Tactical adaptation is one of ten principles in naval warfare and listed in Swedish Doctrine for Naval Tactics from 2010. All levels of command can use tactical adaptation and uses it to reach the goal with the battle. Behind tactical adaptation, technology in relationship with tactics as a concept works together to support the tactical adaptation. This thesis aims to identify factors from theories about technology and tactics and to see how those factors affect the tactical adaptation in different cases. Known theorists as Van Creveld, Lauten- schläger and Hughes is used to form a tool for analyzing different cases. Factors derived from the three theorists is used in a qualitative case study consisting of the Yom Kippur-war and the Falkland campaign. Factors as combinations, flexibility, logistics, organization, secrecy, knowledge and further development was identified in the cases, but the factor development was nowhere to be found. The conclusions drawn from the analysis is that all factors accept development is useful and supports successful tactical adaptation.

Deception has long been a central component of Russian warfare, a fact that has become evident in modern conflicts where the state has been involved, not least during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the armed conflict, an unstable period unfolded in several Ukrainian regions, as well as in the adjacent maritime areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s aggressive behavior in the sea regions was driven by a goal of dominance, manifested through multifaceted actions that included both conventional and unconventional methods. A gray zone conflict was launched in the maritime domains. Existing research studying Russia’s naval warfare has paid only limited attention to use of deception, which means it misses a key aspect of its on-sea activity. With the aim to contribute more broadly to research on Russian naval warfare, this study has used a theory of deception to describe how and when the state has employed methods related to the phenomenon in the gray zone conflict. The result of the analysis shows that Russia, in its multidimensional conduct across the broad spectrum between war and peace, has utilized deception methods in various instances, with an increased intensity in the year preceding to the conflict’s escalation into full-scale war.