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Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness. / It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents. / If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules.

Much like unpalatable foods, filthy restrooms and bloody wounds, sociomoral transgressions are often described as “disgusting”. This linguistic similarity suggests that there is a link between sociomoral disgust and more rudimentary forms of disgust associated with toxicity and disease. Critics have argued, however, that such references are purely metaphorical, or that sociomoral disgust may be limited to transgressions that remind us of more basic disgust stimuli. My aim was to provide more direct evidence that sociomoral transgressions do genuinely evoke disgust, and to explore factors that may influence how much disgust is evoked. I first searched for similarity in the facial expressions evoked by gustatory distaste (elicited by unpleasant tastes), physical disgust (elicited by photographs of contaminants), and moral disgust (elicited by unfair treatment in an economic game). I found that all three states evoked activation of the levator labii muscle region of the face, characteristic of an oral-nasal rejection response and consistent with an origin of sociomoral disgust in oral disgust. I next investigated whether individual differences in the tendency to experience physical disgust are related to variability in sociomoral judgement and emotion. In two different populations, heightened sensitivity toward physical disgust was related to more severe sociomoral judgements. A complementary neuroimaging study showed overlap between the neural correlates of physical disgust and sociomoral judgement, as well as highlighting brain regions that may underlie sociomoral hypersensitivity. Finally, I tested the idea that perceived differences in the causal stability of sociomoral transgressions may specifically affect levels of disgust. Although it was not possible to dissociate disgust from anger, the transgressions that were presented did evoke reliable self-reports of disgust. Taken together, these findings converge to support the conclusion that sociomoral transgressions can in fact elicit disgust, and accordingly that references to the disgusting nature of wrongdoing reflect biological reality rather than metaphor.

Much like unpalatable foods, filthy restrooms and bloody wounds, sociomoral transgressions are often described as “disgusting”. This linguistic similarity suggests that there is a link between sociomoral disgust and more rudimentary forms of disgust associated with toxicity and disease. Critics have argued, however, that such references are purely metaphorical, or that sociomoral disgust may be limited to transgressions that remind us of more basic disgust stimuli. My aim was to provide more direct evidence that sociomoral transgressions do genuinely evoke disgust, and to explore factors that may influence how much disgust is evoked. I first searched for similarity in the facial expressions evoked by gustatory distaste (elicited by unpleasant tastes), physical disgust (elicited by photographs of contaminants), and moral disgust (elicited by unfair treatment in an economic game). I found that all three states evoked activation of the levator labii muscle region of the face, characteristic of an oral-nasal rejection response and consistent with an origin of sociomoral disgust in oral disgust. I next investigated whether individual differences in the tendency to experience physical disgust are related to variability in sociomoral judgement and emotion. In two different populations, heightened sensitivity toward physical disgust was related to more severe sociomoral judgements. A complementary neuroimaging study showed overlap between the neural correlates of physical disgust and sociomoral judgement, as well as highlighting brain regions that may underlie sociomoral hypersensitivity. Finally, I tested the idea that perceived differences in the causal stability of sociomoral transgressions may specifically affect levels of disgust. Although it was not possible to dissociate disgust from anger, the transgressions that were presented did evoke reliable self-reports of disgust. Taken together, these findings converge to support the conclusion that sociomoral transgressions can in fact elicit disgust, and accordingly that references to the disgusting nature of wrongdoing reflect biological reality rather than metaphor.

Moral responsibility is an issue at the heart of the free-will debate. The question of how we can have moral responsibility in a deterministic world is an interesting and puzzling one. Compatibilists arguments have left open the possibility that the ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. The challenge, then, is to come up with what our attributions of moral responsibility are tracking. To do this, criteria which can adequately differentiate cases in which the agent is responsible from cases in which the agent is not responsible are required. I argue that an agent is responsible for the consequences of an action if they stem, in an appropriate way, from the agent's deep values and desires. These deep values and desires make up the Deep Self. Parts of the Deep Self, first, tend to be enduring; second, desires within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things); third, they tend to be reflectively endorsed by the agent; fourth, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception; and fifth, they are not generally in extreme conflict with other deep traits. Empirical work is drawn upon to help develop a suitable account of what deserves to be called a part of the Deep Self. I also strengthen and extend this view by considering issues of poor judgement and weakness of will, and when and how we can be considered responsible for them.

<p>The purpose of the study was to explore what parents expect of schools regarding citizenship and moral education. It was argued that it is important that parents' views are taken into accouint when exploring citizenship and moral education in the schools in order to enhance congruence between values and associated virtues promoted at school and at home.</p>

This study aimed to enhance understanding of the moral reasoning of gifted children. While research has explored the justice moral reasoning of gifted children (Arbuthnot, 1973; Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Gross, 1993; Henderson, Gold, & Clarke, 1984; Howard-Hamilton, 1994), this study explored prosocial moral reasoning, moral reasoning which involves conflict between one??s own needs and desires and the needs and desires of others. In addition, this study sought to gather empirical evidence for literature claims that gifted children have higher levels of empathy than their age peers (Lovecky, 1997; Piechowski, 2003; Silverman, 1993b). The study aimed to investigate the possible relationships among giftedness, prosocial reasoning and empathy. Primary (elementary) school students aged between 9 and 12 years in the Sydney Metropolitan area were administered The Prosocial Reasoning Objective Measure (PROM), The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and The Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents (IOE) questionnaires. The results for gifted students (n = 176) were compared with a control group of students not identified as gifted (n = 128). The study found that gifted students used more of the highest level of prosocial reasoning in the PROM than their age peers. Furthermore, gifted students used more empathic concern, fantasy empathy and cognitive empathy than their age peers, although ability was not predictive of the other empathy factors in the instruments. Small but significant correlations between some types of empathy and some levels of prosocial reasoning were also found, indicating possible relationships between empathy and prosocial reasoning. Interviews were conducted with selected students (n = 13) from the above sample, along with some of their teachers (n = 5) and parents (n = 2). Despite the small sample, the interviews seemed to indicate a relationship between experience with bullying and prosocial reasoning. The study highlights the need for an empathy questionnaire that specifically tests cognitive and affective empathy in children. A new questionnaire may unravel some of the seemingly contradictory results in the present study. The study also provides empirical evidence that gifted children use higher levels of prosocial moral reasoning and empathy than their age-peers.

Zugl.: Hohenheim, Univ., Diss., 2006