Following the 2008 Georgian war, Russia identified major deficiencies in its warfare capability, which lead to an extensive reformation and modernization of Russian forces. The reformation was accompanied by a Russian theoretical discussion concerning the wars of tomorrow. Several eminent Russian theorists emphasized the growing importance of non-kinetic means and methods, of which psychological warfare was considered as one of the most primary. Western scholars also emphasized an increased Russian focus on psychological warfare. Despite the identified increased significance on the subject, there is a palpable lack of research on contemporary Russian psychological warfare. This study aims to decrease this lack of research on the subject. Using a theory consuming approach, Russian psychological warfare is analyzed from two cases, Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of open sources. By combining two theories on psychological warfare, an analytical tool is developed which is then used in the analysis of the two cases. The theories that form the study´s theoretical base derives from Martin Libicki and Ron Schleifer. The two cases are analyzed and then followed by a comparative analysis of the cases. The study’s result shows that psychological warfare is an important component in Russian warfare, especially in the case of Crimea. Furthermore the study indicates that psychological warfare was a main component in the Crimea case, whereas it was a mere supportive component in the Georgian case.   The results show that Russian psychological warfare is used above all to create a favorable strategic context, where the Russian society and neutrals appears to be the most important target audiences to influence. The results also indicates that psychological warfare contributes in misleading the opponent and could thereby also contribute with obvious operational and tactical advantages for Russian warfare.