In this article, I discuss a new methodology for course of action comparisons within the Military Decision Making Process MDMP. I discuss the problem with the current methodology used to compare and recommend courses of action to operational or tactical level commanders, and I describe and demonstrate how using this new methodology gives commanders a better tool to select those courses of action. I also provide additional analysis of the comparison that can provide the staff and the commander with actionable information generated from sensitivity analysis. / text

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): William Kemple, Dan C. Boger. Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-117). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): William Kemple, Dan C. Boger. "AD-A406 190." Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-117). Also available online.

Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) will become a disruptive force on the modern battlefield. In recent years, sUAS size and cost have decreased while their capability has increased. They have forced a reconsideration of the air superiority paradigm held since the First World War. Perhaps their most attractive, and worrisome, feature is the huge range of combat roles that they might fulfill. The presence of sUAS on future battlefields is certain, but the role they will play and their impact on those battlefields are not. This work presents a decision support framework for sUAS deployment in small infantry units. The framework is designed to explore and evaluate multiple sUAS-small-unit deployment concepts' impact on small unit effectiveness in a combat scenario of interest. The framework helps decision makers identify high-level sUAS deployment principles for testing and validation in physical experiments before sUAS are implemented on the battlefield. The decision support framework comprises the following: 1) a definition of the sUAS-small-unit deployment concept design space and combat scenario, 2) an agent-based computer model for exploring sUAS deployment concepts, 3) a set of analysis tools for evaluating sUAS deployment impact on combat effectiveness, and 4) suggestions for synthesizing high-level sUAS deployment principles from the analysis. In this work, the decision support framework for sUAS-small-unit deployment is used to explore and evaluate the impact of deploying an infantry platoon with between one and nine unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operating in a reconnaissance role while executing one of several sUAS patrol pattern variants. In a scenario in which a defending platoon uses sUAS to intercept and aid in indirect fires targeting against a platoon of attacking infantry, the sUAS were shown to markedly improve the defending platoon's combat effectiveness. The framework is used to synthesize several key principles for sUAS deployment in the scenario. It shows that, when fewer UAVs are deployed, short-range sUAS patrols improve defender combat effectiveness. Conversely, when more UAVs are deployed, long-range sUAS patrols improve the defenders' ability to target attacking units with indirect fires, increasing the firepower concentrated against opponents. The analysis also shows that increasing the number of deployed UAVs improves the likelihood of defending warfighters surviving the engagement and the defenders' ability to detect and engage the attackers with indirect fires. Finally, the framework shows that sUAS can force alterations in attacker behavior, removing them from combat by non-violent, but highly effective, means.

This thesis discusses military operations planning and methodology by reviewing two of NATO’s planning documents, i.e. the ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning’ (AJP 5) and the ‘Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive’ (COPD), and defends the following claim. Parts of the description of NATO’s Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP), as described in the AJP 5 and the COPD, is methodologically inconsistent (contradictory), due to epistemic and practical implications of methodology. As such, the thesis discusses three topics: approaches to Operational Art, planning heuristics and implications of methodology. The thesis also intertwines military operations planning, methodology and military problem-solving. This thesis consists of two published papers and an introduction. The introduction explains and further discusses operations planning as well as terms and concepts stated within the two papers. Paper I focuses on the AJP 5 and discusses the methodological distinction between two approaches within Operational Art, denoted the ‘Design’ and the ‘Systemic’ approach. The distinction between these approaches is vague and paper I states one epistemic and one practical implication of methodology. Paper II focuses on the COPD and discusses two specific planning heuristics. The first relates to the Systemic approach and the second heuristic relates to the third approach denoted the ‘Causalist’ approach within Operational Art. A methodological contradiction exists between these specific heuristics and paper II states one epistemic and three practical implications of methodology. Briefly, this thesis implies that parts of NATO’s description of the OLPP suffers from a methodological contradiction. Hence, a suggestion is to revise parts of the AJP 5 and the COPD. The thesis also suggest the development of a “NATO handbook of methodology” to better explain methodological implications on military operations planning and the “how to” of military problem-solving. / <p>QC 20170403</p>

Kemisk krigföring i form av luftburna gifter har förekommit i många historiska kontexter. Trots att luftburna gifter, som till exempel giftig rök och gas är likartade företeelser, har inte forskare kunnat enas om äldre former av denna krigföring är jämförbar med den moderna. Huvudorsaken är att deras analyser saknar teoretiska perspektiv som belyser hur respektive   kontexts kemiska förutsättningar påverkar krigföringen. Syftet med den här undersökningen är att jämföra ett modernt nyttjande av luftburna gifter, tyskarnas första klorutsläpp vid Ypres 1915 med ett forntida exempel, den moistiska skolans användande av brandrök som gift under århundradena f. Kr. i Kina. För att kringgå tidigare forsknings problem anläggs ett teoretiskt perspektiv. En teori som belyser dynamiken   mellan kemisk krigföring och respektive kulturs föreställningar om och förhållande till miljön. Undersökningen visar att det är relevant att jämföra det moderna användandet av luftburna gifter med användandet i andra historiska kontexter eftersom det sker i liknande taktiska sammanhang och kräver mycket naturkunskap. Samtidigt belyser analysen att kontexten ger krigföringen en viss karaktär. Moisterna försökte nå framgång genom att samordna och   förbättra den process som gjorde det luftburna giftet effektivt samtidigt som de förlitade sig på generalistkunskap. Tyskarna, däremot förlitade sig på ett så effektivt  kemiskt ämne (agens) som möjligt. För denna typ av krigföring nyttjades utpräglade specialister.   Dessutom var relationen till själva giftet annorlunda i de två kontexterna. Moisterna utsatte sig för röken medan tyskarna avskärmade sig helt från klorgasen. Dessa skillnader går att förstå genom att se hur människorna i respektive kontext utnyttjade den för krigföringen relevanta kemin i icke-militära sammanhang. Den tidigare forskningens problem med att diskutera kemisk krigföring blir också tydligt i undersökningen. Problemet beror på att den vetenskapliga disciplinen kemi medför institutioner och begrepp som begränsar synen på användandet av luftburna gifter. Denna insikt tillsammans med undersökningens övriga resultat belyser något som har relevans för dagens hotbild. Luftburna gifter, kan i rätt sammanhang och genom rätt   prioriteringar göras effektiv utan tillgång till modern vetenskap och industri. Detta bör beaktas när hotbilden från aktörer utan egen militärindustri analyseras. / Airborne poison, as a type of chemical warfare, has been used in many historical contexts. Although airborne poison such as toxic smoke and gas are similar phenomena, researchers have not been able to agree if older forms of warfare are comparable to modern. One reason for this is that their respective analysis lacks theoretical perspectives that account for contextual chemical conditions. The purpose of this study is to compare a modern example of the use of airborne poison, the Germans' first chlorine emissions at Ypres in 1915 with an ancient one, the Mohists use of smoke as a poison in ancient China. A theoretical perspective is applied to circumvent the problems of earlier research. This theory focuses on the dynamics between decision-making in chemical warfare and a particular culture's perception of and relationship to the environment. The study shows that it is relevant to compare the modern use of airborne poison with its use in other historical contexts because the weapon occurs in a similar tactical context. Also this type of warfare requires a lot of knowledge of the natural world. At the same time the analysis illustrates that a specific context gives the warfare a certain character. The Mohists tried to achieve success by coordinating and improving the process by which the airborne poison was made effective. Furthermore they relied on generalist knowledge. The Germans, however, relied on having an efficient chemical substance (agent). For this type of warfare they utilized specialists. The human-poison relationship also differed. The Mohist exposed himself to smoke while the German soldier shut himself off completely from the chlorine gas. These differences can be understood by studying how people exploited similar chemistry in a non-military way  in their respective context. The problems that previous research has had in discussing chemical warfare is also made evident. These problems occur because chemistry as a scientific discipline creates institutions and concepts that limit the view of airborne poison as a weapon. This realization, along with results of the survey in general, illustrates something which has relevance in today’s world. Airborne poison can, in the right place and with the right priorities be effective without modern industrial and scientific resources. This should be considered when analyzing political actors lacking a modern military industry.