Cognitivismo Avaliativo Descritivista é a tese segundo a qual atribuições de valor pretendem descrever aspectos da realidade. Segundo essa tese, ser valioso não é senão instanciar certa propriedade ou participar de certa relação. O esforço de reflexão e discussão avaliativa é concebido como um esforço para ajustar nossas convicções avaliativas à realidade, e quando este esforço é bem-sucedido obtermos conhecimento avaliativo. Atribuições de valor se distinguem de outras proposições descritivas apenas em razão do caráter peculiar dos aspectos da realidade dos quais se ocupa. O objetivo da presente dissertação é objetar a este tese. Cabe ao defensor do Cognitivismo Descritivista delimitar a região da realidade da qual tratam atribuições de valor. É por referência a ela que o cognitivista deve explicar os traços distintivos do juízo de valor. Há duas alternativas disponíveis: ou juízos de valor dizem respeito a um reino de fatos que transcendem a realidade natural ou dizem respeito a fatos naturais. No primeiro capítulo argumento que o Cognitivismo em sua forma Não-Naturalista não pode dar conta da covariação do valor. A covariação consiste no fato de diferenças em valor sempre são acompanhadas de diferenças não-avaliativas. Esta é uma restrição à qual nossas atribuições de valor se conformam, mas não podemos dar sentido a ela se assumimos a verdade do Cognitivismo Não-Naturalista. O Cognitivismo Descritivista deve, portanto, assumir uma forma Naturalista. No segundo capítulo argumento a única razão para preferir o Cognitivismo Naturalista a caracterizações alternativas do juízo de valor consiste no fato de que essa tese promete dar conta da objetividade de atribuições de valor segundo certa concepção de objetividade Segundo esta concepção só são objetivos aqueles aspectos da realidade acessíveis em abstração de qualquer perspectiva particular, incluída aí a perspectiva caracterizada pela propensão a certas respostas comportamentais e afetivas que adquirimos ao longo de nossa educação moral. Argumento que esta concepção de objetividade não se sustenta e que, portanto, não temos nenhuma razão para adotar o Cognitivismo Naturalista. No terceiro capítulo argumento que, mesmo que tivéssemos alguma razão para supor que atribuições de valor consistem na descrição de aspectos naturais da realidade, esta caracterização do juízo de valor também falha em dar conta de um traço distintivo de tais juízos, qual seja, a restrição à terceirização de juízos de valor. A restrição à terceirização consiste no fato de que o parecer de pretensos especialistas em valor não pode fornecer razão para aceitar certo juízo de valor. Usualmente o parecer de especialistas pode fornecer razão para adotar juízos descritivos, e se assumimos que atribuições de valor descrevem aspectos naturais da realidade não podemos dar conta dessa restrição. Concluo que devemos recusar o Cognitivismo Descritivista. / Descriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.

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The author's purpose has been to trace in a very broad and general manner the trend of naturalism up to this point where the central figure of our study, Theodore Dreiser, enters into the picture. This survey is designed primarily to give the reader an indication of what naturalism is, both in philosophy and method, and a very brief historical background of the movement.

Recent literature seems to have opened up space for naturalistic theistic metaethics in a contemporary context, as proponents of divine command theories have tended to be restricted to either supernatural or theistic non-natural theories within existing taxonomies of normative theory. While perhaps encouraging for theists, would theism add anything substantive to theories of ethical naturalism? In this paper, I examine this question. I argue that theistic naturalism appears to incur certain objections as well as provide a plausible and explanatory constraint on content for theories of ethical naturalism. As a result, a corresponding challenge to non-theistic variants is raised. / Master of Arts / Realists, roughly summarized, are those metaethicists who believe that some moral propositions have truth values, that some (or at least one) of those propositions turn out to be true, and that if rational agents disagree on the truth value of a particular moral proposition, only one of them has the possibility of being correct. Broadly construed, moral realists tend to fall under one of two “tents”, preferring either naturalism (for which moral properties turn out to be wholly natural in constitution) or non-naturalism (which posits that at least some moral properties have, even if only partly, non-natural constituents as part of their make-up. Theists, who base their theories of morality on some facet of the nature or essence (or commands) of God, have tended to either be relegated in philosophical debate to a characterization of “supernaturalism” or to some seldom visited corner of the non-natural “tent” of moral realism. The former tends to limit theistic engagement in contemporary metaethical dialogue such that it can seem (at times) as if theists and non-theists are talking about two different subjects entirely. On the other hand, a non-naturalistic theory of theistic moral realism saddles the view with some fairly difficult metaphysical and epistemological baggage in the form of powerful objections levied against non-naturalistic theories in general. This paper explores another option for theism in light of very recent work by Gideon Rosen, namely his article examining the metaphysical implications of varieties of moral realism, particularly naturalistic ones. This article has already garnered a general characterization (within metaethical research, writ large) as being a “taxonomy” of naturalistic (and non-naturalistic, for that matter) theories. Specifically for my purposes here, Rosen suggests that divine command theory (and theistic metaethics in general) should be understood as being naturalistic in formulation. This would seem to be advantageous to theists, in that their metaethical theories might avoid either the bounded characterization of supernaturalism or the difficult challenges of non-naturalism. However, the theist, should she avail herself of naturalism in this regard, will need to tread carefully. Given that Rosen has couched his 'taxonomy' in terms of metaphysical grounding, I examine some resultant challenges for naturalistic theistic metaethics, concluding they can be overcome, as well as a related objection to non-theistic naturalism that arise as a result of the same grounding discussion coupled with the resources theists can leverage in a naturalistic context.

Students and consumers of psychological science are routinely taught that the scientific approach used in psychological research facilitates its providing the most accurate information about human behavior. Because this approach to knowledge acquisition is supposed to be based on objective evidence and systematic reasoning rather than the biased interpretation of other approaches, these other approaches are often marginalized as being inferior. Critics of these claims assert that psychological science is subject to biases just as other approaches are and that the philosophy of naturalism not only pervades, but is also hidden and largely unquestioned in mainstream psychology. This study examines this claim, beginning with a dialectical contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic cultures to concretize practical features of naturalism and non-naturalism. It then uses those features to frame an in-depth analysis of introductory psychology textbooks where a compendium of the important settled principles and findings of all major sub-areas of the discipline should be found. Results show that naturalistic features are to be found throughout all the sub-areas of psychology and that non-naturalistic features are absent or marginalized in the texts.

When it comes to potential children, is to love them to leave them be (nonexistent)? I examine the possibility of virtuous reproduction, as well as some more basic theoretical issues surrounding the nature of moral goodness and obligation generally. Currently, there is a large body of literature in the field of reproductive ethics on questions of what considerations and practices ought to guide reproductive decision-making. The appropriate use of testing technologies to inform such decision-making, for instance, has been widely debated. Much smaller and less visible is the debate surrounding the prior question of whether reproduction itself is morally appropriate or desirable. I am particularly interested in how consequentialist strategies for including considerations of beneficence in reproductive decision-making have shaped moral approaches to reproduction. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), which mandates potential reproducers to select the best possible child, highlights the problematic nature of these strategies. The limited conceptual resources and problematic normative foundations of such strategies have stymied the development of a robust discussion on the ethics of reproduction itself. Other types of ethical approaches, loosely defined as deontological, offer superior accounts of what is at issue in reproduction, but also draw on some flawed background assumptions regarding, for instance, the nature of the moral agent and the scope of the moral sphere. The question of the morality of reproduction itself thus leads to an examination of far more basic issues in ethical theory: namely, the significance of meta-ethical commitments, and the desirability of a normative framework that offers a rich and agent-focused account of moral goodness and badness. I argue that a virtue-centred ethics, grounded in neo-Aristotelian naturalism, accomplishes just that. And it is well-equipped to provide a meaningful and helpful analysis of the morality of reproduction, both holistically, in terms of the potential virtuousness of reproduction generally, and in terms of how the virtues of courage and benevolence may be expressed in reproduction. I conclude that a virtue-centred assessment of reproduction offers a sound and practical form of evaluation and that a virtuous character may indeed be expressed through reproduction. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-17 10:44:50.827

Dès le début de sa carrière littéraire, Zola se bat contre le romantisme. C’est en grande partie autour de cette polémique qu’il cherche à fédérer le groupe naturaliste, dont le recueil de 1880 "Les Soirées de Médan", auquel participent à ses côtés Céard, Maupassant, Hennique, Alexis et Huysmans, proclame l’existence. La haine affichée du romantisme unit les auteurs naturalistes dans un même combat contre l’-isme d’hier, en faveur d’une nouvelle esthétique et d’un nouveau mouvement de pensée : le naturalisme. La stratégie médiatique et collective mise en place par Zola pour faire de cette polémique anti-romantique un événement, permet aux naturalistes d’occuper le terrain de l’édition et du journal. Mais c’est aussi à travers l’opposition au romantisme que les naturalistes construisent leur propre esthétique, profondément anti-idéaliste, et se positionnent sur des questions telles que le rapport de la littérature à la société et à la politique. Enfin, la polémique anti-romantique informe également les œuvres de fiction. Si le personnage naturaliste apparaît souvent comme une victime de la culture romantique, le discours critique des naturalistes dans les romans passe également par la défiguration ou le dépassement de clichés considérés comme typiquement romantiques. Le métadiscours de certains romans naturalistes permet d’insérer la polémique anti-romantique au sein de la fiction, souvent de façon critique et réflexive. / From the beginning of his literary career, Zola fought against Romanticism.This opposition allowed him to build the unity of the Naturalist movement, a movement which first sprung into existence with the publication of "Evenings at Médan" (1880), the collection of short stories co-written with Céard, Maupassant, Hennique, Alexis and Huysmans. Naturalist authors, united by their hatred for Romanticism, joined forces against yesteryears’ dominant movement to defend a new aesthetics and a new school of thought: Naturalism. Thanks to Zola’s efforts to publicise this controversy, Naturalists gained visibility in the press and the publishing sector. It is largely through this opposition to Romanticism that Naturalists developed their own, deeply anti-idealistic aesthetics, and defined their positions on issues such as literature’s relation to society and politics. Their anti-Romantic stance further shaped their works of fiction. Naturalist characters often appeared as victims of Romantic culture. Moreover, Naturalist authors developed their critical discourse by dismantling clichés considered as typically Romantic. Through the novel’s metadiscourse, they inserted anti-Romantic polemic in the fiction, in an often critical and self-reflexive way.

Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Banca: Marcos Antônio Alves / Banca: Leonardo Ferreira Almada / Resumo: Há mais de três décadas, o filósofo estadunidense John Rogers Searle voltou-se para as questões de filosofia da mente, donde apresenta sua solução para os variados problemas acerca da natureza do mental. Sua primeiro incursão se deu com o livro Intentionality, onde seu principal objetivo não era, num primeiro momento, solucionar problemas referentes a essa questão, mas sim oferecer uma fundamentação conceitual mais sólido para sua teoria dos atos de fala. Contudo, a partir deste livro Searle se volta decisivamente para questões propriamente de filosofia da mente. Um de seus principais focos é a relação entre mente-corpo, onde ele acredita que a solução teórico-cenceitual para tal questão não é tão difícil quanto pensamos. Porém ele não deixa de abordar uma série de outros temas afins que julga de extrema importância na consolidação de seu escopo teórico, tal como o problema da causação mental e a subjetividade humana. Dessa forma, a presente dissertação tem por objetivo principal apresentar, discutir e avaliar criticamente a solução que Searle propõe a esses quatro problemas centrais da filosofia da mente: relação mente-corpo, causação mental, subjetividade e intencionalidade. Os três primeiros capítulos têm por objetivo mostrar como Searle enxerga essas questões, ou seja, o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada. No capítulo quatro iremos apresentar as principais críticas à solução de John Searle, focando-nos numa abordagem temá... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: There is more than thirty years, the American philosopher John Rogers Searle turned around to the questions of philosophy of mind, whence presents his solution to varied problems about the nature of mental. His first incursion occurred with the book Intentionality, where your main objective was not to solve, at first, problems relating to this issue, but rather to offer a theoretical grounding more solid to his theory of speech acts. However, from this book Searle turns to questions specifically of philosophy of mind. One of his main focus is the relationship between mind-body, where he believes that the solution theoretical-conceptual for that question is not so difficult as we thought. Nevertheless he is not leave of to broach a number of other related topics that he considers of utmost importance in the consolidation of his theoretical scope, such as the causation mental problem and the human subjectivity. Thereby, the present dissertation have for main objective to show, to discuss and critically evaluate the solution that Searle proposes these four central problems of the philosophy of mind: mind-body relationship, mental causation, subjectivity and intentionality. The first three chapters aims to show as Searle see these questions, in other words, what he believes to be wrong in philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution. In chapter four, we will go to show the main critics to John Searle's solution, focusing in a thematic approach. Thus we will ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Orientador: Maria Célia de Moraes Leonel / Banca: Juliana Santini / Banca: Franco Baptista Sandanello / Resumo: O objetivo do trabalho é verificar de que modo, em O mulato, Aluísio Azevedo representa componentes históricos, sociais e culturais - incluindo aqueles relativos à sexualidade e ao corpo - tendo em vista o centro da obra que é apontar as nefastas consequências do preconceito racial e da escravidão. Para tanto, investiga-se a representação da sociedade burguesa no século XIX no Maranhão e, particularmente, em São Luís, em sua articulação com os preceitos do Naturalismo. Como tal representação é construída por meio das categorias narrativas, essas são analisadas separadamente e em seu conjunto, dando-se prioridade à articulação entre história, personagens e espaço, bem como com a instância narrativa (narrador), a focalização e o tratamento do tempo. O embasamento teórico é constituído por três grupos de estudos: a) histórias da literatura sobre o Naturalismo e ensaios críticos sobre Aluísio Azevedo; b) ensaios sobre o corpo de modo geral e textos específicos sobre o corpo no naturalismo brasileiro e c) estudos teóricos da narrativa. Quanto ao primeiro grupo, as principais balizas são: História concisa da literatura brasileira de Alfredo Bosi e Aluísio Azevedo, vida e obra (1857-1913) de Jéan-Yves Mérian. Em relação ao segundo grupo, a base é formada por História do corpo, organizado por Jean-Jacques Courtine, Georges Vigarello e Alain Corbin, Leituras do desejo: o erotismo no romance naturalista brasileiro de Marcelo Bulhões e A metáfora do corpo no romance naturalista de Sonia... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The objective of the present work is to see how, in O mulato, Aluísio Azevedo represents historical, social and cultural components - including those related to sexuality and body - having in mind the center of the literary work that is to point out the negative consequences of racial prejudice and of slavery. For this purpose, it is investigated the representation of the bourgeois society in the nineteenth century in Maranhão, and particularly in São Luís, in its articulation with the precepts of the Naturalism. As such representation is constructed through narrative categories, these are analyzed separately and as a whole, giving priority to the relationship between history, characters and space, as well as to the narrative instance (narrator), the focus and the time treatment. The theoretical background consists of three study groups: a) literature stories about Naturalism and critical essays about Aluísio Azevedo; b) essays about the body in general and specific texts about the body in the Brazilian naturalism and c) theoretical studies of the narrative. As for the first group, the main references are: História concisa da literatura brasileira by Alfredo Bosi and Aluísio Azevedo, vida e obra (1857-1913) by Jéan-Yves Mérian. As for the second group, the basis is formed by História do corpo, organized by Jean-Jacques Courtine, Georges Vigarello and Alain Corbin, Leituras do desejo: o erotismo no romance naturalista brasileiro by Marcelo Bulhões and A metáfora do corpo no ro... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Ce travail de thèse interroge la représentation du héros au sein des mouvements réaliste et naturaliste du XIXe siècle. Il s'agit, au travers d'un corpus de six romans et nouvelles, de mettre en lumière la tension inhérente à la figure héroïque chez Honoré de Balzac, Gustave Flaubert, Guy de Maupassant et Émile Zola. Malgré un refus apparent du modèle classique antique qui se signe par une banalisation du personnage principal, les romanciers réalistes-naturalistes n'échappent finalement pas à la tentation héroïque; en proposant un parcours initiatique et des formes originales de sacralisation, ils fabriquent un nouveau type de héros, à la fois plus proche des préoccupations de la société de l'époque et traversé par des représentations mythiques, éternelles (qu'elles soient issues du domaine mythologique, biblique, littéraire, psychanalytique ou religieux). La dialectique entre temporalité sociétale et permanence du légendaire se donne alors à lire. Cette thèse de doctorat cherche donc à démontrer l'exécution immuable d'une symphonie héroïque au sein de la poétique réaliste et naturaliste tout en rappelant la nature spécifique du héros chez chaque auteur étudié. / This thesis questions the representation of the hero by the realist and naturalist movements of the XIXth century. Transgressing six novels and short stories, it aims at highlighting the inherent tension of the heroic figure in the works of Honoré de Balzac, Gustave Flaubert, Guy de Maupassant and Émile Zola. Despite an apparent refusal of the classic antique model which is illustrated by a trivialization of the main character, the realist-naturalist novelists do not escape from the heroic temptation; by offering a journey of initiation and unusual forms of sacralization, they fabricate a new type of hero, both closer to the concerns of society at that era and influenced by mythical and eternal representations (whether from mythological, biblical, literary, psychoanalytical or religious fields). The dialectic between the societal temporality and the permanence of the legendary is thus to be read. This doctorate thesis therefore seeks to de! monstrate the immutable execution of a heroic symphony within the realist and naturalist poetry while recalling the specific nature of the hero in the work of each author studied