In recent years the popularity of Islamic insurance policies has grown rapidly with many companies across the world providing this service. London is said to be the hub for Islamic finance. It is well known for welcoming innovative financial methods. The FSA have already authorised the insurance company Salaam Halal to provide policies based on Shariah principles. The FSA, however, announced that they must operate within the same legal framework as all other insurance policies. Consequently English law has to be applied in Islamic policies taken in this country. However, in many aspects, Shariah principles contradict English insurance law. This thesis aims to discover how they contradict and recommend how the Islamic insurance policies can be applied in English law without breaking Shariah principles. As Shariah principles merely provide a wide boundary within which any law can be applied, this thesis analyses English insurance law first, and then discusses how Islamic insurance policies can operate within the English framework. In many cases, English insurance law crosses the boundary of Shairah principles due to its unfair consequences. Consequently making English insurance law fairer could be the best solution to allow the use of Islamic insurance policies under English law. Pragmatically, the thesis focuses mainly on problems within current English insurance law and recommends possible solutions. In many cases, the solutions suggested by the Law Commission are found to be incapable of establishing fairness. The majority part of this thesis is spent trying to establish a fairer framework for English insurance law. This fairer English insurance law is found to be Shariah compliant in most cases. In some cases it is not complaint due to operational differences between the two legal systems. In these cases, the thesis recommends that the Islamic insurer should incorporate certain terms to make policies Shariah compliant without breaching English insurance law.

<p>Background</p><p>In 2006 the audit duty for SME’s was abolished in Denmark, and January 1st 2007 Finland decided to do the same. The subject is now under investigation in Sweden since the government has appointed an</p><p>investigation dealing with the future of the audit duty for small companies. The report will not only investigate whether an abolishment needs to be done but also if compliments are needed in order to prevent companies from breaking the rules, intentionally or unintentionally due to lack of knowledge.</p><p>Purpose</p><p>To investigate how a possible abolishment of the auditing duty for small companies will affect the creditors’ ability to assess the company’s creditworthiness.</p><p>Method</p><p>The selected sample of this study contained interviews with five organisations that would be affected differently of an abolishment of the audit duty. The authors wanted to interview organisations with different perceptions of the audit duty although the or-ganisations have in common that they all possess knowledge which is important to the banks in the credit rating process. The sample consists of representatives from; FAR SRS, Företagarna, Handelsbanken, Nordea and Upplysningscentralen.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>All the different organisations in the study showed different views in the value of having audited financial statements. FAR SRS and Företagarna were, as could be expected, most and least in favour of having audited financial statements. UC did not predict to be affected by an abolishment, but did see a value in it. Interesting conclusions could be seen between the banks. It showed that depending on the organisational structure dif-ferent value was seen in the audit duty. This addresses how important a bank’s routines are in the process of valuing a company’s creditworthiness. The study showed that an abolishment will probably turn the focus in the credit process from the information that figures generates. The information used to assess a company’s creditworthiness would to a larger extent be on analysing the business concept, the environment and the re-sources that a company posses.</p>

後果論（Consequentialism）和義務論（Deontology）是規範倫理學裏兩個基本理論。兩個理論之間的差異，經常成為討論基本倫理問題的框架。一方面，義務論認為後果論道德上容許任何能達到最好結果的行為，這是過於寬鬆。另一方面，後果論認為義務論是自相矛盾的；因為它既禁止某些行為，視之為不道德，但又不容許人們以違反義務為手段，整體減少這類行為發生的次數。 / 這篇論文的旨趣是研究用後果論的理論框架，來表達義務論的可能性。這將提供一個新的視角，以了解後果論和義務論的基本理論差異。 / 全文共分四個部分。第一章，我會檢視兩個理論的一些基本特徵。第二章，我第一次嘗試用後果論的理論框架來表達義務論。方法是給違反義務的行為分配一個負面道德價值。然而，這方法不能成功把義務論表達為一種後果論。因為它引申了一些義務論不接受的道德判斷。第三章，我會檢視義務論和道德價值之間的關係；並順著 Louise (2004) 提出的理論，論證後果論的理論框架可以用來表達義務論。方法是把遵從義務的行為視為把時間和行動者相對 (time-relative and agent-relative) 的道德價值最大化。第四章，我將嘗試回應對這理論可能提出的反駁。 / Discussions in basic ethical problems are often framed by the essential differences between consequentialism and deontology - two fundamental theories in normative ethics. Most arguments in those ethical problems are basically reiteration of how the two theories differs from each other: Deontology holds that consequentialism is too lax as it allows all actions that leads to the best outcome, while consequentialism holds that deontology is essentially paradoxical because it forbids agents to act against a constraint even when doing so can avoid more violations. / My interest in this thesis is to examine a possible alternative in characterizing the differences between consequentialism and deontology, namely the doctrine of "consequentializing deontology". This doctrine holds that all deontological theories can be given a representation in consequentialist form. / This thesis consists of four parts. In Chapter 1, I will first examine three essential features of consequentialism, namely it is structurally axiological, teleological and maximizing. Then I will examine various formulations of deontological constraints and argue that they are best formulated as agent-relative reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I will explicate the first attempt to consequentialize deontological constraints by assigning a negative weighing to any violation. I will show that this attempt is not satisfactory because it entails a number of implausible claims. In Chapter 3, I proceed to examine various accounts that explain the normative power of deontological constraints in terms of values. Following Louise (2004), I argue that deontology can be consequentialized by giving a consequentialist representation to deontology, so that when an agent acts upon a deontological constraint, he is maximizing values that are both agent-relative and temporal-relative in nature. In Chapter 4, I will examine possible challenges to consequentializing deontology and respond to them. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Chan, Pui Yee June. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Delineating Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology: A Possible Alternative to Characterizing the Differences between Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Overview --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- What Makes a Theory in Normative Ethics Consequentialist? --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Conception of Outcome: Future-Oriented is Not a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.13 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Maximizing is a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.17 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Consequentialism Essentials Summarized --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4 --- Deontological Constraints --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Absolute and Threshold Deontological Constraints --- p.26 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Agent-Relative & Agent-Neutral Reasons for Action: Two Approaches --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Deontological Constraints & Reasons for Action --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Attempt of Consequentializing Deontology without Agent-Relativity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction & the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Threshold Constraints --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Absolute Constraints --- p.42 / Chapter 2.4 --- Limits and Problems with Consequentializing Deontology --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- Responding to Challenges --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.48 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.50 / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary: Consequentializing Deontology Fails --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Deontology and Agent-Relative Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology and Agent-Relativity in Values --- p.54 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction in Values --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Agent-Relative & Temporal-Relative Values --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2 --- Nagel: Agent-Relative Reasons and Agent-Relative Values --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Reasons of Autonomy --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Reasons of Deontology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Korsgaard: Deontology and Inter-subjectivity --- p.70 / Chapter 3.4 --- Pettit: The Honoring/Promoting Distinction as the Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction --- p.78 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Values that cannot be honored --- p.80 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- It is not always clear what counts as "honoring" a value --- p.82 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Honoring is promoting agent-relative value --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Consequentializing Deontology - Its Limits and Implications --- p.88 / Chapter 4.1 --- Thesis Project Recap --- p.88 / Chapter 4.2 --- Consequentializing deontology and agent-relativity --- p.94 / Chapter 4.3 --- Extended application of consequentializing to other ethical theories --- p.99 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fragmentation of values and consequentializing --- p.101 / Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion: How successful consequentializing contributes to moral discussions --- p.104 / Bibliography --- p.107

Background In 2006 the audit duty for SME’s was abolished in Denmark, and January 1st 2007 Finland decided to do the same. The subject is now under investigation in Sweden since the government has appointed an investigation dealing with the future of the audit duty for small companies. The report will not only investigate whether an abolishment needs to be done but also if compliments are needed in order to prevent companies from breaking the rules, intentionally or unintentionally due to lack of knowledge. Purpose To investigate how a possible abolishment of the auditing duty for small companies will affect the creditors’ ability to assess the company’s creditworthiness. Method The selected sample of this study contained interviews with five organisations that would be affected differently of an abolishment of the audit duty. The authors wanted to interview organisations with different perceptions of the audit duty although the or-ganisations have in common that they all possess knowledge which is important to the banks in the credit rating process. The sample consists of representatives from; FAR SRS, Företagarna, Handelsbanken, Nordea and Upplysningscentralen. Conclusion All the different organisations in the study showed different views in the value of having audited financial statements. FAR SRS and Företagarna were, as could be expected, most and least in favour of having audited financial statements. UC did not predict to be affected by an abolishment, but did see a value in it. Interesting conclusions could be seen between the banks. It showed that depending on the organisational structure dif-ferent value was seen in the audit duty. This addresses how important a bank’s routines are in the process of valuing a company’s creditworthiness. The study showed that an abolishment will probably turn the focus in the credit process from the information that figures generates. The information used to assess a company’s creditworthiness would to a larger extent be on analysing the business concept, the environment and the re-sources that a company posses.

Driving cycles are acting as the basis of the evaluation of the vehicle performance from air quality point of view, such as fuel consumption or pollutant emission, especially in emission modeling and emission estimation. The original definition of the driving cycle, or drive schedule, given by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is basically a speed-time trajectory which is able to describe the general driving characteristics and driving patterns. Therefore, the development of drive cycles requires a large amount of real data to realize such “generalization”. Then, with such the eligible data collected, it leads to the development of modeling, from traffic modeling to emission modeling, especially for those pollutant emissions which have the public concern. In this study, focused on heavy duty diesel vehicles (HDDVs), the estimations of the common emissions are being made based on the Texas specific drive cycles, in second-by-second form, collected and generated from five local metropolitan areas, including Houston, Austin, San Antonio, Dallas-Fort Worth and El Paso. First of all, the accurate Global Positioning System (GPS) logging technique is applied for data collection in order to collect not only the moving data but also the relevant geographical information, such as location and roadway, for further analysis. Then, during the progress of data cleaning and data processing, some modifications are made subjectively to improve the deficits of the general methodologies developed by EPA. Afterwards, the specific drive cycles are presented in the format of operating mode distributions, which are also the main part of the input during the emission estimation in Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES). Along with all the Texas specific inputs prepared, both the rates and amount of studied emissions are estimated through MOVES. A further comparison is made between the emission rates of default analysis and local analysis to verify the accuracy of MOVES at project level. It is found that the default estimation made by MOVES is accurate for mid-speed cases, at magnitude level. Significant differences happened in low-speed cases and high-speed cases, in which it shows the importance to develop the local drive cycles when estimating the emission rates regionally.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Göttingen.

This thesis explores how Protestant Charlestonians and Philadelphians interpreted and responded to the secession crisis of 1860-1861. "Christian duty" was a vital part of these responses, not only informing the worldview of Protestants, but directing their actions in the midst of the crisis. Charlestonians and Philadelphians defined the concept of "Christian duty" in similar ways, however as the crisis progressed they applied it in increasingly different manners. Early in 1860, Protestants in both cities emphasized their shared spiritual and political heritage, often defining Christian duty in regard to unity and conciliatory speech. However, the secession crisis marked a transition away from this shared unifying rhetoric toward the expression of regional exceptionalism. Increasingly, both Philadelphians and Charlestonians understood themselves and their respective governments to be specially anointed by God. Accordingly by the end of 1861, Charlestonian and Philadelphian Protestants described Christian duty as tied to serving the Confederacy or the Union. / Master of Arts

The thesis focuses on the concept of the duty of due managerial care as regulated in the legal framework of the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany; in particular, the comparison is aimed at the application of this duty against the members of the board of directors and the supervisory board of the joint-stock company and the executives of the limited liability company. The thesis first describes the duty of due managerial care as a standard of conduct. Chapter 3 describes the particular consequences of said duty for the conduct of the members of the board of directors and the supervisory board of the joint-stock company. Chapter 4 is focused on the reflection of this duty on the legal relationships within the limited liability company. Chapters 3 and 4 each include a partial conclusion concerning the most important differences as well as the effectiveness of the respective legal regulation. Chapter 5 is divided into two parts, differentiated according to the legal form of the company in question, and concerns itself with the liabilities following from the breach of said duty. Particular attention is paid to the possibilities of shareholders (members) to influence - whether ex ante or ex post - the said liabilities, as this area is marked by the most significant differences when...

The bequest of a usufruct to one or more interim usufructuaries for a limited period after the decease of the first usufructuary is often utilised by estate planners to reduce the value of the ceasing limited interest and thus to effect a saving in respect of estate duty. The saving in respect of estate duty is effected due to the fact that - the value of the ceasing limited interest in the estate of the first usufructuary is calculated only over the duration of the period during which the interim usufructuary is entitled to the limited interest and not also over the life expectancy of the ultimate beneficiary, and - that, on the cessation of the interim usufruct due to the efflux of time. no estate duty is payable. The very first reference to this method appeared in an article published in The Taxpayer during 1965. Other authors like Meyerowitz, Silke and Stein and Davis, Beneke and Jooste also referred to this method without analysing it or investigating the legality thereof. All the aforementioned authors relied to a certain extent for their views on a judgment of acting judge Warner in Bassett v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1 961 4 SA 769 (D)). This dissertation is therefore aimed at investigating the legality of the method and to focus on a few practical aspects regarding the application thereof as an estate planning instrument. An analysis of the wording of the charging clause (section II (a )(1) of the Estate Duty Act and the valuation clause (section 5(1) of the act) has led to the belief that, in considering the validity of the method, it is extremely important to bear in mind the principles applicable to the vesting of testamentary rights. In terms of the valuation clause of the Estate Duty Ad the value of a ceasing limited interest for estate duty purposes is determined by capitalising the annual value of the right of enjoyment of the properly in which the deceased held any such limited interest to the extent to which the person who, upon the cessation of the said interest of the deceased in consequence of the death of the deceased, becomes entitled to any right of enjoyment of such properly. In terms of the charging clause "the person to whom any advantage accrues by the death of the deceased" is liable for the payment of estate duty in respect of the cessation of a limited right. In order to calculate the value of a ceasing limited interest and to determine the liability for payment of estate duty in respect thereof it is necessary to determine (a) the extent to which a successor in title of a deceased in consequence of the death of the deceased has become entitled to any right of enjoyment, and (b) to which person any advantage has accrued by the death of the deceased. After analysing the wording of section 5(1)(b) and section 11(a)(1) the writer has come to the following conclusions: (a) In the case of an interim usufruct the right of enjoyment of the first usufructury has to be capitalised only over the period of currency of the interim usufruct and not also over the life expectancy of the owner of the nuda proprietas. (b) Subsection 5(l)(b) does not make provision for the valuation of an interim usufruct at the termination them due to the efflux of time. (c) Upon the decease of the first usufructuary an advantage as contemplated in section 11(a)(1) accrues to the interim usufructury but not to the owner of the nuda proprietas. (d) On the cessation of an interim usufruct due to the efflux of time there is no person to whom any advantage accrues by the death of a deceased as contemplated in subsection 11 (a)(1), and consequently the owner of the nuda proprietas does not at that stage incur any liability for estate duty. In view of the aforegoing considerations the writer has come to the conclusion that the utilisation of this method does not constitute a contravention the provisions of the Estate Duty Ad. The artificiality of the valuation method prescribed in terms of subsection 5(1)(b) lends itself to reducing the value of a limited interest by interposing a successor for a short period between the deceased and the ultimate beneficiary. It follows therefore that the utilisation of this method does not constitute tax evasion. Where the main consideration for the appointment of an intermediary usufructuary is not so much the possible benefit that may acme to the intermediary as the limitation of estate duty, the application of the method may constitute an avoidance of estate duty. The Estate Duty Act, however, does not contain any general anti-avoidance provision similar to section 103 of the lncome Tax Act. In utilising this method estate planners should therefore bear in mind the possibility that the fiscus may sooner or later introduce an amendment to the Estate Duty Act to close this loophole. / Thesis (LL.M. (Estate Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

The bequest of a usufruct to one or more interim usufructuaries for a limited period after the decease of the first usufructuary is often utilised by estate planners to reduce the value of the ceasing limited interest and thus to effect a saving in respect of estate duty. The saving in respect of estate duty is effected due to the fact that - the value of the ceasing limited interest in the estate of the first usufructuary is calculated only over the duration of the period during which the interim usufructuary is entitled to the limited interest and not also over the life expectancy of the ultimate beneficiary, and - that, on the cessation of the interim usufruct due to the efflux of time. no estate duty is payable. The very first reference to this method appeared in an article published in The Taxpayer during 1965. Other authors like Meyerowitz, Silke and Stein and Davis, Beneke and Jooste also referred to this method without analysing it or investigating the legality thereof. All the aforementioned authors relied to a certain extent for their views on a judgment of acting judge Warner in Bassett v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1 961 4 SA 769 (D)). This dissertation is therefore aimed at investigating the legality of the method and to focus on a few practical aspects regarding the application thereof as an estate planning instrument. An analysis of the wording of the charging clause (section II (a )(1) of the Estate Duty Act and the valuation clause (section 5(1) of the act) has led to the belief that, in considering the validity of the method, it is extremely important to bear in mind the principles applicable to the vesting of testamentary rights. In terms of the valuation clause of the Estate Duty Ad the value of a ceasing limited interest for estate duty purposes is determined by capitalising the annual value of the right of enjoyment of the properly in which the deceased held any such limited interest to the extent to which the person who, upon the cessation of the said interest of the deceased in consequence of the death of the deceased, becomes entitled to any right of enjoyment of such properly. In terms of the charging clause "the person to whom any advantage accrues by the death of the deceased" is liable for the payment of estate duty in respect of the cessation of a limited right. In order to calculate the value of a ceasing limited interest and to determine the liability for payment of estate duty in respect thereof it is necessary to determine (a) the extent to which a successor in title of a deceased in consequence of the death of the deceased has become entitled to any right of enjoyment, and (b) to which person any advantage has accrued by the death of the deceased. After analysing the wording of section 5(1)(b) and section 11(a)(1) the writer has come to the following conclusions: (a) In the case of an interim usufruct the right of enjoyment of the first usufructury has to be capitalised only over the period of currency of the interim usufruct and not also over the life expectancy of the owner of the nuda proprietas. (b) Subsection 5(l)(b) does not make provision for the valuation of an interim usufruct at the termination them due to the efflux of time. (c) Upon the decease of the first usufructuary an advantage as contemplated in section 11(a)(1) accrues to the interim usufructury but not to the owner of the nuda proprietas. (d) On the cessation of an interim usufruct due to the efflux of time there is no person to whom any advantage accrues by the death of a deceased as contemplated in subsection 11 (a)(1), and consequently the owner of the nuda proprietas does not at that stage incur any liability for estate duty. In view of the aforegoing considerations the writer has come to the conclusion that the utilisation of this method does not constitute a contravention the provisions of the Estate Duty Ad. The artificiality of the valuation method prescribed in terms of subsection 5(1)(b) lends itself to reducing the value of a limited interest by interposing a successor for a short period between the deceased and the ultimate beneficiary. It follows therefore that the utilisation of this method does not constitute tax evasion. Where the main consideration for the appointment of an intermediary usufructuary is not so much the possible benefit that may acme to the intermediary as the limitation of estate duty, the application of the method may constitute an avoidance of estate duty. The Estate Duty Act, however, does not contain any general anti-avoidance provision similar to section 103 of the lncome Tax Act. In utilising this method estate planners should therefore bear in mind the possibility that the fiscus may sooner or later introduce an amendment to the Estate Duty Act to close this loophole. / Thesis (LL.M. (Estate Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.