The work undertakes an examination of Indian metaphysical theories and their relationship to ethical ideas and moral conduct, as these operate in Indian thought. Special account is taken of the samkhya, advaita and visistadvaita systems, the metaphysical conceptions presupposed in these systems, and the ethical theories proposed by them. The peculiarities characteristic of each system in terms of both metaphysics and ethics are set out and examined in terms of the vital concepts of dharma, karma and mok~a. It is demonstrated that, in the case of each system the original classical formulations, as supported by a relatively consistent dialectic through the centuries down to modern times, in fact accentuate and harden the distinctions among the systems . se fuat 1he three systems appear to be supporting distinctly differing patterns of ethical behaviours. The safukhya is seen to be supporting a somewhat simplistic model of life-denying ethics as flowing from its metaphysical premises, while the visistadvaita, with its clear accent on theism, gives the impression of a more positive attitude in ethical thought and practice. Its ethical concerns, however, are seen to be markedly individualistic in character and operation. The advaita system, with its singular peculiarity of a splitlevel theoretic orientation, is seen to vac~te between a negative withdrawal from life, and a mor-e positive concern towards life in the world. The complex character of advaita metaphysical constructs, in their relation to the more ~ractical aspects of life, are seen to be related to the operation of some stresses and tensions reflected at the individual and social levels. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1988.

Plato’s late works contain an unexpectedly consistent treatment of the physics and metaphysics of souls. In the course of showing this, I argue that: (1) the mid- dle period dialogues Phaedo and Republic assume, but do not mention, a Form of Soul; (2) the Timaeus contains a physical theory according to which all changes of every kind are forms of spatial motion; (3) Plato’s view of souls as self-movers is identifiable in more of his late dialogues than is usually recognized (namely, in the Statesman as well as in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws); (4) in the definition of souls as self-movers, “motion” should be read as “spatial motion” rather than “change” in general, and (5) neither the Phaedrus nor the Timaeus contains the claim that human souls are immortal, while both dialogues contain a concept of “soul-stuff,” a material from which individual souls are manufactured.

This thesis examines the extent to which the doctrine of due measure can be rightfully called the skopos of Plato’s Statesman. In order to determine the doctrine’s explanatory power, the thesis adopts the Neoplatonic method of exegesis. It first examines the current state of Platonic scholarship in general and then of studies on the Statesman in particular, then provides both the philosophic and literary context of the dialogue in question. Next, it analyses the doctrine of due measure’s philosophic content, and then proceeds to examine its ability to illuminate the literary details of the text. In completing this exercise, this thesis hopes to demonstrate a method of interpreting a Platonic text, by which we can better understand how Plato wrote his dialogues, and how we can be better interpreters of his writing—both in its philosophical and literary aspects.

This thesis investigates whether Aristotle is actually presenting substance as the subject of a single science in Metaphysics ?. It proposes that he is, and that the common principles of all substances, which are required for there to be a single science of substance, are those found in ?.2-5. Although these causes and principles describe change, the analogy of the general and the army, which describes the relationship between God and the cosmos, also describes the relationship between causing and caused sensible substances. The analogy of the general and the army is used to the show that the principles that describe the actuality and effects of separate substance are analogically similar, and that the cause of this similarity is God’s ordering of the cosmos to be like his own eternal actuality as far as possible.

This thesis explores the role the concept of divinity played in the physical theories of Anaximander of Miletus (c.610 – c.546 BCE), arguing that his work anticipated and helped create the metaphysical theories of Aristotle and subsequent thinkers. Focusing on Anaximander’s notion of the apeiron (the indefinite), the thesis claims: (1) that Anaximander used theological terms to describe a physical and ontological principle well before such concepts were elucidated by Aristotle himself; that he thereby (2) anticipated Aristotle’s potentiality-actuality distinction; and (3) identified the central flaws of the mode of explanation current in 6th-century BCE Miletus. The argument is supported by a conceptual schema which shows that Anaximander advanced an ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful metaphysical theory that assigned the apeiron both temporal and ontological priority, thereby serving as an early alternative to Aristotle’s Prime Mover. / Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior (such as the waving of my hand) is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states (event dualism), then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should guide our ontological commitment. If we can offer true explanations that appeal to more than one event (or property), then we are committed to overdetermination for the event explained. I argue that accepting overdetermination is not absurd and that we can give an adequate account of causal relevance for psychological and other supervenient properties. The result is a partial defense of both property and event pluralism. Recent work by Davidson, Fodor, Jackson, Kim, Pettit and Yablo receives explicit and critical discussion.

Within the thought of Bernard Lonergan, is described a universal dynamic structure immanent within intellectual, moral, and religious consciousness. In Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, his analysis of the invariant pattern of that structure grounds a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics which then enables him to propose an ethic based on the structure of the good as immanent within every act of rational self-consciousness. In later works, principally Method in Theology, his orientation shifts to incorporate a new notion of value, which is distinct in that it is apprehended through feeling. The result is an ethic oriented to the transcendental objective of value and developed from the patterns of cognition which apprehend that value. This thesis studies that shift, and focuses on Lonergan's admitted sources to it: Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Jean Piaget, Susanne Langer, Abraham Maslow, and existential thought generally. In reconstructing it, the thesis finds grounds to differentiate the cognitional theory based upon analysis of intellectual as opposed to affective operations, their invariant norms for authentic operation, and their contents in facts and values respectively.

Determining when some xs compose a y provides the answer to the Special Composition Question. There are three types of possible answers: always, sometimes, never. All of the competing views fall into one of these three categories. I present these competing theories, and explain the advantages and objections to each, and in the cases of those falling into the “always”, and “never” categories explain why the categories cannot provide a satisfactory response. Then I present my own answer to the Special Composition Question and show that it is not vulnerable to the objections the competitor theories cannot overcome. I also present a novel solution to the General Composition Question.

Determining when some xs compose a y provides the answer to the Special Composition Question. There are three types of possible answers: always, sometimes, never. All of the competing views fall into one of these three categories. I present these competing theories, and explain the advantages and objections to each, and in the cases of those falling into the “always”, and “never” categories explain why the categories cannot provide a satisfactory response. Then I present my own answer to the Special Composition Question and show that it is not vulnerable to the objections the competitor theories cannot overcome. I also present a novel solution to the General Composition Question.

In this thesis, I attempt to map a relationship between theories of selfhood and theories of free will. In doing so, I hope to establish that the metaphysical commitments that characterize major branches of libertarian theory entail a commitment to an ‘executive’ model of selfhood as opposed to a ‘psychological’ model. In essence, I argue that there exist two major lines of disagreement between libertarian and compatibilist thinkers. The first disagreement is over the truth of the determinism thesis, and a second disagreement is over the nature of the self or agent. I then argue that while much attention has been given to the first of these disagreements, the most significant problem facing free will has to do with the nature of the self, and that if stronger efforts were devoted to uncovering the nature of selfhood, there would be much to be learned about the possibility of free will. / Graduate / 0422