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"Where You Sit Matters: Diplomatic Networks and International Conflict" examines how a state's structural position within diplomatic networks influences its foreign policy behaviors, particularly in the domain of international security. Despite the established understanding in International Relations (IR) that relationships among countries matter, there is little empirical knowledge on what exactly the complicated web of those relationships looks like and how it impacts state behavior. Much IR literature tends to focus only on dyadic or multilateral relationships and treat networks as background, which has left a gap in our understanding of how the structures of international networks affect international outcomes. To address this gap, my dissertation uses network analysis and a variety of statistical methods to reveal key structures of diplomatic networks and examine their impacts on a state's foreign policy behavior. My argument extends in three directions. The first part uses a large-n, cross-sectional analysis to examine the impacts of a state's broker position within diplomatic networks on its decision to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). By using the rare events logit and Heckman selection models, I find that occupying a broker position in diplomatic networks increases a state's decision to initiate MIDs over the nearly 200-year period from 1817 to 2001; its marginal impact is nearly twice that of military capability. The second part employs a separable temporal exponential random graph model (STERGM) to examine how key structures of diplomatic networks influence a state's decision to terminate diplomatic ties. My findings show that the breakdown of diplomatic ties is not a rare event and network dynamics play a role in terminating ties: states take cues from other countries in the network to decide whether or not to terminate diplomatic ties. The last part uses a community detection method, specifically a link communities method, to reveal latent communities of the diplomatic network and identify key countries that belong to multiple communities. I find that the diplomatic network resembles a hierarchical structure in that diplomatic communities tend to overlap; only a small number of major powers simultaneously belong to multiple communities and few communities are independent from those major powers.

Does a leader's psychology affect his/her likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate dispute? The study of leadership psychology has continuously found support for the central assumption that leaders matter in explaining a state's foreign policy behavior. However, many of these research projects have relied on small-sample case studies and experimental methods that have limited generalizability. In this paper, I use two variables drawn from the research program on leadership trait analysis (distrust and need for power) in a multivariate large-n study to explain the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 1,601 cases are drawn from the Correlates of War MID data set. First, using an ANOVA model, I demonstrate that MID initiators have higher average scores for both distrust and need for power and that this difference is statistically significant. Then, using logistic regression, I demonstrate that distrust and need for power have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of MID initiation. I conclude by comparing the predicted probabilities of the psychological variables of interest with territorial contiguity. All of these methods demonstrate that the psychological traits of leaders have an important effect on the likelihood of MID initiation.

Research on ethnicity and conflict treats the concept of ethnicity as defining the actors in these conflicts, whereas research on the construction and maintenance of ethnic identity explores why ethnicity unifies individuals into a single social group. What happens when this unifying concept is divided between two enemy countries? How does this situation influence peace settlements over territorial issues, armed conflict, and economic relations between these countries? To answer these questions, I create a continuous measure of ethnic similarity between rivals. I find that ethnic similarity can facilitate cooperation and exacerbate conflictual interactions between rivals, but governments will seek to limit interactions with their rival when the cross border ethnic groups are minorities. In addition, I create categorical predictors of ethnic similarity, which reveal nuances in these relationships. Specifically, rivalries sharing a pan-ethnic identity are more likely to engage in conflict regardless of actual ethnic similarity, and dyads with a majority in one country sharing ethnicity with a minority in another country are less likely to fight once in a state of rivalry. This is because a quid pro quo exists between these rivals where one rival can reduce oppression of the minority in exchange for the other rival not supporting secessions by their co-ethnics. These pairs of rivals also are more likely to attempt peace settlements. Contested nations, which are rivalry-dyads with similar ethnic majorities, are both the most likely of the ethnically similar rival categories to engage in militarized interstate disputes, but also engage in larger amounts of interstate trade.

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