ investments in producing pressure will however be wasteful. One pressure group’s increased expenditure on political pressure will force other pressure groups to increase their expenditure on political pressure and both groups will thus maintain their influence, the same influence they had before the increased expenditures. The lobbies are in a social dilemma – an additional investment is rational for the individual lobby but disadvantageous for the whole group of lobbies.</p><p>Which socio-economic effects will this imply for the EU? Is there a need for increased regulations on lobbying?  In order to give an answer I have used second-hand data on lobbying in the EU – how lobbying has grown and how it works today – together with second-hand data on the decision-making process for an EU legislation and an EU programme.</p><p>The analysis of the economic and democratic effects, that lobbying in the EU implies, shows that there is a need for increased regulations on lobbying in the EU.</p><p> </p>

As EU’s authority increased the number of lobbies in Brussels grew. Today there are approximately 15 000 lobbyists in Brussels. EU decisions and EU directives can have a huge impact on companies and organizations. They can however influence these decisions and directives through lobbying. The EU institutions also have an interest in cooperating with lobbies. Organizations and companies are regarded as important providers of knowledge and information. Lobbying has its advocates and critics, and is often debated. Which democratic and economic effects can lobbying imply? According to different perspectives lobbying can have either negative or positive effects on democracy. Advocates think that lobbying imply more opportunities to influence policies and that good policies are created in a society open to all kinds of new ideas.  Critics claim that lobbying creates non-democratic decisions and non-democratic decision-making processes. This is due to the fact that lobbying performance is more dependent on resources rather than the number of votes, there is a lack of transparency and that lobbies pursuit a special interest.  According to critics lobbies often obtain a political influence at the expense of the general interest. Economic theory states that lobbying can cause an inefficient allocation of resources and imply a waste of resources.   Lobbying is regarded as rent-seeking - an attempt to capture existing wealth instead of creating new wealth.  The competition for political influence is regarded as the main cause of inefficient allocation of resources. Becker, however, has a different view and states that the competition for political influence will result in an implementation of efficient policies. Governments will favor the politically powerful lobbies, and these lobbies are politically powerful because they lobby for efficient policies. The lobbies’ investments in producing pressure will however be wasteful. One pressure group’s increased expenditure on political pressure will force other pressure groups to increase their expenditure on political pressure and both groups will thus maintain their influence, the same influence they had before the increased expenditures. The lobbies are in a social dilemma – an additional investment is rational for the individual lobby but disadvantageous for the whole group of lobbies. Which socio-economic effects will this imply for the EU? Is there a need for increased regulations on lobbying?  In order to give an answer I have used second-hand data on lobbying in the EU – how lobbying has grown and how it works today – together with second-hand data on the decision-making process for an EU legislation and an EU programme. The analysis of the economic and democratic effects, that lobbying in the EU implies, shows that there is a need for increased regulations on lobbying in the EU.

The thesis presents research on participation of interest groups in the Canadian trade policy making process that has relatively recently been extended to include non-business interest groups who now participate in the process that was previously limited to government officials and business groups representatives. The research examines how both business and non-business groups perceive their participation in this process. To achieve this aim, interviews with two representatives of business groups and two representatives of non-business groups were conducted. The resulting data include information about groups motives for engagement in the Canadian trade policy making process, the perceived effects Canadian institutions have on interest groups participation in the process, and whether, and if so how, the extension of the process to include non-business groups has changed the lobbying strategies of business groups. The research results allow the author to test contradictory propositions about interest groups participation in the process found in literature and to arrive at a more accurate model of groups involvement in the Canadian trade policy making process.

The thesis presents research on participation of interest groups in the Canadian trade policy making process that has relatively recently been extended to include non-business interest groups who now participate in the process that was previously limited to government officials and business groups representatives. The research examines how both business and non-business groups perceive their participation in this process. To achieve this aim, interviews with two representatives of business groups and two representatives of non-business groups were conducted. The resulting data include information about groups motives for engagement in the Canadian trade policy making process, the perceived effects Canadian institutions have on interest groups participation in the process, and whether, and if so how, the extension of the process to include non-business groups has changed the lobbying strategies of business groups. The research results allow the author to test contradictory propositions about interest groups participation in the process found in literature and to arrive at a more accurate model of groups involvement in the Canadian trade policy making process.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att ta reda på hur lokala kommunikationskonsulter i Falun/Borlänge-regionen ser på opinionsbildning via professionella konsulter. De centrala begrepp som avhandlas är PR, opinionsbildning och lobbying.Den teoretiska ram som omger undersökningen består av de teoribyggen som skapats av Jürgen Habermas, James E. Grunig och Larsåke Larsson. Habermas ställer sig tveksam till den demokratiska nyttan av professionell opinionsbildning, Grunig är mer positiv och Larsson ser både för- och nackdelar med PR-verksamheten. Larssons undersökning av opinionskonsulter från 2005 refereras också.Undersökningen bygger på intervjuer med ett antal kommunikationskonsulter verksamma i Falun och Borlänge. Den lokala marknaden för opinionsbildande uppdrag diskuteras, men också huruvida politiska uppdrag förser byråerna med politisk färg. Huruvida medarbetarnas engagemang är viktigt och hur hög statusen på opinionsbildande uppdrag är ventileras, samt vilka arbetsmetoder som används. Intervjuerna behandlar också förekomsten av lobbying på lokal nivå. Till slut redogör de intervjuade för sin syn på hur opinionsbildning, PR och lobbying via konsulter påverkar demokratin.Under slutsatser diskuteras resultatet i relation till den teoretiska ramen. Att PR- och reklambranscherna alltmer växer samman och att opinionsbildning är ett vanligt inslag i många projekt är ett faktum som också skymtat fram i den teoretiska ramen. Men reklam- och PR-metoder integreras också i politiken, på gott och ont. Följaktligen växer den gråzon som finns mellan de olika typerna av kommunikation och mellan opinionsbildande och icke-opinionsbildande uppdrag. Det försvårar gränsdragning och tydlighet, men skapar nya kreativa möjligheter.Att den ökade användningen av kommunikationskonsulter kanske kan bidra till en orättvis fördel för resursstarka organisationer diskuteras. Ny teknik, t.ex. Internet, kan dock eventuellt vara den motvikt som gör det möjligt även för resurssvaga grupper att höras i det offentliga samtalet. Kommunikation som maktfaktor tas även upp utifrån termer som lobbying och medias dagordningsfunktion.Några aspekter av den outnyttjade potential som PR har ventileras också. PR som metod är en outnyttjad resurs på det lokala planet, något som kan bero både på okunskap hos de lokala kunderna och ett traditionellt arbetssätt hos byråerna. Utifrån intervjusvaren framkommer att både byråerna, deras kunder och media på landsorten skulle gynnas av ett större samarbete.Resultaten av intervjuerna stöder mycket i den teoretiska ramen, medan somligt förkastas. Som sammanfattning kan sägas att opinionsbildning via konsulter kan användas för både gott och ont. Vilket som blir resultatet handlar som oftast om etik, ansvar, öppenhet och professionalitet.ABSTRACTThe primary target for this report is to find out how communication consultants in the region of Falun and Borlänge views the practice of establishing public opinions by using professional public relations consultants. The concepts in focus are PR, the moulding of public opinion and lobbying.The theoretical framework surrounding this report is the writings by Jürgen Habermas, James E. Grunig and Larsåke Larsson. Habermas has doubts as to the democratic use of professional consultants working with public opinions, Grunig has a somewhat more positive approach and Larsson sees both advantages and disadvantages in a democratic sense with the PR industry. Larssons research concerning consultants working with the moulding of public opinions from 2005 is also reviewed. The research is carried out by interviewing some communication consultants working in the Falun /Borlänge- area. The local market for commissions concerning public opinions is discussed, but also if and how political commissions are forcing a political stamp upon the firms engaging in such commissions. The importance of personal commitment in the consultants and the level of prominence commissions concerning public opinion has in the business is discussed, but also which methods is used and preferred. The interviews also deal with the practice of lobbying in the local arena. Finally the participants state their views on how the moulding of public opinion, PR and lobbying effects the democracy. Conclusively, the result is put in relation to the theories earlier mentioned. The public relations market is merging with the advertising business, that is a fact, and establishing public opinion is a common element in a lot of projects. But methods used for advertising and PR are also integrated in the political sphere, for good and bad. That has made the distinction between different kinds of communication harder, thereby enhancing the difficulties of establishing boundaries and achieving clarity. Yet at the same time it facilitates new creative opportunities.The growing use of communication consultants may contribute to unfair advantages for organisations with large economic resources. New technical development though, such as the Internet for example, may prove to simplify communication for groups with lesser economic power. Communication as an aspect of power is being discussed in terms of lobbying and the agenda setting power of media.Some aspects of the unused potential that lies within PR are also in focus in this report. PR as a method is an unused resource in the local market, which can be due to the local clients lack of knowledge but also to the traditional work carried out by the communication firms. The findings of the interviews show that both communication firms, their clients and the local media would benefit from greater cooperation.The theoretical base in this work is mostly supported by the interviews, though a few of the findings does not agree. The moulding of public opinions by professional consultants can be used for both good and bad. What the result will be is, not surprisingly, a question of ethics, responsibility, openness and professionalism.

In plural democratic societies, individuals or organizations often use all kinds of channels to express opinions to governments and tend to impact or change particular policies on behalf of themselves. Though it is ordinary phenomenon in democratic systems; while¡A the source is limited, and its distributions have been done to be as possibly fair as we can. If pressure groups lobby in policymaking process, it might lead in such problems as corruptions, tortuosity benefits feeding and illegalities, etc. It does not only decline the policy-making qualities, but also is unfair to the citizens. To prevent this kind of canker and to improve the fairness and justice of policymaking process, we should establish a system of adequate lobbying disclosure laws. In one hand, protecting people¡¦s rights to petite to public departments, the freedom to speak, the freedom to associate; in the other hand, making a lobbying and meaningful law that suits for the political environments. For the goals above, the article will discuss the theories about lobbying, the law making process of the lobbying law, and introduce the lobbying legist rations and experiences in America. Finally, the advance research developments and suggestions Are offered.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2008. / Title from title screen (site viewed Sept. 16, 2008). PDF text: viii, 234 p. ; 1 Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3297756. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche formats.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2008. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-78)