This thesis looks at the failure of individual people living in affluent societies to do more to help those living in conditions of extreme poverty at the present moment. Affluent people have the capacity to assist, by contributing additional funds to aid and humanitarian organisations. Given an understanding of what is at stake, the fact that they fail to do so is both morally problematic and difficult to explain. Yet, without an understanding of the causes of inaction, it is difficult to know what measures may be taken to alleviate extreme suffering in the world today. The thesis draws upon different philosophical accounts of practical reason to argue that the conduct of the affluent can only be understood in one of three ways: these people may lack decisive reason to assist, they may be misinformed, or they may be rationally deficient in some regard. Considering each possibility in turn, it advances two central arguments. Firstly, the normative reasons claim is sound: affluent people, who do not incur minor costs by assisting, ought to do more. Secondly, these people tend to have false beliefs about the nature of poverty, to make substantive errors of judgement, and to follow flawed patterns of reasoning when they deliberate about what to do. Taken together, these factors explain their failure to act. Building upon this diagnosis, the thesis then considers how to respond to the problem of inaction, advancing a solution that is institutional in character. It argues for the construction of a division of labour between state and citizen, at the national level, which would see political institutions take on responsibility for poverty eradication, thereby leaving individuals freer to pursue their own personal goals and objectives. In order to perform this function effectively, wealthy nations would have to improve the quantity and quality of assistance that they provide to low-income countries. They would also have to cease partaking in practices that harm the global poor. This approach has a number of advantages over reliance on private philanthropy alone: it forms part of a fair and effective solution to the problem of motivating assistance, the arrangement it proposes is both stable and legitimate, and it is also something that could be achieved in practice. Therefore, it represents part of the best possible way in which to proceed.

Propomos neste estudo uma leitura e comentário do capítulo De l\'institution des enfans, Livro I, 26, dos Essais de Michel de Montaigne. Trata-se de contribuir para a discussão e elucidação de um capítulo que, embora muito conhecido e mobilizado pela crítica especializada, sobretudo pelos historiadores da educação, apresenta um trabalho de interpretação quase sempre pouco atento aos desenvolvimentos próprios do texto. A tese labora em duas frentes: naquela da história e das concepções educacionais do humanismo renascentista e naquela - em que está seu interesse principal - da compreensão e articulação dos elementos essenciais do pensamento pedagógico de Montaigne. Ressaltamos o exercício do julgamento, a conversação como meio pedagógico e a importância da filosofia moral na formação dos jovens / The purpose of this study is to do a read and comment the chapter De l institution des enfans, Livre I, 26, of the Les Essais, wrote by Michel de Montaigne. It contributes to discuss and elucidate a chapter that, even though its very known and mobilized by the specialized critics, over all by the educations historians, presents an interpretation work almost always little intent to the proper developments of the text. The thesis deals in two fronts: in that one of the history and the educational conceptions of the Renaissance Humanism and in that one - in which exists its main interest - of the understanding and joint of the essential elements of the Montaignes pedagogical thought. We stand out the exercise of the judgment, the conversation as pedagogical instrument and the importance of the moral philosophy in the formation of the young

Euthanasia has been subject of controversy since antiquity, but 3000 years later it still seems to be highly debated among contemporary ethicists and philosophers. The main purpose of this essay is to investigate under which circumstances euthanasia could be morally permissible, by highlighting and discussing the most debated objections against it. The first objection brings up the problem of how we can be sure that a wish to die is confident and final. This objection is followed by a discussion about the risks of administering euthanasia incorrectly. The second objection concerns whether voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide really is necessary. Here, the main question is whether people about to die would be harmed rather than helped if they had euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide available as an alternative. The third section discusses the doctrine of double effect. Here, the main purpose is to investigate where DDE stands in relation to cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, the final two objections concern the parallel between killing and letting die, and second of all the slippery-slope argument in connection with euthanasia. The essay concludes with a discussion about the ways in which practicing euthanasia can be harmful, as well as a more detailed debate about the sustainability of the objections mentioned above.

This thesis presents an account of the development of Scots criminal law which concentrates on the influence of the Scottish moral tradition, as epitomised by Calvinist theological doctrine and Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy. It argues that there are several crucial but seldom-acknowledged points of similarity between the Calvinist aim of creating a holy community and key tenets of eighteenth century Scottish moral thought, which rest upon community-oriented conceptions of the nature of morality and society. Both these shared conceptions and the particular ways they are expressed in Calvinist creed and Enlightenment philosophy are shown to have had a bearing on the way that Scots criminal law changed over time. The areas in which this influence is demonstrated are: the scope and principles of the law, i.e. the type of conduct that was punishable and the arguments that were put forward to justify its prohibition; the attribution of criminal responsibility (and non-responsibility); and the importance of mental state. It is argued that in each of these discrete areas changing perspectives on the nature of morality and human agency had a palpable impact on both legal doctrine and practice. When these different areas of the law are viewed as a whole and in historical perspective, the formative force of the Scottish moral tradition becomes clear and its influence can be seen to have extended into the contemporary law. The thesis therefore provides an original interpretation of the history of Scots criminal law by considering its sources and institutions from hitherto unexplored theological and moral perspectives, whilst simultaneously enhancing scholarly appreciation of certain aspects of the contemporary law that appear unusually moralistic. It also makes a broader contribution to socio-historic scholarship and strengthens its position as a recognised and worthwhile discipline by illustrating, using a concrete legal system, how legal history can enhance debates within criminal law theory and vice versa.

O estudo do princípio da autonomia, conceito central na filosofia moral de Kant, permite compreender a origem da lei moral. A fórmula da autonomia prescreve que a lei moral é fruto da vontade e não depende de fatores externos: nós somos colegisladores de uma lei a que nos submetemos. A tese da unidade do imperativo categórico assevera que o imperativo categórico é uno e apenas um. Portanto, ao aplicar-se o imperativo categórico na política através da fórmula da lei universal estáse efetivamente a aplicar o princípio supremo da moralidade num contexto sócio político. A fórmula do reino dos fins faz com que esta associação seja mais presente, principalmente através da analogia entre súditos e soberanos de uma lei moral, que na política se dá através da relação entre chefe de Estado e cidadãos. Com o conceito de \'reino dos fins\' dá-se um passo em frente e a ideia de co-legislação é aplicada, segundo cremos, por um processo sócio-político na Paz Perpétua. Por sua vez, expõese o pensamento de vários autores que interpretam conceitos morais de um ponto de vista político. No entanto, nos afastamos dessa interpretação por reconhecermos que na Filosofia Moral kantiana não existe uma evidência suficiente para essa asserção. A relação é, por isso, inversa à proposta pela tradição construtivista: a moralidade está presente na Filosofia Política. Ela pode, com efeito, coincidir completamente com a política quando se trata dos princípios fundamentais da política. Ou pode servir como um impedimento a certas ações que, embora não sejam de teor moral, estejam em contradição com ela. Tal como acontece com os imperativos hipotéticos. A razão prudencial, pragmática ou técnica, deve dobrar seus joelhos perante a razão prática pura. Propõe-se, assim, um paralelo com conceitos desenvolvidos na Paz Perpétua, designadamente com a ideia de um modo de governo republicano (constituição republicana), onde os seus membros têm de participar de uma legislação, e com o político moral, considerado o agente responsável por aplicar a moral (razão prática pura). / The study of the principle of autonomy, a central concept in Kant\'s moral philosophy, allow us to understand the origin of the moral law. The formula of autonomy dictates that the moral law is the result of the will and does not depend on external factors: we are co-legislators of a law that we submit to ourselves. The thesis of the unity of the categorical imperative asserts that the categorical imperative is one and only one. Therefore, when applying the categorical imperative in politics through the formula of universal law is being effectively applied by the supreme principle of morality in a sociopolitical context. The formula of the kingdom of ends makes this association more present, mainly through the analogy between sovereigns and subjects of a moral law, which in politics is through the relationship between the head of state and citizens. With the concept of \'kingdom of ends\' a step ahead is done and the idea of co-legislation is applied, giving us, we believe, by a socio-political process in the Perpetual Peace. In turn, we expose the thought of many authors who interpret moral concepts from a political point of view. However, we drifted apart this interpretation because we recognize that in Kant\'s Moral Philosophy there isn\'t a strong evidence for this assertion. The relationship is, therefore, reverse to the proposal by the Constructivist tradition: the morality is present in Political Philosophy. It may, in fact, match completely with the politics when it comes to the fundamental principles of politics. Or can serve as a constraint to certain actions that, while not of moral content, are in contradiction with it. As occurs with the hypothetical imperatives. The prudential reason, pragmatic or technical, should double their \'knees\' before the pure practical reason. Therefore we propose a parallel with concepts developed in Perpetual Peace, namely the idea of a republican form of government (republican constitution), where its members have to participate in a common legislation, and the moral politician, considered the agent responsible for applying morale (pure practical reason).

Um dos caminhos possíveis para compreendermos os objetivos gerais da obra platônica é tomarmos como guia de leitura dos diálogos as várias investidas de Platão em responder-nos a seguinte questão crucial: de que modo devemos viver? Os diversos discursos produzidos nos diálogos como possíveis respostas a tal questão são colocados na boca dos personagens que melhor os representariam paradigmaticamente. Assim, Sócrates é tornado nos diálogos platônicos o modelo máximo de virtude, verdadeira encarnação do que podemos propriamente chamar, segundo Platão, de vida filosófica. O intento de Platão consiste em mostrar, diante das alternativas, que a vida filosófica se impõe como a mais satisfatória possível. Deste modo, a pergunta crucial da ética platônica a respeito do gênero de existência ao qual é digno nos consagrarmos exige de Platão a investigação da natureza de noções éticas fundamentais como o bem, a eÙdaimona e o prazer. Alguns textos desenvolvem a articulação de tais conceitos de maneira mais explícita e decisiva como é o caso do Protágoras, do Górgias, do Fédon da República e do Filebo. Nestas obras podemos observar como a posição de Platão com relação a sua concepção geral de eÙdaimona e o lugar que o prazer nela ocupa desenvolve-se na mesma medida em que sua noção da natureza do bem é paulatinamente construída, tornando-se mais precisa. O objetivo de nosso trabalho é investigar o modo como Platão articula estes conceitos nos diálogos mencionados, e outros relevantes, com especial atenção à posição atribuída ao prazer em nossa vida moral. Deste modo, nosso tema de reflexão é o lugar do prazer na Filosofia Moral de Platão. / One way to understand the main goals of platonic philosophy is to take as a reading guide Platos many attempts to answer the crucial question,How should we live?, in his dialogues. The different discourses produced in the dialogues as possible answers to this question are put in the mouth of the characters that best represent them paradigmatically. Thus, Socrates is shown in the platonic dialogues as the best model of virtue, the true personification of what we may call, according to Plato, the philosophical life. Platos intent is to show that the philosophical life is, of all alternatives, the ideal satisfactory life. Therefore, the crucial question of platonic ethics about the worthiest genre of life demands from Plato a research on the nature of basic ethical concepts such as the good, eÙdaimona and pleasure. Some texts articulate these concepts in a more explicit and decisive way, namely the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Phaedo, the Republic and the Philebus. In these works we can see how Platos position to his general conception of eÙdaimona, and the place of plesure in it, develops at the same time as his notion of the nature of good is gradually constructed, becoming more acurate. The goal of our work is to investigate how Plato articulates these concepts in the forementioned dialogues, and others that are relevant, with a special focus on the place attributed to plesaure in our moral life. In conclusion, our subject of reflexion is the place of pleasure in Platos Moral Philosophy.

Esta dissertação explora a obra de Theodor W. Adorno dando enfoque às questões concernentes à moral, articulando problemas de filosofia da história e sua dimensão política. O texto divide-se em três capítulos: o primeiro trata do diagnóstico de época do qual partimos, a saber, o mundo tal como ele se configurou após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. O segundo capítulo explora a dimensão prática ética e política imanente ao conceito de verdade na tradição da teoria crítica, de modo a considerar sua centralidade no âmbito de uma discussão sobre a moral. O terceiro capítulo, intitulado Antinomias da moral, disserta sobre a abordagem adorniana de problemas tradicionalmente vinculados à filosofia moral a partir de uma leitura da Minima Moralia, da Dialética Negativa e de Problemas de filosofia moral. / This dissertation explores the work of Theodor W. Adorno, shedding light at the problems regarding moral philosophy in an articulation with an interpretation of history and its political dimension. The text contains three chapters: the first one deals with the diagnosis of time of the post-war world. The second chapter explores the practical ethical and political dimension which is immanent to the truth concept employed in the tradition of critical theory, so that we can consider its centrality in the discussion on moral philosophy. The third chapter, entitled Antinomies of morals, discusses Adornos approach of traditional problems of moral philosophy, based mostly on an interpretation of his works Minima Moralia and Negative Dialectics, and his lectures.

This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant??s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant??s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the ??art of the possible??, rendering Kant??s impartial standpoint by means of the ??original position?? (Rawls) or the ??procedures of discourse ethics?? (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice??s failure, discovering, in Kant??s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the ??undecidability?? of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. ??Reasonable faith?? in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice??s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which affirms that deconstruction can productively engage with the constructive tradition. Deconstruction is at home in Rawls?? view that ??the ideal of a just constitution is always something to be worked toward??.

This study explores the factors that influence how three First Nations educators in the City of Saskatoon define ethics, identify ethical dilemmas, and resolve ethical dilemmas.<p> Using the case-study methodology guided by respectful inquiry with First Nations people, the study sought to identify influential factors affecting the ethical considerations among three Aboriginal educators. The research questions were: 1) How do three Aboriginal educators define ethics? 2) How do the three Aboriginal educators identify an ethical dilemma? 3) What factors do the three Aboriginal educators identify as influencing the resolution of ethical dilemmas? The study sought to identify how the educators perceive ethics, and was not meant to be built on a priori theory of ethics. The reliance on ethical theory beyond what was generated by the participants or through relevant and related studies was carefully selected so as not to impede the expression of the understandings of the participants and the interpretations and understandings of the researcher and readers.<p> The study found that the participants identified their definitions, instances, and resolution of ethical dilemmas as reflecting the experiences of the participants. Their histories are a part of the diversity of First Nations people, and it is their stories that illustrate the ethical frameworks of the participants. The study participants reported a connection to their First Nations cultures from which they drew. Their influential experiences, though, have diminished a concrete connection to their First Nations cultures. They maintain a sense of belonging to an Aboriginal collective, and it is this membership that frequently defines their ethical dilemmas.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 100 years after his death, remains a controversial figure in philosophy. Much of this controversy stems from Nietzsche's view of truth, which seems superficially hopelessly contradictory, vacillating between relativism and denial of truth on the one hand, and praise for science and hard truths on the other. Thus, any person wanting to defend Nietzsche's positive philosophy must first make sense of his epistemology. The solution to this puzzle regarding Nietzsche's theory of truth is the realization that Nietzsche changes his view on truth. Much like Wittgenstien, Nietzsche had an early and a late period in his epistemic views, and a middle period where he is struggling with two very different, incompatible views. The late view of truth is surprisingly straightforward: Nietzsche can be seen as an early pragmatist. Once we have a coherent truth theory, we can then start to conclude some of the more contentious arguments in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as: what is the Will to Power, and how does Nietzsche's view of truth interact with his criticism of morality? This thesis will trace the development of the former and endeavor to answer some of the latter.