Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 372-377).

Thesis--Groningen. / At head of title: Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen. Includes index. Includes bibliographical references (p. [358]-372).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1991. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 408-434).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 1979. / Summary in Dutch. Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 158-161).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--RAND Graduate School, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

My research focuses on the integration of behavioral economics into well understood general equilibrium macroeconomic models populated by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents. Specifically, I analyze the implications of populating model economies with present-biased agents who are finitely lived, subject to idiosyncratic labor income shocks, and heterogeneous in both exponential and present-biased discount factors. My primary goal is characterizing the contribution of behavioral biases towards resolving several issues in the literature pertaining to human capital investment and aggregate wealth inequality. Further, the inclusion of present bias in carefully calibrated model economies allows me to rationalize empirical differences in consumption, wealth, and education that arise between observationally similar households that models of homogeneous, exponential discounters are unable to match.

This thesis examines economic uncertainty from various sources, and studies the impact of uncertainty on the macroeconomy. In Chapter I, I theoretically investigate uncertainty on asset returns and its role in financial fragility using a stylized model where the level of uncertainty is endogenously chosen by banks. The risk behavior of banks imposes a negative externality on the profitability of other banks because liquidation of risky assets depresses asset prices in the secondary market. Combined with limited liability, the model can give rise to a vicious feedback loop between collective risk-taking behavior in the banking sector and fire sales of assets. The model suggests that ''panics'' over fire sales of assets can initiate banks' perverse risk-taking incentives, and trigger a self-fulfilling financial crisis where banks are taking risky investment, market liquidity is low, and credit risk is high. In Chapter II, I study empirically the role of productivity uncertainty on firms' investment in customer base. I find that similar to the case of physical capital investment, idiosyncratic uncertainty has a significant negative impact on customer base investment. However, different from the case for physical capital investment, firms with low customer base tend to be more sensitive to uncertainty. The empirical analysis suggests an alternative transmission mechanism for uncertainty shocks to the real economy that relies on the interaction between idiosyncratic uncertainty and product market frictions. In Chapter III, I focus on uncertainty about the monetary policy stance of the central bank. I investigate the optimal monetary policy in a theoretical framework where households are uncertain about central bank credibility. Contrary to the binary ''commitment vs. discretion'' commitment setting, the central bank in this model is able to commit to the optimal plan it formulates, but only over some finite (random) horizons due to its temptation to renege on the plan. Given that central bank credibility deteriorates with high inflation rates in the past, the central bank would contemplate on the impact of inflation on its future credibility and social welfare, in addition to the traditional inflation-output tradeoff. The main finding is that the central bank would enhance its credibility directly through a more conservative inflation policy.

xii, 114 p. : ill. / The banking sector has been extensively analyzed in economics. On the microeconomic side, research has advanced our understanding of banks and the inverse relationship between market power and bank production. The macroeconomic side of research has focused on the transmission of monetary policy, and it is understood that the financial system, including banks, plays an integral role in transmitting monetary policy decisions to economic variables such as investment, consumption, and GDP. There is limited understanding, however, about how market power and bank concentration affects the transmission of monetary policy. The main focus of this dissertation is to address this gap in the literature and is achieved by three contributions. First, I develop a theory of banking behavior that accounts for competition and monetary policy. I empirically test the theory and show that banking concentration dampens the impact of monetary policy on lending activity in the short-run. My second contribution involves building a theoretical model with these short-run lending effects incorporated into an endogenous growth model that allows agents, banks, and the central bank to interact. This model shows how short-run lending is tied to growth. Again, monetary policy is less effective in markets with higher concentration. The last contribution is made by empirically testing the second contribution. The empirical findings are consistent with both the first and second contributions; banking markets with less competition adversely affect growth and also diminish the long-run impact of monetary policy. / Committee in charge: Dr. Mark Thoma, Co-Chair; Dr. Wesley Wilson, Co-Chair; Dr. Shankha Chakraborty, Member; Dr. Larry Dann, Outside Member

This dissertation examines the macroeconomic effects of poverty and inequality. The second chapter considers the effect of poverty and subsistence consumption constraints on economic growth in a two-sector occupational choice model. I find that in the presence of risk taking, subsistence consumption constraints result in a dramatic slow down in terms of economic growth. The third chapter (joint with Shankha Chakraborty) proposes a model in which agents face endogenous mortality and direct preferences over inequality. I find that the greater the scale of relative deprivation the worse the mortality outcomes are for individuals. The fourth chapter looks at the relationship between inequality and the demand for redistribution when individuals have social status concerns. I show that under social status concerns an increase in consumption inequality results in higher taxation and lower growth. This dissertation includes unpublished coauthored material.

Chapter 1.—This chapter addresses model specification uncertainty using the Bayesian Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Employing Canadian data, I estimate 64 hybrid New Keynesian models which differ in their lag specification, and use a modified GMM quadratic function to produce model posteriors. I compute optimal discretionary policies for each model and then derive a posterior-weighted policy and loss. My results show that i) policy should respond more to the output gap than inflation, ii) a more aggressive policy is prescribed for the period of stagflation in the 1970s and early 1980s and iii) a relatively light-touch policy is recommended during the Great Moderation, and produces better outcomes. This last result supports the hypothesis of ‘good luck’ over ‘good policy’. Chapter 2.—In this chapter I develop an inverse control procedure to recover the under- lying preferences of a monetary authority engaged in discretionary policymaking. I adjoin the first-order condition (FOC) of the optimal interest rate rule-setting derived under discretion to the usual least squares moment conditions during the GMM procedure. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I show that the preferences on output gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing may be recovered. Robustness reveals that recovering the preference on the output gap is dependent upon policy actions having sufficient effect on the macroeconomy. Further testing indicates that the procedure functions for alternative starting values, may be adapted to different lag specifications of the underlying model, and is able to recover different sets of policy preferences. Chapter 3.—This chapter tests the hypothesis that the monetary authorities of Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom have exhibited similar preferences over stabilizing the output gap and smoothing the interest rate, by way of an inverse control algorithm (FOC- based GMM) for a discretionary policymaker. For the sample period covering 1968:1-2006:4, the FOC-based provides comparable structural estimates to a benchmark specification using an instrument-based GMM. The data suggest no role for output stabilization in any country, but a large and significant concern for interest rate smoothing is observed in Canada. Measures of fit reject optimality in the United States for baseline specification sample, but do not preclude it in any country when sample periods are restricted to the current man- dates. Policymakers’ reaction functions are shown to be sensitive to the underlying policy preferences, though decreasingly so at high levels of interest rate smoothing. Robustness is seen with respect to starting values and fixed policy coefficients.