<p>The purpose of the essay is to investigate whether the principles formulated by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, concerning strategic non-violent conflicts, can serve a purpose when analyzing improvised non-violent conflicts. The principles are derived from factors that have been prominent in earlier successful improvised non-violent conflicts.</p><p>The essay is based on two research questions; if the factors included in the principles formulated by Ackerman and Kruegler, exist in the two cases that this study investigates, and if those principles offer a satisfactory explanation for the outcome of an improvised non-violent conflict.</p><p>To answer the questions the study uses a comparative method, where the improvised non-violent conflict of 2004 in Ukraine is compared to the improvised non-violent conflict of 1988 in Burma.</p><p>The answer to the first question shows that the factors contained in the principles previously mentioned, exists in both cases. The answer to the second question is more uncertain, as there seems to be doubts on whether the case of Ukraine really was completely improvised. Another reason for caution is that the factors contained in the principles, only consider actions made by non-violent actors, and not by opponents or third parties. Thus the risks of missing vital explanatory factors are substantial.</p>

The concept of peacebuilding evokes the image of international interventions in countries emerging from civil wars. Despite the visibility of this engagement, post-civil war peacebuilding is just one form of peacebuilding. As a response to smaller scale violent conflicts, ongoing peacebuilding interrupts cycles of violence and prevents the escalation of violent conflict. The 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya captured international attention due to the scope and magnitude of the conflict. In 1992 and 1997, Kenya had experienced lower levels of electoral violence. The recurring and escalatory nature of violent conflict implies that peacebuilding should be a strategic response, earlier on, to prevent violence from reaching new levels. Since 2002, the Kenyan state has actively engaged in peacebuilding. This study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya deviates from the typical post-war interventions to analyse peacebuilding as an ongoing preventative response by national actors to intermittent violence. This thesis seeks to explain the impact of this state-led peacebuilding approach on the practice and prospect of peace. To do so, I first explore the multiple conceptions of peace held by those engaged in this approach to understand what type of peace is being built. Second, I analyse the paradox of the state in peacebuilding and how the role of the state has influenced the nature of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for peace. The state in peacebuilding presents a paradox because of the state’s direct and indirect involvement in violent conflict as well as the top-down nature of state engagement. Third, I interrogate the relationship between the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace. I find that state-led peacebuilding in Kenya has raised the profile of peacebuilding, improved the synergy between peacebuilding actors and increased the inflow of resources available to build peace. This positive influence is countered by the negative implications of the state’s role in promoting a reductive conceptualisation of peace and unsustainably institutionalising peace building. I conclude that, though the state has a role to play in peacebuilding, the contradictory implications of state-led peacebuilding challenge the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace.

The causes of violent conflicts in Ethiopia in general, and in Gambella in particular, are complex. Critically examining and explaining the causes entails going beyond labelling them solely in terms of one variable, such as 'ethnic conflict‘. The contestation of the study is that contemporary conflicts in Ethiopia have remained protracted, untransformed and recurring. This is largely because the past processes which gave rise to them were not properly taken into account and not properly comprehended, thereby giving rise to much superficiality in their explanations, inappropriate policies and a failure of efforts at apprehending them. The thesis identifies four major factors and two contrasting narratives which have framed the analysis of conflict complexity in Gambella. Qualitatively designed, the study focuses mainly on the structural causes of violent conflicts since 1991 and how their constituent elements were conceived and explained by different actors. First, asymmetrical centre-periphery relations entrenched in the state building processes of the imperial and military regimes, continued under the present regime rendering Gambella an object of extraction and repression. Consequently, competing claims of ownership of Gambella between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic groups evolved entailing shifting allegiances to the central government. Second, ethnic politics of the new social contract ushered in a new thinking of ‗each ethnic group for itself‘; it made ethnic federalism a means of consolidating the regime‘s political philosophy, depriving the local community of a genuine political representation, leading to broader, deeper and more serious violence. Third, land policy of the incumbent favoured its political party affiliates and foreign investors, thus inducing more violence. Finally, external dynamics impacted on internal conflict complexity. The study has argued that single factor approaches are inadequate to explain what has constituted violent conflicts in Gambella since 1991; it has concluded that internal conflicts are complex, and their constituent elements are conceived of, and explained, differently by the local peoples and different levels of government. Nevertheless, given commitment and a political will, the local and national governments, as well as peoples at grassroots level, have the capacity to transform the present, and to prevent future violent conflicts in the region.

The purpose of the essay is to investigate whether the principles formulated by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, concerning strategic non-violent conflicts, can serve a purpose when analyzing improvised non-violent conflicts. The principles are derived from factors that have been prominent in earlier successful improvised non-violent conflicts. The essay is based on two research questions; if the factors included in the principles formulated by Ackerman and Kruegler, exist in the two cases that this study investigates, and if those principles offer a satisfactory explanation for the outcome of an improvised non-violent conflict. To answer the questions the study uses a comparative method, where the improvised non-violent conflict of 2004 in Ukraine is compared to the improvised non-violent conflict of 1988 in Burma. The answer to the first question shows that the factors contained in the principles previously mentioned, exists in both cases. The answer to the second question is more uncertain, as there seems to be doubts on whether the case of Ukraine really was completely improvised. Another reason for caution is that the factors contained in the principles, only consider actions made by non-violent actors, and not by opponents or third parties. Thus the risks of missing vital explanatory factors are substantial.

The women and peace hypothesis suggests that women are more likely than men to choose peace and compromise over violent conflict, whether as ordinary citizens or as government leaders. I test this concept by analyzing the percent of women in the parliaments and executive cabinets of 93 nations over a 31-year-period, comparing these figures to the presence of violent interstate conflicts for each country-year. Controlling for wealth, democratic status, national capabilities, military expenditures, and contiguity, I find moderate support for the women and peace hypothesis. This support continues when democratic system type is interacted with the measured office. While women do not affect a nation’s likelihood of violent conflict to the same degree that other, well-documented predictors do, the effect of women in higher office is nonetheless still significant.

This thesis investigates the relationship between violent conflicts and sexual and reproductive health in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The aim of the thesis is to investigate how war affects demographic outcomes across individual life courses. The thesis contributes to the research field by linking macro level conflict data measuring the intensity and frequency of violent conflict with micro level data on women’s sexual and birth histories and infant deaths across time and place. The results show that war affects infants’ survival and women’s sexual and reproductive health and behavior. The first study finds an increase of premarital first sexual intercourse during the violent conflicts in Rwanda. The second study finds evidence of a delay in the fertility transition due to the Congolese war and the lingering conflicts in East DRC. The third study suggests that the Congolese war affects infant mortality, but only post-neonatal mortality. Despite consistent evidence that conflict affects the everyday life of women and children, the mechanisms that explain this relationship are largely unknown. This thesis identifies important gaps in the research that limit our understanding of the mechanisms at work. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Submitted.</p>

acase@tulane.edu

The causes of violent conflicts in Ethiopia in general, and in Gambella in particular, are complex. Critically examining and explaining the causes entails going beyond labelling them solely in terms of one variable, such as 'ethnic conflict‘. The contestation of the study is that contemporary conflicts in Ethiopia have remained protracted, untransformed and recurring. This is largely because the past processes which gave rise to them were not properly taken into account and not properly comprehended, thereby giving rise to much superficiality in their explanations, inappropriate policies and a failure of efforts at apprehending them. The thesis identifies four major factors and two contrasting narratives which have framed the analysis of conflict complexity in Gambella. Qualitatively designed, the study focuses mainly on the structural causes of violent conflicts since 1991 and how their constituent elements were conceived and explained by different actors. First, asymmetrical centre-periphery relations entrenched in the state building processes of the imperial and military regimes, continued under the present regime rendering Gambella an object of extraction and repression. Consequently, competing claims of ownership of Gambella between the Anywaa and the Nuer ethnic groups evolved entailing shifting allegiances to the central government. Second, ethnic politics of the new social contract ushered in a new thinking of ‗each ethnic group for itself‘; it made ethnic federalism a means of consolidating the regime‘s political philosophy, depriving the local community of a genuine political representation, leading to broader, deeper and more serious violence. Third, land policy of the incumbent favoured its political party affiliates and foreign investors, thus inducing more violence. Finally, external dynamics impacted on internal conflict complexity. The study has argued that single factor approaches are inadequate to explain what has constituted violent conflicts in Gambella since 1991; it has concluded that internal conflicts are complex, and their constituent elements are conceived of, and explained, differently by the local peoples and different levels of government. Nevertheless, given commitment and a political will, the local and national governments, as well as peoples at grassroots level, have the capacity to transform the present, and to prevent future violent conflicts in the region.

no / This book is an invitation to reflect on the dangers that threaten the stability, security and world peace. The authors point to climate change, competition for natural resources, the gap between rich and poor and the proliferation of military technologies as factors capable of triggering violent conflict, civil unrest and destabilization of international order in the near future if immediate measures are not taken. From a rigorously researched analysis, then present strategies and sustainable alternatives to build a more cooperative, fair and conscious future. A book that promises to change the way you view the world.

Outrages committed during violent conflict and as part of the 'war on terror' are not only an affront to human dignity -- they also violate the Geneva Conventions. This book examines recent high-profile cases of repeated and open abuse of the Conventions. The contributors explore why these and related violations of international humanitarian law cannot be viewed as anomalies, but must be regarded as part of a pattern which is set to undermine the Geneva Conventions as a whole. The contributors argue that an international system in which there is diminishing legal restraint on the use of force means that the world will become less secure and more volatile, even for those in the most powerful countries. Individuals everywhere face the prospect of a horrifying vulnerability. This is the first scholarly yet accessible work to consider the meanings of outrages such as the normalisation of torture, as well as the worrying new normative, technical and tactical developments that challenge the purpose and standing of the Geneva Conventions.