One of the fi rst decisions taken by Bernardo O’Higgins when he became Supreme Directorof Chile was to build up a naval force capable to dispute the control of the sea to the PeruvianViceroyalty forces. This article explores the motivations that might have led him to realize theimportance of this effort, by reviewing his previous maritime experiences, fi rst in a convoycrossing the Atlantic under the protection of the Malaspina expedition corvettes, and later onwhen the frigate on which he headed from Cadiz to Buenos Aires was captured by a Britishsquadron. / Una de las primeras decisiones que tomó Bernardo O’Higgins cuando asumió el mandoen Chile fue constituir un poder naval capaz de disputar el control del mar a las fuerzas delvirreinato peruano. El presente artículo explora las motivaciones que lo habrían llevado apercatarse de la importancia de ese esfuerzo al revisar sus previas experiencias marítimas,primero en un convoy que cruzó el Atlántico con la cobertura de las corbetas de la ExpediciónMalaspina, y luego al ser capturada por un escuadrón británico la nave en la que sedirigía de Cádiz a Buenos Aires.

No description available.

No description available.

This dissertation explores the influence of late eighteenth-century British imperial and global paradigms of thought on the formation of British policy and strategy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It argues that British imperial interests exerted a consistent influence on British strategic decision making through the personal advocacy of political leaders, institutional memory within the British government, and in the form of a traditional strain of a widely-embraced British imperial-maritime ideology that became more vehement as the conflict progressed. The work can be broken into two basic sections. The first section focuses on the formation of strategy within the British government of William Pitt the Younger during the French Revolutionary Wars from the declaration of war in February 1793 until early 1801. During this phase of the Anglo-French conflict, British ministers struggled to come to terms with the nature of the threat posed by revolutionary ideology in France, and lacked strategic consistency due to acute cabinet-level debates over continental versus imperial strategies. The latter half of the work assesses Britain’s response to the challenges presented by Napoleonic France. Beginning with the debates surrounding Anglo-French peace negotiations in late 1801, the British increasingly came to define Napoleonic France as a regime harboring imperial aspirations that represented an explicit threat to British imperial interests. By defining the Napoleonic regime as an aspirational imperial power, British opponents of the Peace of Amiens provided the intellectual framework for the hegemonic struggle between land and sea powers that would define the Anglo-French struggle until its conclusion in June 1815. While Britain ultimately proved successful in defeating France in Europe, the expanse of the conflict also exposed the strengths and weaknesses of British force projection outside of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. / History

This thesis examines the context and causes of signal reform in the British Royal Navy during the American War of Independence. It argues that changes in the ethos of the officer corps before and during the American War of Independence led to a complex period of signal reform. The original system was tied to the General Printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, more often referred to as the Fighting Instructions. For around a century (ca. 1690 to ca. 1790), the Royal Navy utilized the Fighting Instructions as its main system of communication. During the American War for Independence, however, some sea officers began to question the system and devise new methods of signaling. This change was brought on by changes within the officer corps. Among the changes were trends of centralization and the influence of Enlightenment ideals. Both of these shifts helped to inspire the signal reformers, while also creating the environment to sustain signal reforms. This thesis examines the signal reforms of the three principal signal reformers of the war: Richard Howe, Richard Kempenfelt, and George Rodney. / Master of Arts / This thesis examines the context and causes of signal reform in the British Royal Navy during the American War of Independence. It argues that changes in the ethos of the officer corps before and during the American War of Independence led to a complex period of signal reform. For nearly one hundred years, the navy utilized the same system of signaling to communicate between ships: the General Printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, more commonly known as the Fighting Instructions. During the American War of Independence, some British sea officers began to question that system and propose alternate systems of their own design. Influenced by their lengthy naval experience, shifts in trends of centralization, and the influence of Enlightenment ideals, officers like Richard Howe, Richard Kempenfelt, and George Rodney experimented with new methods of signaling.

On 1st September 1931, the most serious mutiny affecting the Chilean Navy in nearly two centuries of existence broke out. The various books and articles which have examined this subject have used as their sources the local press and the participants´ own stories. Just in a few cases, historians have had access to official documents, because they were seldom published or access was restricted until now. This has led to gross factual mistakes in the existing historiography, leading to questionable interpretations and to the creation of legends still alive in Chile and elsewhere. This thesis discusses these topics. The Chilean Navy has in its archives a collection of 35 volumes (about 9,200 pages) of Courts Martial official documents and proceedings never studied by historians. The author used these sources under a special authorization for academic purposes. The following theories of the causes of the mutiny commonly expounded by contemporaries and subsequent historians have been researched: a. Participation of Marxist groups in the origin of the mutiny and exploitation of it. b. Participation of the two Chilean populist political groups in the movement’s generation (headed by the former presidents Arturo Alessandri and Carlos Ibáñez) c. Army and Navy officers’ participation in politics during 1924 to 1931 and the consequence in the behaviour of the mutineers. Examination has also been made of connections with the mutiny on board HMS Lucia in Devonport in January 1931 which occurred while the Chilean battleship Latorre was being refitted at that port. Months later and being anchored in the port of Coquimbo, Chile, serious mutiny or revolt started on board Latorre and spread to other naval units as well as other Navy’s, Army’s and Air Force’s shore establishments. One week after the Chilean mutiny, the Invergordon mutiny started in the Royal Navy Atlantic Fleet. This thesis also compares both mutinies because they had many aspects in common.

Cette thèse étudie les logiques et les moyens du combat en mer dans l’Atlantique du début de l’époque moderne. Les XVIe et XVIIe siècles voient la diffusion puis le perfectionnement de l’artillerie embarquée sur les navires des grandes puissances atlantiques (France, Angleterre, Espagne, Portugal, Provinces-Unies), ce qui provoque de larges recompositions dans les pratiques de la guerre sur mer. Le combat naval passe ainsi d’un corps-à-corps nécessaire, en l’absence d’armes à distance efficaces, à un éventail d’options et d’hybridations entre des tactiques anciennes comme l’abordage et l’usage de l’artillerie, jusqu’à l’apparition d’un nouveau paradigme hégémonique du combat en mer avec la ligne de bataille au milieu du XVIIe siècle. Si cette évolution a été évoquée dans le cadre général du débat sur la « Révolution militaire », le combat en mer a jusqu’à présent été relativement ignoré au profit d’analyses sur le temps très long, sans détailler les ambiguïtés et les subtilités de cette période de transition — ce que cette thèse se propose de faire. Ce travail applique en outre au combat en mer le renouvellement méthodologique à l’œuvre depuis quarante ans dans l’histoire de la guerre : au lieu de se concentrer sur des questions générales de tactiques et de formations, ou de tenter de distribuer l’éloge ou le blâme sur des figures d’amiraux célèbres, il s’agit au contraire de se rapprocher le plus possible du combattant. En particulier, cette thèse se penche sur l’expérience individuelle du combat, les logiques et les gestes qui permettent la survie sur le champ de bataille, et l’horizon sensoriel qui enveloppe les acteurs de la guerre sur mer. / This dissertation studies the tools and the logics of naval warfare in the Early Modern Atlantic. The wide spreading and improvement of shipboard artillery in the 16th and 17th centuries, applied to the main Atlantic countries (France, England, Spain, Portugal, Dutch Republic) trigger deep transformations in Atlantic naval warfare. The main paradigm of battle thereby evolves from traditional tactics such as boarding and hand-to-hand fighting, towards a widespread use of artillery, until a new paradigm emerges in the mid-17th century in the shape of the line of battle. This general evolution has been tackled most notably within the “Military Revolution” debate, but naval warfare has been a side subject in those discussions and was for the most part included in very wide-ranging analysis. Those don’t really do justice do the uncertainties and the subtleties of this transition period, as this dissertation intends to do. Furthermore, this work applies to naval battle the evolutions in the history of warfare in the last 40 years by focusing less on tactics and formations, on blaming or lauding great admirals of the past, and more on the individual experience of fighting. In particular, this dissertation focuses on men within the battle, the logics and the gestures that allow for survival, and the sensory environment surrounding the protagonists of naval combat.

Ce travail étudie une catégorie socio-professionnelle méconnue de l'époque moderne : les commissaires aux classes et ceux qui en faisaient fonction de 1668 à 1795. Il retrace l'évolution de cet office au cours de la période, en mettant au jour les modifications apportées par les différents secrétaires d'État : ceux-ci cherchent à mieux circonscrire les charges dévolues aux commissaires, s'appuyant sur les nombreux rapports, correspondances et mémoires rédigés dans les ports, en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix. Mais au-delà de la fonction, souvent protéiforme (de la levée des classes aux inspections de bâtiments), il y a les hommes mêmes, des hommes de terrain, souvent commissaires de père en fils, qui tissent auprès des gens de mer de véritables réseaux (familiaux, professionnels) qui compensent leur image ambivalente. Critiqués, ils jouent pourtant dans les quartiers qu'ils ont en charge un rôle de modérateur social jusqu’ici largement ignoré. L'étude se propose de montrer comment au fil des ans ces hommes de plume se sont mués en agents d’administration. Elle met également en évidence la naissance de dynasties constituant et s’intégrant à des clientèles plus vastes, conscientes tout autant de leurs devoirs que de leurs prérogatives vis-à-vis de l'épée. Deux études de cas, l’une présentant l’émergence d’une de ces dynasties et l’autre analysant un procès en prévarication, illustrent les thèses avancées. Le volume II présente un dictionnaire biographique de 440 responsables des classes, permettant de mieux se représenter la réalité tant numérique que sociologique de ces cadres de l'administration maritime. / This study analyses a widely unknown 18th century socio-professional category: the commissaires des classes. The French government's system of naval conscription created by Colbert in 1668 divided the realm into several districts, each one directed by an officier des classes. Although they are a reliable source on the French seamen, no one ever wondered who they were, what their social background was and how they managed to fulfill the government's requests concerning naval conscription. The Secretaries of State for the Navy tried to turn them from simple clerks to officers of administration. Thus emerged many unofficial functions, such as: social appeasement, financial help for seamen and closer relations with the littoral authorities (municipalities, merchants, ship-owners) than ever suspected. Their image proved to be ambivalent: they were loathed because they embodied the Royal Law but also praised for their social work. Difficulties in wartime forced them to rise to the occasion. The study of their work through their letters and reports to the Ministry, their administrative production (registration rolls) and the up to now widely unused personal files kept in the National Archives also revealed that they built dynasties of administrators intimately linked with clientelist networks within the maritime districts and at the Court. Acting as a lobby group, these families were keen on keeping their privileges and on preserving their interests in spite of the numerous reforms held by the Ministers throughout the 18th century. A biographical dictionary of 440 officers of classes completes this study, revealing the sociological reality of this administrative key group.

American military plans for a war with the British Empire, first discussed in 1919, have received varied treatment since their declassification. the most common theme among historians in their appraisals of WAR PLAN RED is that of an oddity. Lack of a detailed study of Anglo-American relations in the immediate post-First World War years makes a right understanding of the difficult relationship between the United States and Britain after the War problematic. As a result of divergent aims and policies, the United States and Great Britain did not find the diplomatic and social unity so many on both sides of the Atlantic aspired to during and immediately after the First World War. Instead, United States’ civil and military organizations came to see the British Empire as a fierce and potentially dangerous rival, worthy of suspicion, and planned accordingly. Less than a year after the end of the War, internal debates and notes discussed and circulated between the most influential members of the United States Government, coalesced around a premise that became the rationale for WAR PLAN RED. Ample evidence reveals that contrary to the common narrative of “Anglo-American” and “Atlanticist” historians of the past century, the First World War did not forge a new union of spirit between the English-speaking nations. the experiences of the War, instead, engendered American antipathy for the British Empire. Economic and military advisers feared that the British might use their naval power to check American expansion, as they believed it did during the then recent conflict. the first full year of peace witnessed the beginnings of what became WAR PLAN RED. the foundational elements of America’s war plan against the British Empire emerged in reaction to the events of the day. Planners saw Britain as a potentially hostile nation, which might regard the United States’ rise in strength as a threatening challenge to Britain’s historic economic and maritime supremacy.

This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.