Was Douglas MacArthur directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military during the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942? This question is still a point of debate among historians. During the six years that preceded the United States entrance into the Second World War, the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines attempted to implement a national defense plan devised by Douglas MacArthur. The end goal of MacArthur's plan was the creation of a professional Filipino military force that would be able to adequately defend the Philippines against invasion. From late 1935 until mid 1941 , MacArthur served as the official United States military adviser to the Commonwealth government. When war with Japan occurred in late 1941 the Philippine military was in dismal shape. The argument that MacArthur was directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military in the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 is strongly supported by historical evidence of events that occurred during the creation, development, and fielding of the Philippine military in 1934-1941. An investigation of historical evidence shows that MacArthur is responsible for making a series of errors that caused rampant financial problems and an inadequate training program. These factors directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of Philippine military units during the 1941-1942 campaign.

This thesis will examine the British way of war as experienced by two British Infantry Divisions - the 43rd ‘Wessex’ and 53rd ‘Welsh’ - during the Overlord campaign in North West Europe in 1944 and 1945. The main locus of research centres on the fighting components of those divisions; the infantry battalions and their supporting regiments. In order to understand the way the British fought this part of the war, the thesis will consider the British Army’s history since 1918: its level of expertise at the end of the First World War; the impact of inter-war changes, and the experience of the early part of the Second World War, as these factors were fundamental in shaping how the British Army operated during the period covered in this study. These themes will be considered in the first chapter. The following seven chapters will study each of the two infantry divisions in turn, to maintain a chronological order. This is so that the experiences of each division can be examined in a logical way, from their initial experiences of combat in late June 1944 through to March 1945. Naturally, their major battles will be considered but so will their minor engagements and day-to-day experiences, as this will give a good, detailed, overview of each division’s campaign. This layout of chapters is also convenient for allowing comparisons between the two divisions as the campaign progressed. This thesis contains several strands of enquiry which will consider how Montgomery’s prosecution of the war actually translated to the smaller units of the division (the battalions, 4 companies, platoons and sections). The historiography for this campaign tends to suggest that the British Army fought the war in a cautious way, and that this approach was characterised by the use of overwhelming material superiority and rehearsed set piece attacks; tactics that were designed not only to destroy the enemy, but also to avoid the heavy casualties of the major battles of the First World War; a factor that was perceived to be vital to the maintenance of fragile infantry morale. Although the basic premise of a ‘cautious’ British way of war is generally accepted (along with its attendant emphasis on consolidation of objectives rather than exploitation of opportunities, and a reliance on adherence to lengthy orders), this study will conclude that the way the war was fought at sub-divisional levels was frequently at a pace that did not allow for such caution. Instead, it was characterised by command pressure to achieve results quickly, hasty planning and a reliance on massive artillery and mortar contributions to compensate for deficiencies in anti-tank and armoured support. This thesis will further conclude that a conscious policy of casualty conservation appears not to have been a priority at divisional command level, but was instead a consideration for company, platoon and section commanders and the men that they led.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka hur Dalregementets militärers giftermålsmönster såg ut under tidsperioden 1650–1799, samt hur dessa påverkades av externa omständigheter som krig, social status och förändrade försörjningsmöjligheter. Den teoretiska grunden har hämtats utifrån tidigare forskning om det västeuropeiska äktenskapsmönstret och olika samhällsgruppers äktenskapsstrategier. En demografisk studie av 221 giftermål har sammanställts från källmaterialet Dalregementets personhistoria I och II. Resultatet av detta har visat att Dalregementets befäls sammanlagda medelålder under tidsperioden 1650–1799 var vid första äktenskapet 31,1 för män och 25,8 för deras makor. Samtidigt har en regressionsanalys av materialet visat en statistisk signifikant höjning av medelåldern från och med 1721 och framåt. Det tyder också på skillnader i giftermålsåldern för adelsmän och resten av officerskåren. Vilken påverkan krig har står fortfarande osäkert, då giftermålsåldern bara sjunker under den första halvan av undersökningsperioden. Detta kan ha berott på reformer som staten genomförde vid denna tid.

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare through a thorough analysis of the nature and strategies of insurgency and a comparative examination of the current strategic approaches to counterinsurgency warfare. Toward this end, a systems model approach, which views insurgent organizations as open systems, is adapted to the insurgent environment. Popular support, external support, and insurgent organization are determined as the major variables of the insurgency system. The evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and its implementation in the Algerian rebellion is examined under the light of the major variables of the system and strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. After an analysis of the F.L.N. tactics and French countermeasures, three important propositions are offered: First, popular support is the primary condition for the success of the insurgent organization; second, political, social, economic, and administrative factors have a primacy over military factors; and, third, domestic factors have a primacy over external factors in the outcome of a rebellion.

Enlisted soldiers preferred to elect company- and regimental-level officers during the first year of the American Civil War. This thesis explores how early Confederate mobilization, class conflict between elites and non-elites, and Confederate military policies affected officer elections from spring 1861 to spring 1862 among Virginia Confederates. Chapter 1 explores how the chaotic nature of mobilization and common soldiers' initial expectations regarding their military service influenced elections from April 1861 until late July 1861. Chapter 2 details the changing nature of elections as elite officers faced challenges from non-elites and Confederate policies regarding furloughs and conscription forced officers to reconcile their men’s expectations of loose discipline with directives from senior commanders.

The main theme of this thesis is the precise role of the navy department in the struggle to maintain the Union. However, naval operations themselves are not within the scope of this thesis. To what degree did the navy department assist in the successful prosecution of the war? What problems were faced by Welles in the purchase, charter, and construction of naval vessels? What was the relationship between the department and Congress? What evidence of fraud and corruption existed?

This thesis, through examination of the battles of Kadesh (1288 B.C.), Alam Halfa (1942), and the Arab-Israeli War (1967), attempts to determine the degree of similarity between tactical employment of the ancient chariot and modern armored vehicles. Sources include official analysis and records of participants and observers. This thesis proves that tactical employment of chariots and modern armored vehicles is clearly similar. Chariots were used to support infantry in the three conflicts examined. Also proved is that chariots were used almost identically with armored vehicles in exploiting a breakthrough, serving as reaction forces, making a reconnaissance, conducting retrograde operations, and holding or blocking enemy forces.

La thèse est une étude analytique de la pensée du Major-general J-F-C Fuller au travers l’ensemble de ses écrits. Elle s’articule en cinq parties principales, chacune d’entre elles étant divisée en 4 chapitres. Pour aborder l’étude Comprendre la guerre, JFC Fuller : une approche évolutionniste, il était fondamental de commencer par présenter l’homme dans toute son épaisseur et sous toutes ses facettes. Cette première partie,biographique, permet de répondre à la question : Qui est le Major-general JFC Fuller ? Elle conduit ainsi à découvrir ce que représente le cadre civilisationnel de l’homme, un citoyen qui évolue dans un jardin anglais,un ilien. Le personnage « Fuller » doit ensuite être compris dans ses trois dimensions c’est-à-dire au travers dela carrière d’un soldat de métier, un officier, puis à l’aide du prisme de ses idées politiques et enfin par les écrits d’un penseur prolixe. La seconde partie se concentre sur la matrice intellectuelle du jeune officier. Il s’agit de rechercher la filiation de la pensée et des premiers évènements qui vont profondément influencer sa vie. Sa participation à la seconde guerre des Boërs puis son affectation dans une garnison des Indesbritanniques sont deux jalons fondateurs de cette matrice. Á partir de 1907, le retour du capitaine Fuller enAngleterre marque le début de son goût pour l’écriture. La troisième partie cherche à montrer quelles sont les véritables caractéristiques d’une pensée novatrice. Confronté à l’impasse tactique des années 1915 et 1916, Fuller pose le problème- comment retrouver la mobilité opérative ?- et découvre le tank. Sa réflexion devient le germe des idées nouvelles qui permettent au chef des opérations du Tank Corps de planifier, de préparer puis de conduire le 20 novembre 1917, la bataille de Cambrai. / Each part equally divided into 4 chapters. To start with this study it was basically relevant to depict the manthroughout his different aspects. Thus the aim of the first part is to answer the question: Who is genuinely Major-generalJFC Fuller. One can discover what the British Empire framework as JFC Fuller matrix is. The man needs also to beunderstood as 3 different ways such as a British officer, his political ideas and as a prolix writer.The second part focuseson Fuller intellectual matrix. Here the goals are to find the filiations of his thoughts and his early events thatbenchmarked his life. His commitment during the Boer War and his 3 years assignment in India are 2 importantmilestones to be studied. From 1907 with his come back in England , Fuller start to write his first military essay. His firstwriting and the article Tactics of Penetration are his main stuff as Staff College Student in Camberley that are deeplyrelevant to be analysed.The third part underlines what the very true characteristics are of a new school of thought. Facingthe tactical deadlock in years 1915 and 1916, Fuller fixed the following issue: How to recover the operational mobilityback? Newly posted in the Heavy Machine Gun his discovered the tanks. His thought gradually became the core of newIdeas that allows to plan and conduct the tank attack at Cambrai on November 20th, 1917. All his studies carried on asGSO 1 of the Tank Corps lead Fuller to write the visionary Plan 1919. This paper will became the leading document forthe interwar strategical thinking for Germans and Soviets senior officers. Then The Journal of the Royal United ServiceInstitution awarded Fuller thought and wrting through The Gold Military Prize Essay for year 1919. The fourth partdepicts the never-ending ambition to implement carefully a scientific method to study War. Within the scope of his firstbook, Training Soldiers for War, one can discover the links with the French school pre-1914. An historical analysisbound to the senior officers behaviour give the floor to understand what is Generalship. An other leading subject lead tofollow Fuller evolution towards his own definition of the principles of war. Then. The Fondations of the Science of Warhis the very books to understand what is Fuller’s scientific method to analyse War.Finally, the fifth part helps to stressthe influence and relevancy of Fuller writings. British Empire crisis at the beginning of the 20’s strengthened the militaryOld school of thought that hampered the evolution pf the Army through mechanisation. Nevertheless in the USA, inFrance but mainly in Germany and in Soviet Union, Fuller name means the reception of a new way of thinking. This newthought is not opposed to Clausewitz’ one because Fuller writings are the very continuation of the former. At last, Fullerrelevancy is this of a brilliant military theorist that each officer must read. In order to summarize Fuller works and toextend his writings the author has underlined what is Military Darwinism.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / The Second World War internment of the West Coast Issei and Nisei remains a tragic moment in American history. It has long been viewed by historians as a singular act of mass social and political pressure to remove a racially constructed social group from the area, but it was carried out by the United States Army under the direction of the War Department. This dissertation studies the formation of the military policy that led to the Second World War internment of Japanese-Americans and the transformation of a reluctant American Army into an agent of a xenophobic West Coast civilian populace through external pressure, poor planning, and false assumptions. This study focuses on several aspects of civil-military relations associated with the Second World War internment of the Issei and Nisei. This includes the history of militancy and mob rule in the West Coast urban landscape and the borders of civil-military relations on the West Coast as they applied to the region’s xenophobic legislative government. Likewise, the relationship between the military and the militia, urban race relations, and the role of intelligence analysis play a central role in determining the distortion of facts, which shaped the American military’s internment policy. Finally, the disconnects between the East and West Coast arms of the federal government and the Justice and War Departments play an equally pivotal role steering the military’s response to the devolving state of affairs on the West Coast in the months following Pearl Harbor, resulting in the internment of over 110,000 Issei and Nisei in the following months.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This study analyzes the effect of the Army Air Forces’ wartime experience on the selection and training of aviation cadets and the steps taken by the Army Air Forces to reduce the number of accidents and fatalities. Over the course of the war, the US Army Air Forces suffered over 54,000 accidents in the continental United States. These accidents accounted for over 15,000 fatalities, the equivalent of a World War Two infantry division. As a result of this wartime experience the Army Air Forces began instituting and enforcing stricter safety measures and emphasizing safety in all phases of training. By the end of the war, the Army Air Forces had transitioned from an organization with loose standards for selection, training, and safety to one with formal procedures for all three. In the process, the Army Air Forces established a new culture of professionalism for the US Air Force.