Psychopaths have traditionally been excluded from the moral realm and have regularly been used as a paradigm case for explaining why emotions, or emotional knowledge, is necessary for the acquisition of moral knowledge. Psychopaths possess an affective deficit that results in an almost total lack of empathy. Emotionists argue that emotions (specifically empathy) are central to moral understanding, and that, since the psychopaths possess this affective deficit, they lack the capacity to acquire moral knowledge which is necessary to be morally responsible. Given recent neurological findings regarding psychopaths, I ague that Emotionists cannot use the psychopath as a case example supporting their argument that emotions are necessary for moral knowledge. I argue that despite psychopaths’ affective disorder, they possess three of the capacities (via cognitive mechanisms) considered by many to be necessary for moral responsibility. Those three capacities are the capacity to acquire moral knowledge, the capacity to be reason-responsive to moral demands, and the capacity to control one’s actions in light of moral demands and reasons. The upshot of my analysis is a rethinking of what it means to possess the right kind of emotional knowledge and a rethinking of the capabilities of psychopaths in relation to the moral realm. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / The commonly held view in philosophy is that psychopaths are not morally responsible. Psychopaths amount to about 1% of the current population and up to 25% of male criminal offenders. While these numbers seem rather small in comparison to the total population, philosophers, psychologists and behavioural psychologists regularly point to psychopaths for insight into the moral realm. The main aim of this dissertation is to block the Emotionist argument that emotions are necessary for moral knowledge and argue that psychopaths, despite their affective disorder, possess three of the capacities considered by many to be necessary for moral responsibility. The three capacities are the capacity to acquire moral knowledge, the capacity to be reason-responsive to moral demands, and the capacity to control one’s actions in light of moral demands and reasons. I conclude by arguing that psychopaths are capable of moral responsibility from a cognitive standpoint and that the Emotionist argument must seek another route to establish its conclusion that emotions are necessary for moral knowledge.

This thesis introduces the idea of progressive autonomy, namely future-oriented self-governance, based on the pursuit of desired goals that one has established for oneself. As the thesis shows, focus on this sort of activity, as well as its value and importance, has been largely left out of the existing literature on autonomy. In contrast, this activity is central to progressive autonomy, which, as this thesis puts forth, enables the individual to actively determine the course of his life. Throughout the process, the individual is author of his own narrative, which, as the ongoing fulfillment of desired goals, he experiences as both meaningful and worthwhile. The thesis does not frame the narrative of the progressively autonomous individual as merely a story or an account of events. Rather, it does so as a sequence events the progressively autonomous individual is directly responsible for bringing about, as well as concretely situated in. He is, in other words, part and parcel of his narrative, as opposed to, say, a novelist who physically stands apart from the events he imagines and writes. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that, though the progressively autonomous individual is motivated by his own desires, he is more than just a pleasure seeker; he is strategically morally responsible. Such responsibility involves and is characterized by rejecting certain motives that undermine the actual achievement of desired goals, while affirming other motives that facilitate this achievement. This, as the thesis shows, renders the progressively autonomous individual more responsible than one who partakes in this rejection or affirmation, without regard to how either will impact one’s future.

This thesis introduces the idea of progressive autonomy, namely future-oriented self-governance, based on the pursuit of desired goals that one has established for oneself. As the thesis shows, focus on this sort of activity, as well as its value and importance, has been largely left out of the existing literature on autonomy. In contrast, this activity is central to progressive autonomy, which, as this thesis puts forth, enables the individual to actively determine the course of his life. Throughout the process, the individual is author of his own narrative, which, as the ongoing fulfillment of desired goals, he experiences as both meaningful and worthwhile. The thesis does not frame the narrative of the progressively autonomous individual as merely a story or an account of events. Rather, it does so as a sequence events the progressively autonomous individual is directly responsible for bringing about, as well as concretely situated in. He is, in other words, part and parcel of his narrative, as opposed to, say, a novelist who physically stands apart from the events he imagines and writes. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that, though the progressively autonomous individual is motivated by his own desires, he is more than just a pleasure seeker; he is strategically morally responsible. Such responsibility involves and is characterized by rejecting certain motives that undermine the actual achievement of desired goals, while affirming other motives that facilitate this achievement. This, as the thesis shows, renders the progressively autonomous individual more responsible than one who partakes in this rejection or affirmation, without regard to how either will impact one’s future.

This thesis introduces the idea of progressive autonomy, namely future-oriented self-governance, based on the pursuit of desired goals that one has established for oneself. As the thesis shows, focus on this sort of activity, as well as its value and importance, has been largely left out of the existing literature on autonomy. In contrast, this activity is central to progressive autonomy, which, as this thesis puts forth, enables the individual to actively determine the course of his life. Throughout the process, the individual is author of his own narrative, which, as the ongoing fulfillment of desired goals, he experiences as both meaningful and worthwhile. The thesis does not frame the narrative of the progressively autonomous individual as merely a story or an account of events. Rather, it does so as a sequence events the progressively autonomous individual is directly responsible for bringing about, as well as concretely situated in. He is, in other words, part and parcel of his narrative, as opposed to, say, a novelist who physically stands apart from the events he imagines and writes. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that, though the progressively autonomous individual is motivated by his own desires, he is more than just a pleasure seeker; he is strategically morally responsible. Such responsibility involves and is characterized by rejecting certain motives that undermine the actual achievement of desired goals, while affirming other motives that facilitate this achievement. This, as the thesis shows, renders the progressively autonomous individual more responsible than one who partakes in this rejection or affirmation, without regard to how either will impact one’s future.

This thesis introduces the idea of progressive autonomy, namely future-oriented self-governance, based on the pursuit of desired goals that one has established for oneself. As the thesis shows, focus on this sort of activity, as well as its value and importance, has been largely left out of the existing literature on autonomy. In contrast, this activity is central to progressive autonomy, which, as this thesis puts forth, enables the individual to actively determine the course of his life. Throughout the process, the individual is author of his own narrative, which, as the ongoing fulfillment of desired goals, he experiences as both meaningful and worthwhile. The thesis does not frame the narrative of the progressively autonomous individual as merely a story or an account of events. Rather, it does so as a sequence events the progressively autonomous individual is directly responsible for bringing about, as well as concretely situated in. He is, in other words, part and parcel of his narrative, as opposed to, say, a novelist who physically stands apart from the events he imagines and writes. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that, though the progressively autonomous individual is motivated by his own desires, he is more than just a pleasure seeker; he is strategically morally responsible. Such responsibility involves and is characterized by rejecting certain motives that undermine the actual achievement of desired goals, while affirming other motives that facilitate this achievement. This, as the thesis shows, renders the progressively autonomous individual more responsible than one who partakes in this rejection or affirmation, without regard to how either will impact one’s future.

In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.

Research suggests that intuitions about thought experiments are vulnerable to a wide array of seemingly irrelevant factors. I argue that when arguments hinge on the use of intuitions about thought experiments, research on the subtle factors that affect intuitions must be taken seriously. To demonstrate how failing to consider such psychological influences can undermine an argument, I discuss Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. I argue that by failing to consider the impact of subtle psychological influences such as order effects, Pereboom likely mis-identifies what really leads us to have the intuitions that we have about his cases, and this in turn undermines his argument for incompatibilism. Last, I consider objections and discuss how to empirically test my hypothesis.

Whether Kant’s account of free will is coherent or not depends upon how we interpret him. On the one hand, if we understand Kant as providing some metaphysical solution to the problem of free will, which secures the reality of free will for agents, then his account seems to be incoherent. One the other hand, if we understand Kant’s account as merely providing a defense of the assumption, or idea of freedom for practical purposes, then his account seems to be useful and coherent. I will argue that the latter account of free will is the one that Kant provides in his works, and will illustrate how this account might shed light on to our epistemic limits and our nature as human beings.

Frankfurt-style cases are purported counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities, since they arecases in which agents appear to be morally responsible for their actions, even though they lack the ability todo otherwise. Philip Swenson has recently challenged these Frankfurt-style cases as effective counterexamplesto PAP by presenting a scenario in which an agent seems to lack morally responsibility for failing to save achild, since he couldn’t do otherwise. And since there’s no morally relevant difference between this case ofomission, and the traditional Frankfurt-style cases, we should therefore conclude that the agents in theFrankfurt-style cases lack morally responsibility for their actions as well. In the following paper I argue thatone could simply run Swenson’s argument in reverse, thereby showing that it is the agent in his case that ismorally responsible for his omission, rather than the other way around, and that Swenson therefore has failedto demonstrate that Frankfurt-style cases should be rejected as effective counterexamples to PAP.

This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the concept of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.