<p>The purpose of the essay is to investigate whether the principles formulated by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, concerning strategic non-violent conflicts, can serve a purpose when analyzing improvised non-violent conflicts. The principles are derived from factors that have been prominent in earlier successful improvised non-violent conflicts.</p><p>The essay is based on two research questions; if the factors included in the principles formulated by Ackerman and Kruegler, exist in the two cases that this study investigates, and if those principles offer a satisfactory explanation for the outcome of an improvised non-violent conflict.</p><p>To answer the questions the study uses a comparative method, where the improvised non-violent conflict of 2004 in Ukraine is compared to the improvised non-violent conflict of 1988 in Burma.</p><p>The answer to the first question shows that the factors contained in the principles previously mentioned, exists in both cases. The answer to the second question is more uncertain, as there seems to be doubts on whether the case of Ukraine really was completely improvised. Another reason for caution is that the factors contained in the principles, only consider actions made by non-violent actors, and not by opponents or third parties. Thus the risks of missing vital explanatory factors are substantial.</p>

The concept of peacebuilding evokes the image of international interventions in countries emerging from civil wars. Despite the visibility of this engagement, post-civil war peacebuilding is just one form of peacebuilding. As a response to smaller scale violent conflicts, ongoing peacebuilding interrupts cycles of violence and prevents the escalation of violent conflict. The 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya captured international attention due to the scope and magnitude of the conflict. In 1992 and 1997, Kenya had experienced lower levels of electoral violence. The recurring and escalatory nature of violent conflict implies that peacebuilding should be a strategic response, earlier on, to prevent violence from reaching new levels. Since 2002, the Kenyan state has actively engaged in peacebuilding. This study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya deviates from the typical post-war interventions to analyse peacebuilding as an ongoing preventative response by national actors to intermittent violence. This thesis seeks to explain the impact of this state-led peacebuilding approach on the practice and prospect of peace. To do so, I first explore the multiple conceptions of peace held by those engaged in this approach to understand what type of peace is being built. Second, I analyse the paradox of the state in peacebuilding and how the role of the state has influenced the nature of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for peace. The state in peacebuilding presents a paradox because of the state’s direct and indirect involvement in violent conflict as well as the top-down nature of state engagement. Third, I interrogate the relationship between the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace. I find that state-led peacebuilding in Kenya has raised the profile of peacebuilding, improved the synergy between peacebuilding actors and increased the inflow of resources available to build peace. This positive influence is countered by the negative implications of the state’s role in promoting a reductive conceptualisation of peace and unsustainably institutionalising peace building. I conclude that, though the state has a role to play in peacebuilding, the contradictory implications of state-led peacebuilding challenge the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace.

The causes of violent conflicts in Ethiopia in general, and in Gambella in particular, are complex. Critically examining and explaining the causes entails going beyond labelling them solely in terms of one variable, such as 'ethnic conflict‘. The contestation of the study is that contemporary conflicts in Ethiopia have remained protracted, untransformed and recurring. This is largely because the past processes which gave rise to them were not properly taken into account and not properly comprehended, thereby giving rise to much superficiality in their explanations, inappropriate policies and a failure of efforts at apprehending them. The thesis identifies four major factors and two contrasting narratives which have framed the analysis of conflict complexity in Gambella. Qualitatively designed, the study focuses mainly on the structural causes of violent conflicts since 1991 and how their constituent elements were conceived and explained by different actors. First, asymmetrical centre-periphery relations entrenched in the state building processes of the imperial and military regimes, continued under the present regime rendering Gambella an object of extraction and repression. Consequently, competing claims of ownership of Gambella between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic groups evolved entailing shifting allegiances to the central government. Second, ethnic politics of the new social contract ushered in a new thinking of ‗each ethnic group for itself‘; it made ethnic federalism a means of consolidating the regime‘s political philosophy, depriving the local community of a genuine political representation, leading to broader, deeper and more serious violence. Third, land policy of the incumbent favoured its political party affiliates and foreign investors, thus inducing more violence. Finally, external dynamics impacted on internal conflict complexity. The study has argued that single factor approaches are inadequate to explain what has constituted violent conflicts in Gambella since 1991; it has concluded that internal conflicts are complex, and their constituent elements are conceived of, and explained, differently by the local peoples and different levels of government. Nevertheless, given commitment and a political will, the local and national governments, as well as peoples at grassroots level, have the capacity to transform the present, and to prevent future violent conflicts in the region.

The purpose of the essay is to investigate whether the principles formulated by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, concerning strategic non-violent conflicts, can serve a purpose when analyzing improvised non-violent conflicts. The principles are derived from factors that have been prominent in earlier successful improvised non-violent conflicts. The essay is based on two research questions; if the factors included in the principles formulated by Ackerman and Kruegler, exist in the two cases that this study investigates, and if those principles offer a satisfactory explanation for the outcome of an improvised non-violent conflict. To answer the questions the study uses a comparative method, where the improvised non-violent conflict of 2004 in Ukraine is compared to the improvised non-violent conflict of 1988 in Burma. The answer to the first question shows that the factors contained in the principles previously mentioned, exists in both cases. The answer to the second question is more uncertain, as there seems to be doubts on whether the case of Ukraine really was completely improvised. Another reason for caution is that the factors contained in the principles, only consider actions made by non-violent actors, and not by opponents or third parties. Thus the risks of missing vital explanatory factors are substantial.

The women and peace hypothesis suggests that women are more likely than men to choose peace and compromise over violent conflict, whether as ordinary citizens or as government leaders. I test this concept by analyzing the percent of women in the parliaments and executive cabinets of 93 nations over a 31-year-period, comparing these figures to the presence of violent interstate conflicts for each country-year. Controlling for wealth, democratic status, national capabilities, military expenditures, and contiguity, I find moderate support for the women and peace hypothesis. This support continues when democratic system type is interacted with the measured office. While women do not affect a nation’s likelihood of violent conflict to the same degree that other, well-documented predictors do, the effect of women in higher office is nonetheless still significant.

acase@tulane.edu

The causes of violent conflicts in Ethiopia in general, and in Gambella in particular, are complex. Critically examining and explaining the causes entails going beyond labelling them solely in terms of one variable, such as 'ethnic conflict‘. The contestation of the study is that contemporary conflicts in Ethiopia have remained protracted, untransformed and recurring. This is largely because the past processes which gave rise to them were not properly taken into account and not properly comprehended, thereby giving rise to much superficiality in their explanations, inappropriate policies and a failure of efforts at apprehending them. The thesis identifies four major factors and two contrasting narratives which have framed the analysis of conflict complexity in Gambella. Qualitatively designed, the study focuses mainly on the structural causes of violent conflicts since 1991 and how their constituent elements were conceived and explained by different actors. First, asymmetrical centre-periphery relations entrenched in the state building processes of the imperial and military regimes, continued under the present regime rendering Gambella an object of extraction and repression. Consequently, competing claims of ownership of Gambella between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic groups evolved entailing shifting allegiances to the central government. Second, ethnic politics of the new social contract ushered in a new thinking of ‗each ethnic group for itself‘; it made ethnic federalism a means of consolidating the regime‘s political philosophy, depriving the local community of a genuine political representation, leading to broader, deeper and more serious violence. Third, land policy of the incumbent favoured its political party affiliates and foreign investors, thus inducing more violence. Finally, external dynamics impacted on internal conflict complexity. The study has argued that single factor approaches are inadequate to explain what has constituted violent conflicts in Gambella since 1991; it has concluded that internal conflicts are complex, and their constituent elements are conceived of, and explained, differently by the local peoples and different levels of government. Nevertheless, given commitment and a political will, the local and national governments, as well as peoples at grassroots level, have the capacity to transform the present, and to prevent future violent conflicts in the region.

no / This book is an invitation to reflect on the dangers that threaten the stability, security and world peace. The authors point to climate change, competition for natural resources, the gap between rich and poor and the proliferation of military technologies as factors capable of triggering violent conflict, civil unrest and destabilization of international order in the near future if immediate measures are not taken. From a rigorously researched analysis, then present strategies and sustainable alternatives to build a more cooperative, fair and conscious future. A book that promises to change the way you view the world.

Efforts to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the periods following violent conflict can have positive or negative impacts on peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, peacebuilding activities can both support or endanger efforts to place SALW under greater control. Despite the regular occurrence of SALW control and peacebuilding activities in the same time and space in post violent conflict contexts, there is insignificant analysis of how the two sets of activities interrelate, and how these interelationships can be strengthened to improve the contribution that SALW control efforts make to peacebuilding, and vice-versa. The effects of interrelationships over time (contingency); in the same geographic space (complementarity) and the effects of public perceptions and social construction are particularly important and provide a framework for establishing these interrelationships through analysing a wide universe of cases of SALW control attempted in countries emerging from violent conflict, five mini-cases studies and a major analysis of interrelationships in Kosovo.

There is much debate among genocide scholars as to the causes and even accurate definitions of genocide. Early warning developed to address the increasing need for humanitarian intervention in violent conflicts around the world. As a subset of genocide studies, early warning seeks to go beyond explaining the causes of genocide. The early warning model created here uses six indicator variables - government, leaders/elites, followers, non-followers/bystanders, outsider group, and environment - to detect the likelihood of genocide within a given case study. Four cases were chosen - Kenya, Nigeria, Yemen, and Ethiopia - and analyzed using the indicator variables to determine if these violent conflicts may already be or may become genocides. Preliminary findings show that the civilian outsider group is a vital component when determining whether or not a conflict is or may become a "limited-genocide" and that genocides are a function of the interaction of the six indicator variables and not just their presence. Other implications for sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are discussed.