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The period from 1808 to 1829, largely neglected by those historians who have looked at the Hydrographic Office, was the crucial formative period for expansion that laid the solid foundations which later Hydrographers could then exploit. The context, achievements and failures of the Admiralty’s hydrographic function, including surveying, chart production, supply, sales and its contribution to the Navy and the scientific world, as an all encompassing beast has been overlooked; the Admiralty placed the responsibility for those tasks on the shoulders of its Hydrographer. Subsequently he determined the success or failure of the office, using his initiative to expand and develop opportunities benefiting the Admiralty, as well as managing a valuable resource of geographical intelligence, fostering links with scientists and the international hydrographic community. The Hydrographer also found himself creating his own policies, serving as Secretary to the Board of Longitude, being a consultant on navigational matters, taking responsibility for the acquisition, supply and maintenance of chronometers for the Navy, as well as being a focal point for issues concerning pay, promotion and manning for surveying specialists. The period from 1808 to 1829 saw many changes, which gave rise to numerous opportunities for expansion. The Admiralty Board and William, Duke of Clarence (as the last Lord High Admiral), both had a direct influence in the way the office expanded, which saw innovation and experimental work become part of the Hydrographer’s routine, especially after the Peace of 1815. But expansion required funding and at a time when internal economy appeared to the be the main objective within the Admiralty, Captain Thomas Hurd managed not only to establish a 100% increase in surveying capacity but laid the foundation for a distinct specialist and professional core of survey officers. His successor, Captain William Parry, despite his absences, overhauled working practices in the office, set standards for surveyors to follow and continued to expand the number of survey ships in commission. Subsequently Captain Francis Beaufort was left the most highly efficient hydrographic office since its foundation in 1795.

This dissertation presents an analysis of the Somers mutiny of 1842 that goes beyond the simple narratives offered by previous studies of the cruise. The mutiny is examined within the context of contemporary American politics and social reform, particularly as they related to naval affairs. These emphases clarify the rationale behind the cruise of the Somers, and shed light upon the nature of her crew. The immediate physical environment of the brig is described in order to reveal the difficulties in its operation, and the destabilising effect that this had on both the functional and social worlds of the vessel. The social environment on board is further defined by examining the daily progress of the cruise with reference to antebellum naval life and practice. When so combined, these factors clarify the officers' perception of the mutiny threat, and go far to explain their actions throughout the crisis. Finally, the dissertation examines the controversy that arose after the Somers returned to the United States. In particular, the military courts convened to investigate the mutiny are subjected to critical analysis since they are fully part of the events that they purported to explain, and because their proceedings remain the primary source material for reconstructing the cruise it is necessary to identify their biases. To conclude, the societal lessons of the Somers mutiny are explored, and an alternative reading of the event is posed.

The Brazilian Navy is unique among most world navies today. Since the end of the Cold War, most nations have reduced their naval power, yet Brazil has maintained a determination to possess a blue-water fleet. Brazil is also attempting to assert itself as the regional power in South America, in this case through the development of a modern yet modest naval force capable of projecting power beyond its shores. This thesis seeks to explore Brazil's recent naval expansion through three points of view. First, Brazil is seeking possession of a blue water naval force as a likely means for it to achieve greater power and prestige amongst other powerful states in the world. Second, Brazil aspires for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and is expanding its fleet to increase its chances of being chosen. Finally, domestic politics also have a great effect on Brazil's current drive to blue water. Creation of the civilian-led defense ministry, the expensive SIVAM surveillance system, and general public sentiment all work to favor naval expansion. The thesis concludes by summarizing the three arguments and stating that each of the three arguments have collectively contributed to Brazil's naval expansion.

The late eighteenth century witnessed dramatic changes in the social, economic, and political fabric of the Atlantic World. The Sailors of the HMS Mars fully participated in this transition to modernity. Over the course of their naval careers, the men laboring on the Mars felt the pull of four distinct, but interlocking cultures. Working class, maritime, naval, and British culture all played a part in the sailors’ identity construction. As a result of these myriad influences the sailors could have chosen to join the emerging trans-national maritime working class, but instead the Mars’ seamen fought to gain full British citizenship and acceptance. From 1794 when she first entered commission, to 1798 when she returned victorious from battling the French l’Hercule, provides numerous examples of the sailors’ identity construction process. Moreover, an examination of the seamen’s whole journey also illuminates how the larger processes of the Revolutionary Era functioned.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-64). Also available online.

Peter Rainier was the longest serving commander on the East Indies station by some margin, and the longest serving commander of any of the navy’s stations in the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This thesis illustrates the issues that needed to be addressed on this station and considers how successfully Rainier dealt with them. It will also suggest that he remains so little known amongst the pantheon of British admirals of the Napoleonic era because the traditional measure of value of a naval commander is success in battle. Although Rainier had a reputation as a fighting captain, as a commander in chief he saw action only in combined operations. Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that skill other than fighting battles is important. Rainier’s thorough knowledge of the station, his capacity to work with people over whom he had no authority, his ability to protect a rapidly expanding and wealth creating trade, and his administrative and financial professionalism, enabled him to play an important, if secondary, part in the establishment of the Second British Empire which, arguably, had a far greater impact on British history than all but the most seminal battle. The East Indies Station had a number of unique elements that heavily influenced the actions of its commander in chief. The two-way communication process between Rainier and the Admiralty could take a whole year. Its thirty million plus square mile area meant that communication and logistics within the station needed long term planning. It was still relatively unfamiliar to British navigators, and charting it was still in progress. The relationship between the admiral and the East India Company, the official government of British India, could make or break the success of both the navy and the Company. With his diplomatic skills and wide experience of the station, Rainier worked with its officials and army commanders to defend current British possessions in the East Indies and India, to extend them to such an extent that, by his return to Britain, they were the foundation of the second British Empire. During this period the centre of power on the station moved eastwards as the value of trade with China overtook that with India – Rainier had to take this into account when allocating his resources. The constraints on navigation and timing caused by the narrow channels in the East Indies and by the weather made it easier for enemy vessels to know by which route the British trade would travel. Rainier had to cover potential threats off Macao, through the Straits of Bali, Banda, Sunda and Malacca, in the Bay of Bengal, off Madras, around Ceylon and between Bombay and the Persian Gulf. When possible he had to cover the French naval base at Mauritius. With a limited number of vessels, of which some were always in need of repair, Rainier was often on the defensive. Acquisition of new colonies opened new trading routes which, together with his commitment to trade protection, led to a steady, if often unregulated, expansion in British trade. His attention to detail and his management skills also allowed him to establish an efficient logistics, victualling and financial operation. What Rainier achieved has to be seen in the context of the complexity of his station and the role of the East India Company. Then it stands far above the level of its absolute achievement. This thesis shows that Rainier’s organization and man management skills, unruffled nature, sound strategic judgement made him a “Safe Pair of Hands”, ideal for such a detached but important command.

In early modern England (after 1707, Britain), there was an argument that war at sea, especially war in Spanish America, was an ideal means of warfare for England. This argument, whose origin can be traced back to the glorious memory of Elizabethan maritime war, revived at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. This thesis examines this pro-maritime war argument, by focusing on its connection with its supposed economic advantages, and investigates its impact on British politics and naval policy during the war, and changes after the war. It reveals that this argument received support from politicians of different political stances because of its alleged economic advantages; colonial maritime war was expected to damage enemy financial resources while enriching Britain, and help to recover the Spanish American market where French merchants were making a rapid advance. At the same time, it makes clear that different political affiliations of the supporters created two types of pro-maritime arguments with different political functions. The thesis also shows that the supporters of colonial maritime war in the government as well as in the opposition tried to implement pro-maritime war policy by naval operations such as capture of Spanish silver fleets and colonial expeditions, and by legislation such as the American Act of 1708. However, their attempts were frustrated by diplomatic considerations, incapacity of naval administration, and by conflicting interests between several groups concerned in the West Indian colonies and Spanish American trade. After the South Sea expedition planned by the South Sea Company in 1712 did not materialise due to similar difficulties, the government focused on protection of the Spanish American trade, and refrained from taking aggressive action against Spanish colonies partly because of considerations for the interests of the company which started the Asiento trade. On the other hand, by the late 1720s the opposition, which championed the interests of private merchants, gradually came to advocate pro-maritime war policy, which eventually led up to propaganda campaigns against the Walpole ministry in the period of the War of Jenkins’s Ear.

The Corps of Marines 1755-1802 (after 1802, Royal Marines) was the smallest of the three military services of the late eighteenth century British Armed Nation. Because of this, their history has largely been marginalised - or if dealt with, only in broad three hundred year studies. However, their importance has been largely underestimated. With the rise in the late eighteenth century of a more coherent ‘Blue-Water Strategy’, classified later by some historians as a uniquely ‘British Way in Warfare’, there was a need to have an operational organisation from which to implement Britain’s grand strategy. The two other contemporary military organizations (Army and Navy) were too large, had internal resistance to, or simply had one-dimensional geographic identification which prevented the full pure operational implementation of British amphibious power. With the dawn of the Seven Years War the government gave this operational priority to the Navy, which began in earnest with the formation of the British Marine Corps. The Navy, and Marines, were able to do this by constructing an operational doctrine and identity for its new Marine Corps. With the forty-seven year construction of its operational doctrine and identity, the Marines not only assisted in the implementation of British grand strategy, but also were pivotal in the protection of the empire. This dissertation is separated into two distinct parts. The first part outlines the skeleton of the Marines; their past formations, administration and manpower construct. The second part outlines the trials and tribulations of construction and institutionalisation of the Marine Corps within the British nation of the late-eighteenth century. This part reveals the non-combat usage, operational development and imperial rapid reaction force aspects of the Marines. Marines were to carry out many protection and security related duties on land and at sea. Because of this they were given direct access to weapons which in the unfortunate event of mutiny might be used against the men. Naval and amphibious combat were the main justifications for why the Marine Corps existed to begin with. Marines were to develop their own special ‘targeted’ suppression fire and a reliance on the bayonet for both of these operations. Importantly Empire; its maintenance, expansion, and protection was an essential element of the Marines existence. Marines were to become an imperial rapid reaction force that could be sent anywhere a naval ship was and used to suppress disorders. Identity was the tool of three powers (Public, Admiralty and Marine Corps) in their construction of this body of men. Marines’ identity allowed them to be relied upon for a multitude of duties, including the basic protection of order on ship. By understanding all of these areas not only will it expand historical scholarship on how the British state constructed and implemented its policy decisions, but also how an organisation creates and validates its own purpose of existence.

David DuBois has chronicled the opening days of World War II in the Pacific and the demise of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet, relying extensively on primary sources such as combat narratives, after action reports, ship's logs, and testimony from congressional hearings. His extensive analysis and historically-substantiated revision of the standard narrative surrounding the initial weeks and months of the Pacific war is a must-read for every World War II historian or enthusiast. - Dr. Stephen G. Fritz, Professor of History, East Tennessee State University / https://dc.etsu.edu/alumni_books/1027/thumbnail.jpg