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British relations with the United States during the period 1895 to 1902 shifted from an attitude defined by suspicion and hostility to one of friendship. The relationship endured three main trials; the Venezuelan boundary crisis, the Spanish-American War, and simultaneous colonial struggles; the United States in the Philippines and Great Britain in South Africa. What developed was a greater mutual understanding, laying foundations for the enduring special relationship of the twentieth century. Public opinion was critical to the development of the relationship with the United States, especially in view of existing suspicions and conflicting interest groups in both countries. Great Britain, with her naval power and the vast resources of the British Empire, was undoubtedly the most powerful nation-state for much of the nineteenth century, and had stood in 'Splendid Isolation' secure in the knowledge that each threat to her supremacy could be met in turn. However, in the latter years of the century, over-stretched from her imperial possessions, Britain faced more serious threats to her security and increasing demands for a formal relationship with a power with similar interests, the United States was advanced as that partner. The Spanish-American War was a brief but successful war for the United States of America, eclipsing the bad memories of the civil war. A renewed belief in the republic was instilled, and with it an end to the isolationist characteristic of American foreign policy from the time of Washington's farewell address. The Spanish-American War was also a turning point in the relations between the United States and Great Britain. This has prompted several historians to examine why the two nations, over a relatively short period, managed to settle their differences. Most studies of Anglo-American relations at the turn of the century have centred upon the diplomatic overtures. Others examining public opinion have focused upon the reaction of the London press. While providing valuable insight into opinion prevalent in the capital of the British Empire they neglect to examine British attitudes outside of the centre, in particular in Scotland. Scottish public opinion, within the larger British context, towards the Spanish-American War and American Imperialism, provides an insight into the growth of Anglo-American relations from a new perspective.

Chapter One describes Britain's nuclear and conventional defence policy towards the United States during 1957-1959. Britain's nuclear policy during these years was based on reconciling British independence with Anglo-American cooperation and cost effectiveness. The British government reduced Britain's conventional forces, but Britain's force strength In Europe had to be adjusted as the Americans began to support calls for a build-up of conventional forces in Europe. Chapter Two deals with Macmillan's policies on SKYBOLT, POLARIS and the NATO MRBM force during 1960. The British government was keen on getting both missiles from the Americans, aiming at a deal that would leave Britain with a maximum degree of independence for her deterrent. The Eisenhower Administration's support for SACEUR's NATO MRBM force proposals thwarted British attempts to get POLARIS. Chapter Three describes Macmillan's attempt at reconciling Britain's nuclear cooperation with the United States with British offers of military cooperation with France during 1961-1962. Such options were considered in order to prevent Britain's deterrent from being subsumed within a multilateral force. An Anglo-French nuclear alignment was one possible alternative to a more obvious example of alliance interdependence, a NATO nuclear force backed by the United States. In Chapter Four Britain's efforts to reduce her conventional forces during the years 1960-1962 are discussed. These efforts coincide with American pressure to build up conventional forces in Europe in the wake of the Berlin crisis. Anglo-American discussions over the conventional force strength issue culminated in the Nassau meeting of December 1962. The general British debate on future commitments and deployments overshadowed the coordination of efforts with the Americans on conventional forces overseas. Chapter Five describes Britain's nuclear relationship with the United States in the aftermath of Nassau. This centred on the drafting of a POLARIS Sales agreement and finding some common ground on the NATO multilateral force issue. On the former, the British position was challenged by American efforts at renegotiating the Nassau agreement. On the latter, the British government was divided over if and to what extent it should cooperate with the Americans on the MLF. The US Administrations under Kennedy and Johnson were only half-hearted in their support for the mixed manned multilateral force. Macmillan meanwhile remained hesitant about suggestions to embark upon a nuclear rapprochement with France. Chapter Six follows Britain's attempt to reach a decision on commitments and conventional force deployments during the years 1963-1 964. Members of the British government were inclined to look at the division of defence tasks between Brita n and the United States in areas outside NATO as another form of Anglo-American interdependence at work. During Douglas-Home's premiership, Britain's role in out-of-NATO areas assumed greater significance.

Traditional historiographies of the Cold War Middle East read into Britain's postwar economic decline a corresponding demise of British regional influence. According to these accounts, the Suez Crisis served to teach Britain new limits to its military capabilities, occasioning a break from independent endeavours to project power in the region. However, the case studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that the Suez Crisis did not mark a precipitous turning point in Britain's political influence in the Middle East in the short- to medium-term. Britain's power in the region rested upon not only its material assets, but other less tangible bases as well. Most importantly, Britain's power in the Middle East during the period examined increasingly included its ability to influence the policies of United States – a country with great resources and an emerging presence in the region.

This thesis traces the development of Anglo-American naval relations throughout the Chamberlain premiership and the various attempts that were made during this period to extend and broaden the existing level of cooperation in the hope that it might be used for politico-strategic purposes. It deals in some depth with the background to and course of Eden's various initiatives to the Roosevelt Administration in the six months following the July 7th incident of 1937 and explains why his attempts to construct some form of naval partnership with the United States evoked such opposition from within the ranks of the British Government. In this connection, Chamberlain's rather ambivalent role in Anglo-American relations and the contrast between Eden and himself in their use of different methods, style and policy is closely examined in the first half of the thesis. After Eden's resignation and until appeasement became discredited, Anglo-American naval cooperation continued to be a mainly technical rather than strategic nature. In the last few months of peace, however, the British again looked to the Americans for strategic assistance and tried unsuccessfully to encourage them to deploy their fleet in the Western Pacific in order to counter the threat of the Japanese in the Far East. The thesis goes on to explore the changing naval relationship between Britain and the United States after the outbreak of the Second World War and how it led to greater involvement between them on detailed day-to-day technical matters related to the war in Europe. Although predominantly a study in the formation of British policy, the thesis has also drawn extensively on the official American records in an attempt to establish that a close link existed between naval strategy and foreign policy in Anglo-American relations during this period.

This thesis explores the continuous British interest in the American Civil War from the war’s end to the late twentieth century and the British utilisation of the conflict at home and in the Atlantic arena. Contributing to the limited, yet burgeoning literature on the subject, this study emphasises the independent agency of both the Civil War and its British interpreters. It thus rejects a simplistic depiction of British adoption of American culture and applies a more sophisticated methodology that accounts for the active, versatile and autonomous British use of complex foreign images. This enables a meaningful analysis of the Civil War’s place and role in modern British culture. The thesis examines the British fascination with the conflict as reflected in four facets: politics, military thought, academe and popular culture. Additionally, it takes a transatlantic perspective and explores how Britons’ view of the United States has influenced their understanding of the Civil War. This study thus provides a first comprehensive and coherent overview as well as a nuanced picture of the American conflict as it travelled across the Atlantic from a historically distanced perspective. The thesis reveals that the Civil War achieved unique prominence in British culture and that this British fascination with the war was part of a greater transatlantic encounter between an epic American affair and sophisticated British interpreters. Accordingly, the two main questions underpinning this study are ‘why were the British particularly interested in the Civil War?’ and, following directly on that path, ‘how did Britons use the war both at home and in the transatlantic sphere?’ Answering these questions further establishes the war’s prominence in British culture and explores the character of the British encounter with the conflict. In so doing, it contributes to our understanding of the Civil War’s global impact and casts another light on Anglo-American relations.

Blair sent British troops to join U.S. forces in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 at great political cost to himself. What motivated him to take this step? Sources for this work include: autobiographies and biographies of individuals close to Blair; journal and newspaper articles and monographs on this topic; Prime Minister's speeches and press conferences. Part one is comprised of five chapters including the Introduction; Blair's years at school; Blair's early political career; and From Parliament to Prime Minister. Part two includes four chapters that analyze motivating factors such as, Anglo-American Relations; Blair's personality, faith, and his relationship with Gordon Brown; and finally, Blair's perception of Britain's Manifest Destiny. All of these factors played a role in Blair's decision.

Although organised Marxist organisations did not emerge in Nigeria until the mid-1940s, leftist ideology had been prevalent among nationalist and labour leaders since the late 1920s. Both official documents and oral histories indicate deep-rooted support for leftism in Nigeria and anxiety among British colonial officials that this support threatened the Colonial Office's own timetable for gradual decolonisation. This study analyses the development of leftist ideology and attempts to establish a nationwide leftist organisation in colonial and post-independent Nigeria. The role of the Zikist movement is retold in light of new evidence, while other leftist organisations are salvaged from the footnotes of Nigeria nationalist history. More importantly, the adaptability of Marxist-Leninist ideology to colonial reality by the different leftist groups in Nigeria is emphasized. The reaction of Anglo-American officials in Lagos and the metropolis towards the Communist Party of Great Britain and other leftist organisations' sponsorship of Marxist groups in Nigeria are discussed. Lastly, the continuity between the departing colonial power and the Balewa administration is addressed to juxtapose the linkage between the two governments. The study thus provides a lucid explanation for the failure of leftist ideology and organisations in Nigeria during the twentieth century. In this eight-chapter thesis I consistently argue, based on official documents from England, Nigeria, and the United States, that the role of Marxists and Soviet Cold War interests in colonial territories are relevant to nationalism and decolonisation in Nigeria; that the issue is not to determine or measure whether or not Anglo-American policies are direct response to Soviet interests; that there are political, economic, and diplomatic policies carried out as part of the transfer of power process; and that the success of these is partly a result of collaboration with local subaltern leaders and official resolve to institutionalise imperial preferences before independence on October 1, 1960. / History / D.Litt. et Phil. (History)