This thesis examines the influences of global banking flows and its implication on the monetary policy regimes and economic fluctuations in the recipient economies. This work is based on the view that monetary policy shocks in core countries could be transmitted to the recipient EMEs via cross-border banking flows. Chapter 1 investigates influences of internal transactions within Asia-headquartered global banking group on the monetary policy effectiveness in selected Asian countries. It has been argued that global banks, when facing financial stress, reallocate their internal funds from their foreign affiliates in support of the parent banks. This action might help the parent banks to better protect their bank lending. In this spirit, the chapter investigates evidences suggestive of the operation of the channel for the Asian global banks. In Chapter 2, the US monetary policy shock identified from narrative sources is applied to measure the responses of banking flows and US global banks that in-termediate cross-border interbank funding. The results suggest that the responses of US global banks and the magnitude in banking outflows are much larger than previously thought. Chapter 3 examines an interaction between exchange rate regimes and financial crisis in EMEs triggered by a US monetary policy shock. First, an empirical evidence on the magnitude in banking outflows in EMEs in response to a US monetary policy shock is suggested. Then, an open economy model equipped with a banking sector is estimated and analyzed. The model predicts the well-known wisdom in the literature on sudden stops episodes: countries in the position of having to defend an exchange rate peg are more likely to suffer severe Sudden Stops and financial distress.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis covers three issues: the aggregate and welfare effects of environmental policies when plants are heterogeneous; what causes the different patterns of employment dynamics in small versus large firms over business cycles; and the welfare costs of expected and unexpected inflation. In the first chapter, we show that accounting for plant heterogeneity is important for the evaluation of environmental policies. We develop a general equilibrium model in which monopolistic competitive plants differ in productivity, produce differentiated goods and choose optimally a discrete emission-reduction technology. Emission-reduction policies affect both the fraction of plants adopting the advanced emission-reduction technology and the market shares of those with high levels of productivity. Calibrated to the Canadian data, the model shows that the aggregate costs of an emission tax to implement the Kyoto Protocol are 40 percent larger than the costs that would result with homogenous plants. In the second chapter, we incorporate labor search frictions into a model with lumpy investment to explain a set of firm-size-related facts about the United States labor market dynamics over business cycles. Contrary to the predictions of standard models, we observe that job destruction is procyclical in small firms but countercyclical in large ones. Calibrated to U.S. data, the model generates this asymmetric pattern of employment dynamics in small versus large firms. This is because a favorable aggregate productivity shock tightens the labor market. A tighter labor market hurts investing small firms. As a result, workers move from small to large firms during booms. In the third chapter, we analyze the welfare costs of inflation when money is essential to facilitate trades among anonymous agents and information about nominal shocks is incomplete as in Lucas (1972). In the model, the transactions in which money is essential coincide with those in which agents are affected by monetary shocks. Consequently, the average value of money and its variation in value in different markets affect agents simultaneously when the supply of money changes. Calibrated to U.S. data, we find that the welfare costs of expected inflation are almost three orders higher than the welfare costs of unexpected inflation.

This thesis consists of three chapters pertaining to issues of long-term relationships in labour markets. In Chapter 1, I analyze a model of a two-period advice game. The decision maker chooses to retain or replace the advisor after the first period depending on the first period events. Even though the decision maker and the advisor have identical preferences, this potential replacement creates incentive for the advisor to avoid telling the truth. I show the condition under which the decision maker can find a random retention rule that induces a truthful report from the advisor, and I characterize an optimal retention rule that maximizes the decision maker's expected payoff. In Chapter 2, I propose a search theoretic model of optimal employment contract under repeated moral hazard. The model integrates two important attributes of the labour market: workers' work incentive on the job and their mobility in the labour market. Even though all workers and firms are ex ante homogeneous, these two factors jointly generate (1) wages and productivity that increase with worker's tenure and (2) endogenous dynamic heterogeneity of the labour productivity of the match. The interaction of these factors provides novel implications for wage dispersion, labour mobility, and the business cycle behaviour of macroeconomic variables. Lastly, in Chapter 3, I quantitatively assess wage dispersion and business cycle implications of the model developed in Chapter 2. In terms of wage dispersion, the model with on-the-job search with wage-tenure contracts seems to accommodate sizable frictional wage dispersion. The model, however, generates very small productivity difference among workers, and shows weak evidence that the productivity difference generated by the endogenous variations in incentives is responsible for frictional wage dispersion. In terms of business cycle implications, workers' endogenous effort choice first amplifies the effect of productivity shock on unemployment rate. Second, responses of workers to productivity shocks generate marked difference between the effects of temporary productivity shock and that of permanent shock. Third, the analysis shows the importance of the distributional effect on macroeconomic variables during the transitory periods after a shock.

This thesis investigates the role of institutions in shaping macroeconomic phenomena. The first two chapters focus on financial institutions, formalizing interactions between information and competition in frictional credit markets and providing novel predictions for output and efficiency. The third chapter then presents a new approach for empirically assessing the relationship between political institutions and growth. In Chapter 1, I construct a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects the monetary transmission mechanism. I examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. A central finding is that relationship lending induces a smoother steady state output profile and a less volatile response to certain monetary shocks. This result provides a theoretical basis for cross-country transmission differences via a relationship lending channel. In Chapter 2, I investigate financial sector inefficiency when banks divide resources between attracting clients and learning about them via screening. I show that banks do not fully internalize the effects that their allocation decisions have on the beliefs and outside options of other lenders. These externalities result in an inefficiently high amount of low-quality credit and thus motivate a tax on activities designed to attract rather than screen borrowers. Steady state results suggest that production exhibits a hump-shaped response to increases in this tax and the model's dynamics indicate that a mild tax can also attenuate business cycle fluctuations. Chapter 3 then turns to the interaction between political institutions and economic outcomes. In collaboration with Gordon Anderson, I use a notion of distributional dominance to evaluate intertemporal dependence between polity and growth without hindrance from the mix of discrete and continuous variables in our data set. We also use this notion to measure the joint contribution of polity and growth to wellbeing. The results support the view that institutions promote growth more than growth promotes institutions. They also suggest that polity has dominated growth in determining the evolution of wellbeing over the past few decades.

This thesis covers three issues: the aggregate and welfare effects of environmental policies when plants are heterogeneous; what causes the different patterns of employment dynamics in small versus large firms over business cycles; and the welfare costs of expected and unexpected inflation. In the first chapter, we show that accounting for plant heterogeneity is important for the evaluation of environmental policies. We develop a general equilibrium model in which monopolistic competitive plants differ in productivity, produce differentiated goods and choose optimally a discrete emission-reduction technology. Emission-reduction policies affect both the fraction of plants adopting the advanced emission-reduction technology and the market shares of those with high levels of productivity. Calibrated to the Canadian data, the model shows that the aggregate costs of an emission tax to implement the Kyoto Protocol are 40 percent larger than the costs that would result with homogenous plants. In the second chapter, we incorporate labor search frictions into a model with lumpy investment to explain a set of firm-size-related facts about the United States labor market dynamics over business cycles. Contrary to the predictions of standard models, we observe that job destruction is procyclical in small firms but countercyclical in large ones. Calibrated to U.S. data, the model generates this asymmetric pattern of employment dynamics in small versus large firms. This is because a favorable aggregate productivity shock tightens the labor market. A tighter labor market hurts investing small firms. As a result, workers move from small to large firms during booms. In the third chapter, we analyze the welfare costs of inflation when money is essential to facilitate trades among anonymous agents and information about nominal shocks is incomplete as in Lucas (1972). In the model, the transactions in which money is essential coincide with those in which agents are affected by monetary shocks. Consequently, the average value of money and its variation in value in different markets affect agents simultaneously when the supply of money changes. Calibrated to U.S. data, we find that the welfare costs of expected inflation are almost three orders higher than the welfare costs of unexpected inflation.

This thesis consists of three chapters pertaining to issues of long-term relationships in labour markets. In Chapter 1, I analyze a model of a two-period advice game. The decision maker chooses to retain or replace the advisor after the first period depending on the first period events. Even though the decision maker and the advisor have identical preferences, this potential replacement creates incentive for the advisor to avoid telling the truth. I show the condition under which the decision maker can find a random retention rule that induces a truthful report from the advisor, and I characterize an optimal retention rule that maximizes the decision maker's expected payoff. In Chapter 2, I propose a search theoretic model of optimal employment contract under repeated moral hazard. The model integrates two important attributes of the labour market: workers' work incentive on the job and their mobility in the labour market. Even though all workers and firms are ex ante homogeneous, these two factors jointly generate (1) wages and productivity that increase with worker's tenure and (2) endogenous dynamic heterogeneity of the labour productivity of the match. The interaction of these factors provides novel implications for wage dispersion, labour mobility, and the business cycle behaviour of macroeconomic variables. Lastly, in Chapter 3, I quantitatively assess wage dispersion and business cycle implications of the model developed in Chapter 2. In terms of wage dispersion, the model with on-the-job search with wage-tenure contracts seems to accommodate sizable frictional wage dispersion. The model, however, generates very small productivity difference among workers, and shows weak evidence that the productivity difference generated by the endogenous variations in incentives is responsible for frictional wage dispersion. In terms of business cycle implications, workers' endogenous effort choice first amplifies the effect of productivity shock on unemployment rate. Second, responses of workers to productivity shocks generate marked difference between the effects of temporary productivity shock and that of permanent shock. Third, the analysis shows the importance of the distributional effect on macroeconomic variables during the transitory periods after a shock.

This thesis investigates the role of institutions in shaping macroeconomic phenomena. The first two chapters focus on financial institutions, formalizing interactions between information and competition in frictional credit markets and providing novel predictions for output and efficiency. The third chapter then presents a new approach for empirically assessing the relationship between political institutions and growth. In Chapter 1, I construct a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects the monetary transmission mechanism. I examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. A central finding is that relationship lending induces a smoother steady state output profile and a less volatile response to certain monetary shocks. This result provides a theoretical basis for cross-country transmission differences via a relationship lending channel. In Chapter 2, I investigate financial sector inefficiency when banks divide resources between attracting clients and learning about them via screening. I show that banks do not fully internalize the effects that their allocation decisions have on the beliefs and outside options of other lenders. These externalities result in an inefficiently high amount of low-quality credit and thus motivate a tax on activities designed to attract rather than screen borrowers. Steady state results suggest that production exhibits a hump-shaped response to increases in this tax and the model's dynamics indicate that a mild tax can also attenuate business cycle fluctuations. Chapter 3 then turns to the interaction between political institutions and economic outcomes. In collaboration with Gordon Anderson, I use a notion of distributional dominance to evaluate intertemporal dependence between polity and growth without hindrance from the mix of discrete and continuous variables in our data set. We also use this notion to measure the joint contribution of polity and growth to wellbeing. The results support the view that institutions promote growth more than growth promotes institutions. They also suggest that polity has dominated growth in determining the evolution of wellbeing over the past few decades.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 372-377). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.