In July 1979, Nigeria's federal military government declared a 100% takeover of select operations belonging to the London-based oil company, British Petroleum (BP). The takeover of BP marked the takeover of Nigeria's most lucrative industry that had been controlled by foreign investors. Within the secondary literature a more elaborate version of this event is offered by scholars, declaring it nationalization with little agreement over why this "Giant of West Africa" nationalization BP. Some mention South Africa, others Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe); some mention oil, while others solely discuss UK diplomacy. Why the discrepancy over the reason for nationalization? This project sets out to explain not only why Nigeria nationalized BP in 1979, but also how the nationalization fits into the broad theoretical discussions on nationalism, economic policy, foreign relations, and nationalization. It challenges the popular narrative of why Nigeria nationalized BP and substantially revises it. The argument is put forward that the nationalization of BP hinged almost entirely on the notion of economic nationalism and that the nationalization fit into an established trend of takeovers aimed at foreign companies. The federal military government simply used southern Africa --discussed as the sole reason for nationalization within the secondary Literature-- as a way to bolster international support. This project also project uses the nationalization as a looking-glass into Nigeria and its oil industry during the 1970s. Also, this project addresses the impact the nationalization had on Nigerian society. With regard to nationalism, Nigeria represents an excellent case for understanding the existence and application of economic nationalism, which functions not only as a subject of study much like ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism, but also as a new perspective on the relationship between the various expressions of nationalism and economic policy.

Although organised Marxist organisations did not emerge in Nigeria until the mid-1940s, leftist ideology had been prevalent among nationalist and labour leaders since the late 1920s. Both official documents and oral histories indicate deep-rooted support for leftism in Nigeria and anxiety among British colonial officials that this support threatened the Colonial Office's own timetable for gradual decolonisation. This study analyses the development of leftist ideology and attempts to establish a nationwide leftist organisation in colonial and post-independent Nigeria. The role of the Zikist movement is retold in light of new evidence, while other leftist organisations are salvaged from the footnotes of Nigeria nationalist history. More importantly, the adaptability of Marxist-Leninist ideology to colonial reality by the different leftist groups in Nigeria is emphasized. The reaction of Anglo-American officials in Lagos and the metropolis towards the Communist Party of Great Britain and other leftist organisations' sponsorship of Marxist groups in Nigeria are discussed. Lastly, the continuity between the departing colonial power and the Balewa administration is addressed to juxtapose the linkage between the two governments. The study thus provides a lucid explanation for the failure of leftist ideology and organisations in Nigeria during the twentieth century. In this eight-chapter thesis I consistently argue, based on official documents from England, Nigeria, and the United States, that the role of Marxists and Soviet Cold War interests in colonial territories are relevant to nationalism and decolonisation in Nigeria; that the issue is not to determine or measure whether or not Anglo-American policies are direct response to Soviet interests; that there are political, economic, and diplomatic policies carried out as part of the transfer of power process; and that the success of these is partly a result of collaboration with local subaltern leaders and official resolve to institutionalise imperial preferences before independence on October 1, 1960. / History / D.Litt. et Phil. (History)

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In this study, rhetorical analysis through the framework of victimage ritual is employed to analyze four Boko Haram messages on You Tube, five e-mail messages sent to journalists from leaders of Boko Haram, and a BlogSpot web page devoted to Boko Haram. The aim of this analysis is to understand the persuasive devices by which Boko Haram leaders create, express, and sustain their jurisprudence on acts of violence. The goal of this study is to understand how leaders of Boko Haram construct and express the group’s values, sway belief, and justify violence. The findings show that Boko Haram desire to redeem non-Muslims from perdition, liberate Muslims from persecution, protect Islam from criticism, and revenge perceived acts of injustices against Muslims. The group has embarked on this aim by allotting blame, vilifying the enemy-Other, pressing for a holy war, encouraging martyrdom, and alluding to an apocalypse. Boko Haram’s audience is made to believe that Allah has assigned Boko Haram the task to liberate and restore an Islamic haven in Nigeria. Therefore, opposition from the Nigerian government or Western forces is constructed as actions of evil, thus killing members of the opposition becomes a celestial and noble cause. This juxtaposition serves to encourage the violent Jihad which leaders of Boko Haram claims Allah assigned them to lead in the first place. As a result of this cyclical communication, media houses, along the Nigerian government, Christians and Western ideals become the symbolic evil, against which Muslims, sympathizers and would-be-recruits must unite. By locking Islam against the Nigerian government, Western ideals and Christianity in a characteristically hostile manner, Boko Haram precludes any real solution other than an orchestrated Jihad-crusade-or-cleanse model in which a possible coexistence of Muslims and the enemy-Other are denied, and the threat posed by the enemy-Other is eliminated through conversion or destruction. As a result, this study proposes that Boko Haram Internet messages Boko Haram’s mission reveals a movement of separatism, conservatism, and fascism. A movement based on the claim that its activism will establish a state in accordance with the dictates of Allah.