魅力(Charisma)型領袖Muhammad Ahmad運用馬赫迪(Mahdi)神學號召群眾推翻土耳其殖民統治；蘇丹獨立初期Abd al-Rahman繼承馬赫迪宗教領袖的權威，結合民族主義，主張蘇丹獨立的政治理念，將宗教組織轉換為溫瑪黨進入公領域，成為議會時期主導民主政治的宗教政治菁英。Abd al-Rahman歸真後，他的孫子Sadiq al-Mahdi歷經三次軍變和三次議會時期，轉換馬赫迪神學，號召民眾起來為蘇丹民主和獨立而奮戰，推動民主進程結合宗教聖戰的概念對抗軍事統治政權。蘇丹在全球化多元政治制度衝擊下，伊斯蘭政治神學成為解決蘇丹內政問題的一種「神學替代方案」以取代今日的民主政體和極權體制。本論文討論蘇丹政治神學如「伊斯蘭民主神學」及「伊斯蘭社會神學」與近代政治制度的融合和交互作用下，探討群眾運動與六次政治體制轉換的關係。 / The charisma leader Muhammad Ahmad used the Mahdi theology to call a large mass of people that overthrew the Turkish colonial rule. In the early independent time, Abd al-Rahman combined nationalism with his inherited Mahdi power. He advocated an ideal of “Independent Sudan” in public and transformed his religious organization into the Umma party. After Abd al-Rahman passed away, his grandson Sadiq al-Mahdi had gone through three times the rotation of the democratic and military rules. Sadiq al-Mahdi has changed the Mahdi theology that calls people “jihad”for Sudan’s democracy and independency. He also proclaims a democratic progress with jihad against the military rule. As a result, Sudan, influenced by the globalized pluralist political system, chooses Islamic political system as a “theocratic alternative” to the present democratic and authoritarian systems to solve her domestic problems. This thesis discusses how Sudan’s political theologies, including “Islamic Democratic Theology” and “Islamic Social Theology”, interacted with the modern political systems and its outcomes to the relation between the mass movements and the six-time transitions between the democratic and military rules.

Darbe, laikantis prielaidos, jog Irano pasiryžimas tęsti branduolinę programą ir agresyvi valdančiųjų retorika yra tikslingos, nuosekliai vykdomos strategijos dalis, buvo užsibrėžtas tikslas išsiaiškinti, kokio pobūdžio yra Irano strategija: puolamojo ar gynybinio tipo, kas padėtų atsakyti į klausimą, ar Islamo Respublika kelia potencialią grėsmę kitoms šalims (darbe akcentuojant JAV ir Izraelį) ar ne. Irano motyvai vykdyti gynybos ar puolimo strategijas yra, atitinkamai, saugumo siekis bei ambicijų įgyvendinimo siekis. Tiek vienas, tiek kitas motyvas turi tvirtą pagrindimą Irano kontekste bei atitinka dabrtinius Irano veiksmus bei valdančiųjų retoriką. Irane kilusios visuomeninės bei institucinės įtampos yra didelė grėsmė valstybės integralumui, tad Irano branduolinę programą bei agresyvią valdančiųjų retoriką yra logiška sieti su aršios visuomenės mobilizacijos forma. Vis dėlto preziumuojant, kad Irans vykdo gynybos ar puolimo strategiją nukreiptą į išorę, mobilizacija tampa tik taktiniu žingsniu strateginio tikslo link. Iranas yra itin ambicinga šalis. Be to, JAV pajėgoms, esant nepajėgioms stabilizuoti Irako ir Afganistano, Irano galimybės įgyvendinti šias ambicijas vis stiprėja. Vis dėlto, nors Iraną galima būtų įvardyti kaip revizionistinio elgesio tipo valstybę, kurios intersai yra susiję su plėtra ir dominavimu - didelės išorinės grėsmės režimo išlikimui verčia Iraną prioretizuoti saugumo siekį. Tad tikėtina, kad Iranas vykdys gynybinio tipo strategiją, ką, iš esmės... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Since Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations between Iran and international community are tensed. Though current situation, which could be described as impasse, has emerged just in the 2002, when the scope of Iran’s nuclear capabilities was first made public by the Iranian opposition group. Still the 2005 could be considered as a date, when Iran‘s and international communities relations gained current structure. In the 2005 new president M.Ahmedi-Nejad has been elected and nuclear works were resumed. Whereupon Iran is demonstrating determinacy to continue its nuclear enrichment and officials who are involved in decision making process are using aggressive rhetoric in account to U.S. an Israel. Though mentioned rhetoric is directed towards U.S. and Israel, other interrelated countries have arrogated these signals to themselves. And they were understood completely different: from assessment that their meaning is coincident with Iran’s peaceful purpose declaration to judgement that they are direct menace towards Western world. Consequently the assessment of Iran’s behaviour and intentions became complicated and that happened for several reasons: first, Iran’s rhetoric is controversial – averment that nuclear programme is peaceful logically don’t merge with declared willingness to destroy opponents. Second, rhetoric and behaviour don’t match - peaceful programme doesn’t go with a concealment of nuclear activities. Third, political assessment still rest upon realism postulates that... [to full text]