Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / O nome do escritor fluminense Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 1914) é uma ausência notável na história da literatura brasileira e, principalmente, na história do naturalismo no Brasil. Observando que o tema naturalismo no Brasil ainda é mal compreendido pela historiografia, esta pesquisa tem como objetivo escrever a história do escritor Figueiredo Pimentel como autor de romances naturalistas, tendo como foco de interesse o estudo dos romances O aborto, publicado pela Livraria do Povo em 1893, e Um canalha, publicado pela Laemmert &Comp. em 1895, ambos no Rio de Janeiro. Para cumprir o objetivo do trabalho, a pesquisa levantou novas informações sobre Figueiredo Pimentel e sua relação com a estética naturalista, especialmente na década de 1890, no acervo da Hemeroteca Digital Brasileira da Biblioteca Nacional. Por meio das consultas às fontes primárias foi possível conhecer a trajetória de um escritor naturalista brasileiro esquecido e as primeiras recepções de O aborto e Um canalha pelos homens de letras escritores, críticos, livreiros e editores e pelo leitor comum / Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 - 1914) is a notable absence in Brazilian literature and history, especially in the history of naturalism in Brazil. Noting that the theme of naturalism in Brazil is still mis understood by historiography, this research aims to write the history of Figueiredo Pimentel as writer and author of naturalistic novels, focusing on the study of his novels O aborto, published by the Livraria do Povo in 1893, and Um canalha, published by Laemmert & Comp. in 1895, both in Rio de Janeiro. To fulfill the objective of the work, the research has raised new data about Figueiredo Pimentel and his relationship with the naturalistic esthetic, especially in the 1890s, in the collection of the Brazilian Digital Newspaper Library. Through consultations of primary sources it was possible to know the history of a forgotten Brazilian naturalist writer and the first receptions of O aborto and Um canalha by writers, critics, booksellers, publishers and the general reader.

Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / O nome do escritor fluminense Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 1914) é uma ausência notável na história da literatura brasileira e, principalmente, na história do naturalismo no Brasil. Observando que o tema naturalismo no Brasil ainda é mal compreendido pela historiografia, esta pesquisa tem como objetivo escrever a história do escritor Figueiredo Pimentel como autor de romances naturalistas, tendo como foco de interesse o estudo dos romances O aborto, publicado pela Livraria do Povo em 1893, e Um canalha, publicado pela Laemmert &Comp. em 1895, ambos no Rio de Janeiro. Para cumprir o objetivo do trabalho, a pesquisa levantou novas informações sobre Figueiredo Pimentel e sua relação com a estética naturalista, especialmente na década de 1890, no acervo da Hemeroteca Digital Brasileira da Biblioteca Nacional. Por meio das consultas às fontes primárias foi possível conhecer a trajetória de um escritor naturalista brasileiro esquecido e as primeiras recepções de O aborto e Um canalha pelos homens de letras escritores, críticos, livreiros e editores e pelo leitor comum / Alberto Figueiredo Pimentel (1869 - 1914) is a notable absence in Brazilian literature and history, especially in the history of naturalism in Brazil. Noting that the theme of naturalism in Brazil is still mis understood by historiography, this research aims to write the history of Figueiredo Pimentel as writer and author of naturalistic novels, focusing on the study of his novels O aborto, published by the Livraria do Povo in 1893, and Um canalha, published by Laemmert & Comp. in 1895, both in Rio de Janeiro. To fulfill the objective of the work, the research has raised new data about Figueiredo Pimentel and his relationship with the naturalistic esthetic, especially in the 1890s, in the collection of the Brazilian Digital Newspaper Library. Through consultations of primary sources it was possible to know the history of a forgotten Brazilian naturalist writer and the first receptions of O aborto and Um canalha by writers, critics, booksellers, publishers and the general reader.

Parmi les thèmes qui traversent l’œuvre de Huysmans celui du rêve a fait l’objet d’une attention soutenue mais restreinte à quelques œuvres, principalement À Rebours et En Rade. Pourtant, dès ses premiers romans, Huysmans met en scène des rêveurs, taraudés par le désir d’être autres ou d’être ailleurs. Dans ses croquis, ses comptes rendus de Salons, il s’intéresse aux virtualités, aux hypothèses et délaisse la chose vue pour explorer des potentialités. La conversion ne met pas fin à cet attrait, exacerbant au contraire le rejet du monde et la tentation de l’au-delà. Ainsi, l’onirique n’est pas qu’une parenthèse dans des vies médiocres, c’est aussi une modalité de l’écriture. L’attention de Huysmans se porte sur le surgissement : les rêves au cœur du sommeil mais aussi le fantastique du quotidien, le retour du souvenir, les mystères de ce que l’on appelle déjà l’inconscient. Notre ambition est, dans une perspective synchronique, de relever la présence du rêve dans son œuvre et d’envisager les formes qu’il peut prendre. Il s’agit de se demander comment le rêve s’inscrit dans la narration et d’évaluer ce qu’il apporte à des textes dont on sait que le romanesque n’est pas la préoccupation principale. Cependant, il faut se garder de donner de Huysmans l’image d’un idéaliste : son œuvre est fortement marquée par un naturalisme revendiqué et l’auteur exprime constamment son rejet d’un style tiède ou vaporeux. Au désir de « substituer le rêve de la réalité à la réalité même » (À Rebours) s’oppose en permanence une volonté de détruire ces simulacres, de dénier au personnage toute échappatoire. L’ambition formulée d’un naturalisme spiritualiste, dont le modèle lui est fourni par la peinture des Primitifs flamands, permet à l’auteur de concilier ces deux exigences et l’engage sur la voie du roman moderne. / Dreaming is one of the well-known themes of Huysmans’ work. It has been well studied as far as Against nature or En Rade are concerned. However, since his earliest writings, Huysmans has presented dreamers who attempt to be somebody else or try to be somewhere else. When writing sketches and art criticism, he takes an interest in different possibilities or assumptions and abandons what he sees to explore virtuality. His conversion does not put an end to this interest, but emphasizes the rejection of the world and the temptation of the beyond. Thus the dream is not a parenthesis in narrow lives, it is also a way of writing. Huysmans’ attention is focused on what springs up: dreams in the heart of sleep but also the fantastic side of everyday life, memories coming back, and the mysterious aspects of what is already called the unconscious. The purpose of this study is to detect, in a synchronic perspective, the presence of dreams in his work and to consider what form they can take. It also wants to show how dreaming is included in the narrative and to evaluate what it brings to novels which reject the romanesque. However, we will be careful not to show Huysmans as an idealist: his work is strongly influenced by naturalism and constantly claims his rejection of a colourless or sentimental style of writing. The desire to “substitute the vision of a reality for the reality itself” (Against nature) is faced with a permanent will to destroy simulacra, to prevent the characters from escaping the real world. Huysmans’ doctrine of spiritual naturalism allows him to reconcile these two requirements and set him as a forerunner of the modern novel.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / O objetivo deste trabalho à compreender a crÃtica do filÃsofo alemÃo Friedrich Nietzsche ao naturalismo cientÃfico. Nietzsche, a partir da obra Humano, demasiado humano, revela um interesse crescente pelas pesquisas cientÃficas, estabelecendo um projeto filosÃfico de cunho naturalista, ou seja, em consonÃncia com os mÃtodos das ciÃncias. Ao longo de sua produÃÃo intelectual, contudo, esta atitude inicial em relaÃÃo Ãs ciÃncias serà problematizada, de tal modo que as obras que se seguem a AlÃm do bem e do mal, apresentarÃo um fulminante ataque à empresa cientÃfica moderna. Este trabalho procura mostrar que esta crÃtica nietzscheana se articula a partir da compreensÃo das ciÃncias modernas como herdeiras do ideal epistemolÃgico grego, da crenÃa no valor supremo da verdade, a vontade de verdade, e de que esta crenÃa compromete o prÃprio empreendimento cientÃfico com uma interpretaÃÃo metafÃsico-moral da existÃncia. Sugerimos, entÃo, que a crÃtica de Nietzsche nÃo implica a recusa em bloco do empreendimento cientÃfico, mas procura desvelar os problemas que se escondem por trÃs das interpretaÃÃes cientÃficas na medida em que elas se coadunam a este valor moral, e que a recusa deste valor, ou melhor, sua superaÃÃo, possibilitaria a realizaÃÃo de um naturalismo pleno, que assumisse o carÃter irredutivelmente interpretativo de suas teorias e proposiÃÃes sobre o mundo. / The aim of this work is to understand the criticism of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to scientific naturalism. Nietzsche, from the book Human, all too human, shows a growing interest in scientific research, establishing a philosophical project of naturalist bias, i.e, in line with the methods of science. Throughout his intellectual production, however, this initial attitude with regard to science will be aim of reflection, so that the works following the book Beyond good and evil, provide a scathing attack on the modern scientific enterprise. This paper seeks to show that this Nietzscheâs criticism is articulated from the understanding of modern sciences as heirs of the Greek epistemological ideal, the belief in the supreme value of truth, the will to truth, and that this belief undermines the scientific enterprise itself with an metaphysical and moral interpretation of the existence. We suggest, then, that Nietzscheâs criticism does not imply refusal to the whole scientific enterprise, but demand to reveal the problems hidden behind the scientific interpretations as they are in line with this moral value, and that the refusal of this value or, rather, its overrun, allow the achievement of a fully realized naturalism, which assumes the character irreducibly interpretative of its theories and propositions about the world.

Le Naturalisme a été peu étudié au Brésil, ainsi que les relations établies entre le Naturalisme brésilien et les modèles européens que l'ont influencé. Dans cette recherche, nous avons voulu éclairer les rapports tissés entre Emile Zola et Aluísio Azevedo, à travers l'analyse des représentations de la ville dans les romans Casa de Pensão et Pot-Bouille, en montrant les ressemblances et les divergences entre ces oeuvres. Cette recherche a donc décrit l'imaginaire urbain présent dans ces oeuvres par le moyen des catégories de Walter Benjamin qui se caractérise par l'opposition à la modernité et à la ville. Ces oeuvres s'appuient encore sur l'idée selon laquelle le topos urbain engendre la formation de certains types de subjectivité. Ainsi, les habitations collectives analysées - l'immeuble généralisé par les réformes urbaines d'Haussmann et la pension de famille carioca - produisent les manières d'être, d'agir et de penser spécifiques chez leurs habitants. Telle démarche anthropologique est au fond une sorte de pédagogie négative selon laquelle les écrivains démontrent un processus erroné d'éducation, en caractérisant ses mauvais résultats. En outre, Emile Zola et Aluísio Azevedo partent toujours d'un modèle éducatif correct qui est implicite ou explicite. Il faut encore ajouter que l'approche topologique et pédagogique, mise en oeuvre dans Pot-Bouille se transforme dans Casa de Pensão en une recherche de l'identité nationale qui se matérialise par l'analyse de plusieurs modèles de formation de subjectivité mis en fonction dans les habitations typiques du Rio de Janeiro du XIXème siècle - le "sobrado"portugais et la pension de famille. / Naturalism has been stereotyped and understudied in Brazil, and so have the relationships between Brazilian Naturalism and the European models that originated it. This thesis aims at shedding light on the relationships between Emile Zola and Aluisio Azevedo through the analysis of the representations of the city in the novels Casa de Pensão and Pot-Bouille. Parallelism and divergence between the two literary pieces will be presented. To this end, this study employs thematic criticism based on Walter Benjamin's categories in order to describe the urban imagery found in Azevedo's Casa de Pensão and Zola's Pot-Bouille, an imagery characterized by an opposition to modernity and the city. Also, both novels are inspired by the strong belief that the urban topos generates peculiar types of subjectivity. Hence, the collective habitations in focus – i.e., the immeuble disseminated by Baron Haussmann's urban reforms and the boardinghouses in Rio de Janeiro – would engender certain ways of being, acting and thinking in their dwellers. Such anthropological demarché translates as a sort of negative pedagogy, which displays an inappropriate educational process and points out its spurious results, thus implicitly or explicitly advancing an alternative educational model. It is here concluded that the pedagogical and topological approach implemented in Pot-Bouille appears in Casa de Pensão as a study of the national ailments, which is in turn demonstrated through the analysis of various models of subjectivity formation at specific loci of the city of Rio de Janeiro, namely the modest Portuguese two-storey houses and the typical boarding houses.

This dissertation examines representations of prostitution in male-authored French novels from the later nineteenth century. It proposes that prostitution has a map, and that realist and naturalist authors appropriate this cartography in the Second Empire and early Third Republic to make sense of a shifting and overhauled Paris perceived to resist mimetic literary inscription. Though always significant in realist and naturalist narrative, space is uniquely complicit in the novel of prostitution due to the contemporary policy of reglementarism, whose primary instrument was the mise en carte: an official registration that subjected prostitutes to moral and hygienic surveillance, but also “put them on the map,” classifying them according to their space of practice (such as the brothel or the boulevard). It is this spatial and conceptual taxonomy, I contend, that makes the prostitute a fulcrum for authorial mapping – for the assertion of mastery over both the prostitute and the city. The first chapter reads the inscription of the tolerated brothel in novels by Huysmans and Goncourt as the mark of a nostalgic longing for old Paris and a desire for stability in a resistant urban present. Analyzing the representation of the brasserie à femmes in lesser-known works by Tabarant and Barrès, Chapter Two posits that the brasserie prostitute fuels the desires of a generation of aspirational Rastignacs by selling stories alongside beer and sex, adopting a writerly role and troubling authorial mastery of the prostitute and the city. The mobilization of prostitutional metaphors in the Rougon-Macquart is the subject of the third chapter, which argues that Zola deploys the prostitute’s entropic force to dismantle the Paris of his predecessors, Balzac and Haussmann, and clear the ground for the construction of a proper city. The final chapter demonstrates that fin-de-siècle novelist Charles-Louis Philippe makes use of the clandestinity of street prostitution in order to locate a breed of urban mapping that is not contingent on mastery. By remapping the prostitute, the dissertation proposes a new model for understanding both the nineteenth-century novel of prostitution and the lived and represented experience of a Paris that Zola termed “le mauvais lieu de l’Europe.” / Romance Languages and Literatures

Values are inherent within cultures, relationships, and many other systems, however, little study has been done on the extent to which individuals may explicitly agree with the metaphysical assumptions that much of psychological science relies upon. Psychological science, which uses scientific methodology, is a trusted source of knowledge for many students. Scientific methodology is conceptually linked to assumptions of naturalism, which makes claims about the truth of reality. These naturalistic assumptions pertain to ideas of disenchantment, which describe the world as free from any transcendent quality. These same ideas have become popular among people of the Western world and are foundational to the worldview of secularism. Accessing whether, and to what extent, individuals explicitly agree or disagree with ideas of disenchantment inherent within secularism may help to better understand relationships between cultural, educational, and spiritual beliefs, and the underlying presumptions of psychological science. A measure of 30 items in length was created in order to evaluate the extent to which individuals agree with statements about some of the foundational assumptions of secularism as it relates to naturalism. A random sample of online participants (N=395) completed the items through an online survey platform. A 1-factor model provided sufficient statistical fit for the data, suggesting that items appeared to support the idea that this measure addresses attitudes of secularism, however no claims on the validity of the measure in the current study can be made. Suggestions for future study are provided.

The dissertation lays the foundations for a naturalistic account of word meaning capable of addressing the conflicting intuitions that word meanings are both “out there”, world-involving and objective (the “objectivist” intuition) and in the heads of speakers, i.e. cognitive and perspectival (the “mentalist” intuition). The strong naturalization constraint endorsed in this project has it that the sought-after syncretic notion of word meaning must be nonmysterious and constitute a potential object for the natural sciences. The objectivist intuition is discussed within the framework of semantic externalism and the theory of semantic deference. Whereas the importance of the phenomenon of semantic deference (i.e. the fact that speakers defer to semantic standards for the fixation of the meaning of their words) is recognized, it is shown that taking the normativity of meaning evidenced by semantic deference at face value leads to embracing a form of meaning objectivism that is incompatible with naturalism. On the one hand, the objectivist/externalist commitment to independent meaning-determining realities could be stronger than the commitments actually undertaken by the natural sciences themselves. On the other hand, the degree of idealization inherent in the objectivist account makes it oddly disconnected from and ultimately irrelevant to actual linguistic practice. However, usage-based accounts – which have meanings determined by the way words are actually used rather than determined “from outside” – notoriously struggle to provide a satisfactory account of the normativity of meaning. The proposed move consists in biting the bullet and treating the inherent normativity of meaning as a form of cognitive illusion, albeit an unavoidable illusion and one which must be taken seriously in order to explain the properties of linguistic understanding. A strictly usage-based account is shown to be viable and even to be able to account for the objectivist explanandum, once it is coupled with biological functionalism. Word meanings “out there” turn out to be viable natural objects, yet quite unlike the apparent objects of our pre-theoretical intuitions. “Complete”, world-involving word meanings are complex functional kinds (like organs or artifacts) constituted (rather than determined) by speakers’ actual dispositions and relevant environmental factors. As such, complete meanings – whether at the communal level (conventional meanings) or at the level of the individual speaker (idiosyncratic patterns of use) – are essentially opaque to speakers and can only be identified from a theoretical point of view on the basis of functional considerations. Moreover, the environmental factors intuitively corresponding to the traditional notion of objective reference or extension cannot be considered independently of the other internal and relational meaning-constitutive factors. The view of meaning defended is thus supportive of a certain form of anti-realism, where reference and truth are relativized to evolved interests, yet it is not supportive of any global form of anti-realism, for the presuppositions of biological normativity still provide a realist anchor to natural-language meanings. From this theoretical perspective, the mentalist intuition is taken to concern the internal, cognitive sub-components of complete meanings. Internal meanings are the cognitive kinds associated with word types (lexical meanings) or word tokens (ways in which words are understood/interpreted on an occasion of use). It is argued that internal meanings – whether stable or occasion-specific – have an irreducible abstract dimension for which no naturalistically plausible worldly counterpart is to be found. The experience of aboutness of the concepts intuitively encoded and expressed by words is again to be treated as a cognitive illusion, on a par with the illusion of the inherent normativity of word meaning. However, the abstract nature of internal meanings explains some of the key properties of linguistic understanding – aboutness, compositionality, co-reference – without which productive thought and linguistic communication would be impossible. The proposed account thus makes room for compositional-extensional semantics and shared understanding, as long as these are fully internalized. The connection with the external components of complete meanings is indirect, mediated by procedures whose workings are to a large extent opaque to users. The main consequence of the proposed framework is the incommensurability of internal meaning and complete meaning, and therefore a rejection of the possibility of an articulation of internal meaning and complete meaning compatible with the commonsense view from which traditional accounts of semantic deference and semantic externalism are built.Cette thèse jette les bases d’une théorie naturaliste de la signification des mots à même de rendre compte de deux intuitions en apparence conflictuelles :d’une part, l’intuition selon laquelle les significations des mots ont une existence extérieure objective et impliquent le monde (l’intuition « objectiviste ») ;d’autre part, l’intuition selon laquelle les significations sont dans la tête des locuteurs, c’est-à-dire correspondent à des réalités cognitives et perspectivales (l’intuition « mentaliste »). La contrainte naturaliste assumée dans ce projet veut que la notion syncrétique de signification que l’on cherche à développer puisse constituer un objet potentiel d’investigation pour les sciences naturelles, c’est-à-dire qu’elle soit, au moins en principe, localisable dans le monde naturel. L’intuition objectiviste est débattue dans le cadre de l’externalisme sémantique et de la théorie de la déférence sémantique. Bien que l’importance du phénomène de la déférence sémantique (le fait que les locuteurs défèrent à des standards sémantiques pour la fixation de la signification des mots qu’ils emploient) soit pleinement reconnue, l’argument poursuivi mène à la conclusion que la normativité de la signification que semble imposer la déférence sémantique ne doit pas être prise pour argent comptant, sous peine d’épouser une forme d’objectivisme de la signification incompatible avec le projet de naturalisation stricte. D’une part, l’engagement ontologique objectiviste/externaliste vis-à-vis de réalités indépendantes déterminant les significations pourrait être plus fort que les engagements ontologiques implicites des sciences naturelles elles-mêmes. D’autre part, le degré d’idéalisation propre au point de vue objectiviste le rend étrangement détaché de la pratique linguistique effective, et en définitive sans pertinence pour rendre compte de celle-ci. Cela étant dit, les théories fondées sur l’usage – pour lesquelles les significations sont déterminées par la façon dont les mots sont effectivement employés plutôt que déterminées « de l’extérieur » – sont en général critiquées pour leur incapacité à rendre compte de la normativité de la signification. La proposition que fait la thèse consiste à assumer cette conséquence d’une théorie fondée sur l’usage et à considérer la normativité intrinsèque de la signification comme une forme d’illusion cognitive, bien qu’une illusion inévitable et devant être prise au sérieux s’il s’agit d’expliquer les propriétés remarquables de la compréhension linguistique. Une théorie strictement fondée sur l’usage est viable et même capable de rendre compte de l’intuition objectiviste, une fois que cette théorie est couplée avec un fonctionnalisme biologique. Les significations « extérieures » des mots sont bien des objets naturalisables, quoique fort différents des objets apparents de nos intuitions pré-théoriques. Les significations « complètes », c’est-à-dire impliquant le monde, correspondent à des espèces fonctionnelles complexes (à la manière des organes ou des artéfacts) qui sont constituées (plutôt que déterminées) par les dispositions effectives des locuteurs et les facteurs environnementaux pertinents. En tant que telles, les significations complètes – que ce soit au niveau de la communauté linguistique (significations conventionnelles) ou au niveau du locuteur individuel (usages idiosyncrasiques) – sont fondamentalement opaques pour les locuteurs et ne peuvent être identifiées qu’à partir d’un point de vue théorique externe et sur base de considérations fonctionnelles. En outre, les facteurs environnementaux correspondant intuitivement à la notion traditionnelle de référence ou d’extension objective ne peuvent être considérés indépendamment des autres facteurs internes et relationnels constitutifs de la signification. La théorie de la signification défendue suggère donc une certaine forme d’anti-réalisme, dans lequel la référence et la vérité sont relativisées à des intérêts spécifiques produits par l’évolution naturelle. Cette théorie ne sert pour autant guère d’appui à un quelconque anti-réalisme global, car les présupposés de la normativité biologique continuent à fournir un ancrage réaliste aux significations linguistiques. Une fois cette perspective théorique sur les significations impliquant le monde adoptée, on fait la supposition que l’intuition mentaliste concerne les sous-composantes internes et cognitives des significations complètes. Les significations internes sont les espèces cognitives associées avec les types lexicaux (significations lexicales) et avec les tokens lexicaux (façons dont les mots sont compris/interprétés lorsqu’ils sont employés). Il est avancé que les significations internes – qu’elles soient stables ou propres à une occasion d’usage – ont une composante abstraite irréductible à laquelle ne correspond aucune contrepartie mondaine acceptable d’un point de vue naturaliste. L’expérience de l’ « être-à-propos » (aboutness) des concepts intuitivement encodés et exprimés par les mots doit encore une fois être considérée comme une illusion cognitive, à l’instar de l’illusion de la normativité intrinsèque de la signification. Cependant, la nature abstraite des significations internes explique certaines des propriétés centrales de la compréhension linguistique – être-à-propos, compositionnalité, co-référence – sans lesquelles la pensée productive et la communication proprement linguistique seraient impossibles. La théorie proposée fait donc une place à la sémantique compositionnelle-extensionnelle et à la compréhension partagée, pour autant que celles-ci soient complètement internalisées. La connexion avec les composantes externes des significations complètes est indirecte, médiée par des procédures dont le fonctionnement est en grande partie opaque aux utilisateurs du langage. La conséquence principale du cadre proposé est l’incommensurabilité de la signification interne et de la signification complète et, partant, le rejet de la possibilité d’une articulation entre les deux types de signification qui soit compatible avec le point de vue de sens commun à partir duquel sont construites les théories traditionnelles de la déférence sémantique et de l’externalisme sémantique. / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Martin Hägglunds kristendomstolkning i boken Vårt enda liv analyseras och jämförs med teologen och existentialisten Paul Tillichs kristendom uttryckt i boken The Courage to be. Frågan om vilka livsåskådningsförutsättningar och premisser som ligger till grund för Hägglunds religionskritik och frågan om hans kritik är rationellt berättigad behandlas.Analysen som ligger till grund för kritiken görs i huvudsak utifrån religionsfilosofen Mikael Stenmarks teoretiska ramverk för livsåskådningsforskning samt Carl-Henrik Grenholms beskrivna metoder för att genomföra en idéanalys.Studien bekräftar tidigare forskning som pekar på att Hägglund går för långt i sin kristendomskritik, när han kritiserar kristendomen. En viktig förutsättning som identifierats i studien är att Hägglunds tidsbegrepp inte innehåller någon dynamisk komponent som ger ett här och nu en särställning. Det innebär att religionstolkningen inte heller öppnar för en religiös upplevelse av existentiell ångest eller ett personligt möte med Gud här och nu. Härigenom begränsas utrymmet för religiösa uttryck samtidigt som Hägglunds eget sekulära trossystem blir mindre dynamiskt. Dynamiken i den sekulära livsåskådningen hänförs snarare till osäkerheten om framtiden som vi alla bär.I stället för att, som Hägglund gör nu, helt avfärda det eftersträvansvärda i evigheten, och därmed missa målet med sin religionskritik, pekar studiens resultat mot möjligheten till att öppna upp det föreslagna sekulära trossystemet för den genuina osäkerhet som finns i livsåskådningsfrågorna. Det kan skapa nyfikenhet och en förändrad attityd i mötet med andra trosuppfattningar. Dynamiken i det sekulära trossystemet skulle kunna skapas genom att bekräfta existentiella (sekulära) brister och därmed ge utrymme för att spegla människors kamp, upplevelser av misslyckanden och känslor av existentiell meningslöshet. Budskapet om andlig frihet står starkt i sig självt och skulle kunna kombineras med en mjukare hållning mot andra livsåskådningar.