This study examines the effect of judicial protection of minority rights on the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy. The framing of the Marriage Act shows that Parliament intended marriage to be between a man and a woman. By nullifying section 30(1) of the Act and making the order above, the Court fulfilled its constitutional mandate of upholding fundamental human rights. At the same time, it negated the intention of Parliament which represents majoritarian interests. The Constitutional Court is, in contra-distinction with Parliament, unelected. By voiding section 30(1) of the Marriage Act and arousing public opposition to legal recognition of same-sex unions, it raised a ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’ This ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has elicited intense scholarly debate.17 The study examines how the Court’s negation of majoritarian interests in order to protect minority rights affects its legitimacy. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2007. / A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Associate Prof. Tamale Sylvia of the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

In the interplay between protection of rights and majoritarianism, the court is the arena. This research focuses on the conflicting role of the court within a constitutional democracy and a contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma that emerges from such a role. The counter-majoritarian dilemma centres on the idea that judges overturning decisions of the legislature through judicial review undermines democracy by thwarting the will of the majority through a subjective reading of abstract constitutional principles. As a point of departure, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is contested by revealing that the court can be seen as a democratically consistent institution if democracy can be reconceptualised. The examination of the South African jurisprudential climate and the adjudicative guidelines followed by the court suggests a rejection of such anti-democratic contention. The court upholds the commitments consented to at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and adjudication is reflective of the values undertaken by the country in reaction to its past. Within these values, minority rights can find a lifeline. Thus minority rights can exist through the implications of majoritarian consent. This research further identifies, in response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma, a constraining self-consciousness on the part of the court and an acute awareness of the court’s precarious role within a democratic infancy. The core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that interpretative indeterminacy of the Constitution means that the will of the people could be substituted for judicial preference. Through the examination of the court’s interpretative strategies and judicial subjectivity, this research suggests that within judicial subjectivity, adjudication continues to be reflective of the will of the people. Far from a constraining and mechanistic interpretation to avoid judicial subjectivity, the research reveals that open and non-formalist interpretative strategies are necessary to effectuate democratic conciliation within the judicial mandate. The results of this research suggest that, far from being a democratically deviant institution, the court in the current South African jurisprudential context, is the most suited to uphold the concept of democracy. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.