Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, many Americans quickly rallied to support the nation. Among the numerous committees, organizations, and individuals that became active in the mobilization process were the forty-eight state councils of defense. Encouraged to form by President Wilson and his administration in the days and weeks following U.S entry in the war, the state councils grew as offshoots of the Council of National Defense and assisted in bringing every section of the country into a single scheme of work. Everyone was expected to do their part in WWI, whether they were fighting overseas or helping on the home front. The state councils, broken down into various sections and county, township, and high-school level councils, made sure that this was the case by reaching down into local communities and encouraging individuals to become involved in the war effort. Their work represented the embodiment of a “total war” philosophy and, yet, studies on these organizations are surprisingly scarce, giving readers an inadequate understanding of the American home front during the conflict. This thesis therefore places the focus directly on the state councils and examines the work they undertook to make the United States ready for, and most effective in wartime service. In particular, it explores the efforts of the Educational Section of the Indiana State Council of Defense. By concentrating on this one section, readers may gain a better understanding of the lengths that the state councils went to in order to put every person – teachers and students included – on a wartime footing.

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".