Thesis (M. A.)--Trinity International University, 2008. / Abstract. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-136).

Inaug.-diss. - Rostock. / Lebenslauf. Bibliography: p. 85-94.

"Substantially the same as ... (the author's doctoral dissertation: The impact of French naturalists and psychologists on August Strindberg's plays of the 1880's and early 1890's ... (with)--additional material." / Bibliography: p. [178]-186.

Part of Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1938. / Lithoprinted. "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, Chicago, Illinois." Bibliography: p. 71.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-196).

Praca doktorska - Uniwersytet Wrocławski. / Summary in German. Bibliography: p. 132-137.

Inaug-Diss.--Berlin. / Vita. "Literatur": p. [7]-11.

This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.

This thesis reads three American Naturalist novels, Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie, Edith Wharton's The House of Mirth, and Kate Chopin's The Awakening, as challenges to both domestic ideology and to the market. Exploring the boundaries of an individual's interiority and exteriority, these novels suggest an alternate, more fulfilling existence, though never fully conceptualizing it. Naturalism presents characters who must make sense of their world almost wholly on a material level; the world presented in Naturalism is concerned with the what of a person, not the who. Capitalism splits the self by valuing the outward performance rather than the inward development. The female protagonists of these three novels attempt to gain happiness promised by consumerism through the only plot available to them, that of marriage. When this fails, they all three turn to artistic expression as a way to find the inner fulfillment their commercial society refuses. Carrie, Lily, and Edna value the art they pursue not because of its economic value, but because of the emotional liberation it allows them. In developing their art, each of these women gets the chance to examine the interior life that their societies deny. Looking at marriage and the market within these novels, this thesis examines the split between an individual's exterior and interior in fin-de-siècle American fiction.

I offer an interpretive reconstruction of John Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics. I explore the function and interrelation of a number of terms that are central to Dewey’s metaphysics, including “nature,” “continuity,” “generic traits of existence,” the “qualitative,” “experience,” and “emergence.” In place of a strictly “pluralistic” idea of nature, I suggest that a Deweyan model provides the basis for understanding nature as a continuous whole. The generic traits of existence are the most general ontological features of nature; they are operative in all that exists, but manifest in unique ways within every particular existence. Because all things share these traits, they can be understood as the ground for naturalistic continuity, for how all existences are capable of interacting within a common world. Generic traits are best understood as the underlying patterns or rhythms of nature, patterns that are “tensional” or oppositional. I propose that “tension” is at the heart of any productive process. Through characterizing generic traits in this way, I link them to an emergent theory of generation. Thus, the generic traits of existence are the common grounds for particular existences, relations among existences, and the generation of new existences and relations. Experience is a broad term, but Dewey provides the basis for differentiating among types of experience in accordance with their functionalities, as well as their contextual “size” or “scope.” We can discuss Deweyan experience as an integrated series of emergent contexts or fields that include what he terms, in order of diminishing size, culture, mind, subconscious, consciousness, and cognitive thought. This emergent scheme shows why culture is a directive field of experience, and that cognitive or reflective thought is only a small portion of our experiential process. Through reflecting upon the nature of various experiential contexts, through treating these contexts as our empirical data, we can engage in what Dewey terms “metaphysical inquiry.” If knowledge itself is understood within a broader experiential context, the ways in which knowledge integrates into experience, the “forms” of our meanings, can tell us a great deal about basic features of existence.